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OHAP~ER I 
I~ Tl ODUOTlON 
1. Statement of the Eroblem 
It is the purpose of this investigation to study a 
special aspect of the thought of the nineteenth century Ger-
rr~n philosopher, Hermann Lotze. What, according to him, is 
the true nature of the self? What relation does this bear 
to various common-sense notions as to its nature? Is the 
self knowable? Is it real? How is it related to the rest 
of reality. 
In order to give adequate considera tion to these 
questions it will be necessary to give attention to Lotze's 
work in its entirety. However, it will not be necessary 
to expound all aspects of that work. Considerations beyond 
Lotze's own immediate exposition of the topic under scrutiny 
will be brought in only as their relevance demands it. 
For reasons which will be made clear later, 1 special 
emphasis will be laid upon the relations between Lotze's 
view and the scientific theories which form a part of its 
foundation. In criticizing Lotze, a ccording ly, an endeavor 
will be made to give careful and detailed treatment to those 
scientific developments since Lotze's time which bear most 
1. See below, pp . 20 - 24, 174- 1 76 . 
directly upon the validity of his view. 
It would be interesting and worth-while to give equally 
detailed study both to the philosophical forebears of Lotze's 
view and to its philosophical results in terms of influence. 
However, such a group of projects lies beyond the scope of 
this investigation. Only general and incidental treatment 
can be given to any of the problems raised in these areas. 
The primary problem is to expound Lotze's conception of 
the self and to criticize it in the light of subsequent 
scientific developments. 
2. Method and Organization of the Investigation 
The general plan of the investigation itself--as dis-
tinguished from the exposition of its results--has been to 
give comprehensive coverage first to the available secondary 
sources and then to the primary sources. Sources in which 
a close relevance to the problem has been discovered have 
been examined with care. All others have been given a t 
lea st a cursory examination. 
The expository method to be followed will involve 
critical exposition followed by systematic evaluation. 
Lotze's view will be set forth in approximately the same 
order of topics wh ich he himself used to expound it. In-
cidental comment and criticism will be included, particu-
larly at points where ambiguity is apparent. However, 
full responsibility for evaluation will not be accepted 
until the exposition is complete . 
Because of this method of exposition, no attempt will 
be made in the beginning to anticipate and set forth all of 
the required definitions . They will be given as they be-
come relevant to the exposition. The term self, for example, 
will not be introduced until the evaluation stage because it 
was not Lotze's characteristic term. Soul, which was his 
characteristic term, will be used during the exposition , and 
its exact relation to the self will be indicated at the 
proper place . 2 
The presentation will be organized in five parts . The 
first will be preliminary to a direct attack upon the problem. 
It will endeavor to provide background for understanding the 
problem by sketching the broad outlines of Lotze's system 
and setting him in his proper place in the history of 
philosophy . The next three parts will expound in order 
Lotze ' s views of the body, the soul, and the relation be-
tween the two. The fifth part will attempt an evaluation . 
Each of the five parts will conclude with a summary, and the 
whole will be concluded with a general summary and declara-
tion of conclusions . 
2 . See below , pn. 222-226. 
3. The Literature Investigated 
A comprehensive list of all the literature investi-
gated is to be found in the bibliography, 3 however the most 
important sources for the investigation may well be mentioned 
here. ~he ~rimary sources are the works of Lotze. The 
following are the titles and publishing dates of his books 
and most important articles: 4 "Bemerbtngen fiber den Begriff 
des Raumes" ( 1841) ; ~ etaphysik ( 1841) ; Allgemeine Pathologie 
und Therapia als mechanische Naturwissenschaft (1842}; Logik 
(1843) ; "Herbarts Ontologie" (1843); "Leben, Lebenskraft" 
(1843); "Instinct" (1844); Ueber den Begriff dar SchBnheit 
(1845); "Seale und Seelenleben" (1846); Ueber Bedingungen 
dar KunstschBnheit (1847); Allgemeine Physiologie des 
kBrperlichen Lebens (1851); Medicinische Psychologie, oder 
Physiologie der Seale (1852); "Psychologische Untersuchungen" 
(1853); Ivdkrokosmus (1856-1864); Strei tschriften ( 1857); 
Geschichte dar Aesthetik in Deutschland (1868); System der 
Philosophie, Logik (1874), Metaphysik (1879}; '!De la Formation 
de la Notion de l' Espace" (1877}; "Alter und neuer Glaube 11 
(1879); "Anfilnge spiritistischer Conjecturalkritik'' (1879}; 
3. See below, pp. 258-285. 
4. Lotze's Latin dissertation (1838), his poems (1840), and 
other minor items of interest are omitted. All of the 
articles and the two early books on aesthetics are to 
be found inKS. (All symbols in footnote citations 
refer to the works of Lotze, unless otherwise indicated. ) 
1
'Philosophy in the Last Forty Yearstt ( 1880); 11 L I Infini 
Actual est-il Contradictoire?" (1880); "Die Prinoipien dar 
Ethik" (1882); Dictate aus den Vorlesungen Lotze's (8 vols., 
1881-1884) • 5 
From this list the items which are available in English 
translation are the Microcosmus (1885), the Logic (1884), 
the Metaphysic (1884), and all of the dictated outlines 
(1884-1887) save the Geschichte dar deutschen Philosophie 
seit Kant. These are Lotze's most mature genera l works. It 
is upon them that the exposition of his views will be 
chiefly based. His earlier works will sometimes be cited as 
corroborative evidence, but in general an effort will be 
made to find Lotze's latest word on every subject considered. 
The distinction between early and late works is not so im-
portant in Lotze's case as in some others, however, for his 
philosophical views matured early and did not subsequently 
undergo very radical change. 
The adequacy, and even the validity, of the posthumous 
outlines as representative of Lotze's thought has been 
widely challenged. These eipht volumes were edited by 
Lotze's colleague, Professor Rehnisch, from Lotze's notes 
and the notes of students. Most of the adverse criticism 
they have received seems to have stemmed originally from 
5. See KS, passim, Santayana, LSP, unnumbered pages at 
the end of the work, Nentscher, FL, 200-201. 
von Hartmann, and examination of his actual remarks 6 is 
needed in order to achieve a proper pers~ive in the matter. 
It is sug ~ested by von Hartmann, in the first place, that 
the circulation which the Lotzean outlines received in 
Germany proved nothing as to their value. It only proved 
the indolence of the public. Dictated notes are only a 
skeleton. They need the sinew, flesh, and skin of the lec-
tures to fill them out, or they remain very thin and dry. 
The publication of ~he outlines was superfluous after the 
a~pearance of two volumes of Lotze's system~ 
It is one thing to say that the outlines--considered 
by themselves--are inadequate to convey Lotze's teaching; 
it is quite another to say that they misrepresent Lotze. 
Strictly speaking, von Hartmann did not affirm the latter, 
although his words have often been interpreted to imply it. 
In any case, without ever directly contradicting von Hart-
mann, Ladd manages to convey a very different estimate of 
the value of the outlines. 7 He asserts that the outlines 
give Lotze's thought both as to substance and as to form 
of expression in a manner calculated to prove valuable to 
readers unable to cope with technical German philosophy. 
Considered on their own merits, the outlines may be 
judged to be a useful supplementary source without being 
6. See von Hartmann, LF, 12-13. 
7. ee Ladd's preface to OM, in OM, v-vi. 
6 
sufficien,tly rounded and detailed to stand on their own for 
serious study of Lotze.s 
If the question be raised, on the other hand, as to 
which is Lotze's greatest work, the opinion is almost unani-
mous. In writing on the one hundredth anniversary of Lotze's 
birth, Ziegler remarked that in speaking of Lotze one 
usually thinks of him first as the author of the Micro-
cosmus,9 his great "chief work~' as it was called by Kronen-
berg.10 It can scarcely be read without evoking both admira-
tion and enthusiasm. Although it has been called a "popular" 
work, the term is not to be understood in the contemporary 
American sense, for the book must certainly be counted among 
the greatest philosophical works of the nineteenth century.ll 
It is a wonderfully rich and inspiring treatmen~ of man and 
his place in the universe. It deserves a far wider reading 
today than it receives. 
The available secondary sources on Lotze are very 
numerous indeed. Apart from works on other subjects which 
8. Despite von artmann's hint that the outlines were 
widely circulated in Germany, Gilbert Jones of iV'ilber-
force, Ohio, who published his doctoral disserta tion 
at the university of Jena in 1909, remarked that the 
outlines were so nearly forgotten by that time that he 
was unable to obtain German originals, but had to rely 
on Professor Ladd's ~nglish translations. (See Jones, 
LUB, 7.) This suggestion is difi' icult to credit in 
view of the ready availability of the German originals 
in American libraries at the present time. 
9. Ziegler, Art.(l917), 161. 
10. Kronenberg, MP , 8. 
11. Cf., e.g., Anon., Rev.(l886-l}, 291. 
7 
j 
refer to Lotze, the bibliography includes the following 
number of Lotzean items: 73 books and 48 articles and re-
views in German, 10 books (including translations) and 36 
articles and reviews in English, and 3 books and 5 articles 
and reviews in Fr ench. lany of the~e are not relevant to 
the topic of this investigation, but they are all listed in 
the bibliography for the sake of completenes s . 1lliich of 
the secondary sources have been found most useful will be 
indicated in detail in the footnote citations. 
4. Previous ~Vork Relevant to the Problem 
A large proportion of the secondary sources deal with 
Lotze's conception of the soul at least in passing, and a 
considerable number give it extended treatment. However, 
only two works devoted entirely to it have been discovered 
in the course of this investigation. These are Lotze's 
metaphysischer Seelenbegriff (1890) by Kresto K. Krestoff 
and Kritische Bemerkungen zu Lotze's Seelenbegriff (1892) 
by J. H. Powers. 12 
The latter of these works is, as the title su~gests, 
a sli~ht volume. It consists primarily of a criticism of 
Lotze's view as set forth in the Medicinische Psychologie . 13 
Its scope is more restricted than th at of the present 
investigation, but there is one striking similarity of 
12. Doctoral dissertations at Leipzig and G~ttingen, 
respectively. 
13 . See Powers, KBLS, l. 
8 
intention between the two. Powers sought first to discover 
how successful Lotz e was in reconciling his conception of 
the soul with the psychological and physiological facts 
generally accepted at the time of the writing of the 
Medicinische Psychologie, and secondly to estimate the 
effect of the developments in physiological-psychology 
during the subsequent forty years . 14 He concluded both 
that Lotze had bad great difficulty in reconciling his 
theory with the facts in his own time and that the passing 
years had steadily aggravated those difficulties. 15 The 
basis for this judgment, however, was strikingly revealed 
when Powers also concluded that Lotze was \~ong in holding 
the soul to be, in the last analysis, more unified than the 
15 body . The advances in knowledP-'e to which l)owers referred 
were inferences from the vork of ,fundt and the developing 
structural ps chology. 16 Nearly sixty years more have now 
passed , and they have served to throw more doub t upon 
Powers's judgments than upon those of Lotze. 17 
The Krestoff work is more extensive than that of 
Powers, and more closely parallel in arrangement to the 
present investi~ation . In addition to an introduction and 
conclusion, it consists of a section on the soul, a section 
on the brain and the soul , and a section on the general 
problem of interaction which their relations raise. In 
14. Powers, lffiLS , 1. 
15. Powers, KBLS , 48-49. 
16. See Powers, KBLS, 47. 
17. See below, p. 222 , for 
an indication of Lotze's 
relation to structural 
psycho logy. 
9 
general, the exposition is sound, straightforward, and 
conservative. The expository emphasis finds much greater 
place than the critical, although the latter is not lacking. 
Criticism from the standpoint of science, however, finds 
little place in the work, for Krestoff was evidently less 
interested in science than Lotze. In fact, one of the chief 
shortcomings of the work is the lack of full understanding 
of or appreciation for Lotze's empiricism which it evinces.18 
18. See, e.g., Krestoff, LMS, 37, 41. 
1 ~ 
CHAPTER II 
LOTZE'S PLACE IN THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 
Before the central problem of this investigation is 
attacked directly, it is necessary to present a background 
for it. This will take the form of a very brief treatment 
of the following topics: Lotze's life and its setting in 
time and place; his philosophical method and the external 
characteristics of his work; his relation to earlier 
philosophical thinkers; the leading features of his system 
of philosophy; his influence upon subsequent thought; and 
a general estimate .of his importance as a philosopher. No 
one of these topics can receive specialized treatment, but 
a general understanding of them all in their relationships 
to each other is an important preliminary to the study 
herein projected. 
Although Lotze has -been called one of the greatest fig-
ures in the history of philosophy, 1 he has not been generally 
accorded so exalted a place. Nevertheless, he was held by 
his contemporaries in the deepest respect, and many regarded 
him as the leading philosopher of his own time. 2 During the 
past generation, however, he has been comparatively neglected, 
despite his importance. The reasons for this are various. 
1. 
2. 
See, e.g., Sommer, Art.(l88l-2)t 345. 
See. e.g., Wentscher, Art.(l916J, 146. Cf. below, 
pp. 44-45. 
11 
Several may be suggested, some of which will be considered 
more fully in other connections later. Lotze was never a 
disciple-maker, although he was a very influential teacher. 3 
He founded no school. He can hardly be said to have left 
any Lotzeans. Linked with this factor, a second may be 
mentioned. His whole system must be taken into considera-
tion, and it is not easily summarized or labeled. Further, 
his manner of exposition is sufficiently rambling and in-
volved as to discourage the reader, despite the fact that 
his language in itself is not difficult . Patience and sus-
tained concentration are required in order to sift Lotze's 
opinions from those he is expounding in order to refute 
them. Finally, it may be said that Lotze's philosophic, 
and even more his scientific milieu must be understood be-
4 fore his views can be. 
1. Lotze's Life 
hudolph5 Hermann Lotze's life was divided almast equal-
ly between the first and second halves of the nineteenth 
century. He was born on ay 21, 1817, at Bautzen in Saxony, 
but this was neither his family seat nor the place where he 
was to grow up. He came from a middle-class family which 
3. Hall, FMP, 69. 
4. See Kraushaar, LTK, ii-iii. 
5. In the latter part of his life the first given name was 
dropped and he was known simply as Hermann Lotze. 
12 
had been living at Dippoldiswald , a few miles south of 
Dresden, from at least the time of his great- grandfather . 
His grandfather, Johann Christian Lotze , was born there 
and lived out his life as a public official in the near-by 
village of Maxen. He lived until Hermann was seven years 
old but appears to have has little influence in the life of 
his grandson. The same is true of other relatives, for 
Hermann's father, Karl Friedrich Lotze, became a military 
doctor and was torn completely out of his petty bourgeois 
baokground by the turmoil of the Napoleonic period. 6 He was 
both wounded and decorated, and was twice a prisoner of the 
Russians. Hermann's mother, the only child of a school 
teacher, was well-educated herself and competent at educating 
her own children. Hermann was the third child, each having 
been born in a different plaoe as the family moved about. 
During the year 1818 they moved to Zittau, but this time to 
stay, and there Hermann gr ew up among relatively stable 
circumstances. His father died just before Hermann was 
twelve, and henceforward his mother and he made their home 
with his older sister. 
The schooling which he received in ' ittau, both at the 
elementary school and at the gymnasium, was unusually good . 
Although mathematics was neglected at the latter, the 
classical training was excellent, and Lotze was the best 
6. See Wentscher, HL, 3-4. 
13 
student in his class. 7 It was a very old school with an 
excellent faculty and a small number of students. The ex-
cellence of its educational advantages is sug~ested by the 
fact that it produced other famous men besides Lotze during 
8 the same period. 
The thoroughness of Lotze's classical training is in-
dicated when it is known that " twenty years later"--pre-
sumably for relaxation--•'he translated the Antigone of 
Sophocles into Latin in an elegant and authoritative 
9 
manner." He was a serious youth who expressed himself 
effectively, though without genius, through both poetry and 
prose fiction. A deep and perastent religious interest ran 
through this work. 
In April of 1834--shortly before his seventeenth birth-
day--Lotze went to the University of Leipzig, choosing this 
one because it was near-by. There he studied medicine and 
philosophy, receiving degrees in both in 1838. 10 The 
lectures he heard here from Christian H. Weisse influenced 
him greatly. It was a crucial time in philosophy, for 
idealism was under attack from materialistic science. Lotze 
endeavored to mediate between the two. 11 
After a year of medical practice in Zittau he was 
14 
7. Wentscher, HL, 22. 
8. ee Rehnisch, Art.(l881), 321-322. Cf. ventscher, HL, 5-7. 
9. Rehnisch, Art.(l881), 322. (Author's t r anslation.) 
10. Falckenberg, HL, 18-19. 
11. Wentscher, HL, 25-27. 
called back to the University as a lecturer, first in 
medicine, then in philosophy. Five years later, in 1844, 
he was called to the chair at G6ttingen vacated by the 
12 death of Herbart. Here he was to stay for the next 
thirty-seven years, virtually the whole of his long and 
fruitful teaching career. He had numerous opportunities to 
go elsewhere13 but he decided to remain in GOttingen. When 
Zeller and Helmholtz finally persuaded him to come to the 
University of Berlin in 1881, it was in part because his 
family circumstances had been changed by the death of his 
wife and the marriage of his sons. Only three months a£ter 
taking up his work in Berlin he died of pneumonia, on 
July 1, 1881. 14 
As far as personal appearance is concerned, Lotze has 
been described as small of stature, 15 and quaint and old-
fashioned in dress.l6 Photographs taken in mature life 
show a rugged face which, while lacking in beauty, is neither 
insensitive nor unattractive. 
Although he has been called brilliant as a lecturer, 17 
Lotze was never an eloquent nor widely popular teacher. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
ventscher, Art.(l916), 146. 
He had calls from Berlin, Bonn, and Leipzig during 
1866-1867 alone. See Hehnisch, Art.(l881), 336. 
See ~anst Art.(l910), 46; Hall, FMP, 67-68; Rehnisch, 
Art.(l881J, 336. 
Stumpf, Art.(l917), 4. 
Hall, FMP, 65. 
See Ueberweg, HP, II, 312. 
15 
His style of lecturing was pedestrian, and was even regarded 
by some as dull. 18 His classes were of moderate size, but 
his influence as a teacher was deep and widespread. Those 
who knew him well accounted him a person of peculiar charm. 
A spirit of great catholicity of tastes, he was widely 
recognized as one who knew no superior in breadth of culture 
in his own generation. In unique degree he combined the new 
science with the traditions of philosophy. Indeed, it has 
been asserted19 that despite his own attacks upon the tradi-
tional systems of philosophy and his influence in their 
demise, he was the only real standard-bearer of the old 
tradition who, during the last two-thirds of the nineteenth 
century, genuinely attempted to reconcile the fundamental 
standpoints of the idealistic systems with the method and 
findings of science. 
Although scientifically trained and tta recognized 
authority in three of the medical sciences," 20 Lotze was 
also the author of a very highly praised critical history of 
German aesthetics, and the possessor of "a veritable genius 
for the auiet enjoyment of art and nature." 20 It must be 
admitted that the keenness of his scientific interest was 
blunted slightly with the passing of the years, 21 but it was 
never lost. In his personal remembrances of Lotze, Julius 
19. See Kraushaar, LTK , 11. 21 . See Kraushaar, LTK, 36. 
20. Hall, FMP, 69. 
16 
Baumann says that his first impression of his former as-
sociate had been as a philosopher who knew his science 
thoroughly. 22 
Lotze's own personality illustrated in striking degree 
the balance and breadth to be found in his teachings. Very 
few men have succeeded in giving to their lives a more many-
sided expression, or a more rich and varied wealth of cul 
23 
ture. It has been said that he had hardly an enemy or 
ill-wisher in the whole world of science and letters, but on 
the contrary was spoken of with the highest respect by men 
of nearly all shades of opinion. 
In terms of outward happenings, Lotze's career was 
scarcely more eventful than Kant's . His domestic life was 
eKceptionally happy. Before leaving Zittau he had come to 
know Ferdinanda Hoffman, daughter of a pastor in the neigh-
boring village of Reibersdorf . 24 Their marriage was blessed 
with three sons, and their home life marked by a strong 
sense of family fellowship. His students were often in his 
home and appear to have found it a rewarding experience. 25 
22 . See Baumann, Art.(l909), 175. 
23. Hall, FMP , 70. 
24. See Falckenberg, HL , 19. 
25. Baumann mentions discussion with Lotze in the latter's 
garden at GBttingen. See Baumann , Art.(l909), 177 . 
An account of a_ conversation between Bowne and Lotze 
on the occasion of a visit by the former to the Lotze 
home is given in McConnell, BPB, 37. 
17 
2. Lotze's Method and Style 
The clue to Lotze's method in philosophy is to be found 
in his attitude toward idealism and realism. It has been 
said that he used a realistic method to construct an ideal-
istic s~ stem. 26 Lotze himself distinguished between the 
terms chiefly on the basis of method. Idealism, he said, 
solves the problem of the whole in the beginning, while 
realism comes to it only later. 27 In other words he re-
garded idealism as rationalistic in method, while raalism 
was empirical. Certainly Lotze cannot be accused of being 
insensitive to the claims of the whole, but he insisted that 
"the worth of a conception m~ be measured by its conformity 
with observed faots. n 28 He aimed always to be empirical and 
thus was very reluctant to identify himself as an idealist. 
He can be identified with the mediating school known as 
Idealrealismus in Germany. Ueberweg, a spokesman for the 
position, has set forth its leading tenets as the beliefs 
that the ideal expresses itself in the real, that essence is 
in appearance, that mechanism is a complex of laws through 
which purpose works, that human moral values are linked to 
the will of God.29 11 of these were acceptable to Lotze. 
26. Kraushaar, LTK, 58. 
27. See OLEP 162-163. 
28. IC, I, 313. Of. 267-273. 
29. See Ueberweg, Art.(l859), 77-78. 
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i. Lotze's Empirical Reference. 
In setting forth his own procedure in Book III of the 
Logic, Lotze indicates a philosophic method which may be 
described as synoptic, although he does not use the term. 
Analysis is not enough. "We no longer indulge the hope,'~ 
says Lotze, "that a mere dissection of the object presented 
can discover within it the principle of which we are in 
30 
search." On the contrary, experience has taught that 
general principles have to be discovered by the human in-
telligence "as the final outcome of a synthetic operation 
31 
of thought" which consists of combination and comparison 
of the manifold facts of experience. Both analysis and 
synthesis are necessary and they cannot be separated in 
the search for truth. 
Lotze's empiricism--and, at the same time, his objection 
to previous German idealism--is emphasized in a different 
way by his insistence upon the impossibility of any trans-
human standpoint in philosophy. Knowledge of absolute 
truth--"such as the archangels in heaven would have to 
accept" 32--is simply not available to man. Philosophy is 
"merely an inner movement of the human spirit, ••• an 
effort ••• to gain a consistent view of the world.n32 
30. LOG, 405. 
31. LOG, 406. 
32. MET, I, 219. 
19 
Inability to achieve absolute truth does not bring the work 
of philosophy to frustration. Any being which stands in re-
lation to anything beyond itselfoan never gain a view of the 
objects of its knowled e "as they would seem if it did not 
see them, but only as they seem if it sees them, and in 
relation to the seeing mind."33 Thus the complete subjectiv-
ity of human knowledge "can settle nothing as to its truth 
or untruth."33 The only ground for accepting one idea as 
true and another as untrue lies in the appeal to coherent 
interpretation. " We have to reject and alter all the 
notions ••• which cannot be maintained without contra" 
diction when our thoughts are systematized."33 The only 
truths which are accepted a priori are of the nature of 
working postulates which are always taken for granted--
whether acknowledged or not--by all thought. They are "the 
confidence of Reason in itself" and "the general truth that 
34 
there is a meaning in the world." 
Thus it is apparent that Lotze's method is empirical 
rather than rationalistic for he believes that philosophy 
should start, not from one or even a few general principles, 
but from the largest possible number of points of contact 
with the real world. His use of coherence as the test of 
truth is unforced, and conceived in the broadest terms of 
3 3 . ~, I, 220. 34. MET, I, 220-2 21. 
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systematic consistency. Despite his rejection of the 
speculative ideal of earlier German idealism he vigorously 
defends his revised interpretation of speculative method in 
philosophy. 
I hold that much reviled ideal of speculative intuition 
to be the supreme and not wholly unattainable goal of 
science, and @xpres~ • • • my hope that German 
philosophy will always arouse itself afresh with more 
of moderation and reserve, yet with no less enthusiasm, 
to the endeavor, not merely to calculate the course of 
the world, but to understand it.36 
ii. The Scope of Lotze's Empiricism. 
Lotze's empirical emphasis has been indicated, but his 
importance for the development of empirical method in phi-
losophy has not yet been adequately suggested. The history 
of philosophy gives dramatic indication that empiricism can 
mean very different things. What data are to be includad? 
nd which are most significant? Until these questions are 
answered, the bent of a given empiricism can hardly be 
known. How shall they be answered for Lotze? 
Clearly Lotze's was not an empiricism limited to sense 
data, or even to data which might be described as intellectu-
al in origin. Kronenberg remarks that Lotze's basic problem 
was that of mediation between the understanding and the 
heart. 37 And it is indeed characteristic of Lotze that he 
35. Of. Valentine, PLTA, 7. 
36. LOG, 530. This is the passage with which the work ends. 
37. Kronenberg, MP, 21. 
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feels called upon frequently, when proceeding with an 
argument which does not bring humane values directly into 
play, to pause in order to show that the argument is not in-
consistent with them. 38 For Lotze it is clearly true that 
the whole man, and not merely the intellectual element, is 
concerned with the search for truth. The "judgment accord-
39 ing to worth" may reject that which is otherwise thinkable 
if it does not accord ~th the demands of the heart. Krau-
shaar suggests that his motive and inspiration for philosophy 
come from a desire to construct a synthesis in which the 
aesthetic, moral, and religious demands of the mind may find 
adequate recognition and satisfaction. "Any s,ystem of 
thought that deeply offends the hopes and aspirations of the 
human spirit is ipso facto invalid." 40 
This matter is brought to sharpest focus in considerin~ 
the affirmation with which Lotze brings to a close both the 
earlier and the later of his two extended metaphysical dis-
cussions. 
When, now several decades since, I ventured on a still 
more imperfect attempt,41 I closed it with the dictum 
that the true beginning of Metaphysic lies in Ethics. 
I admit that the expression is not exact; but I still 
feel certain of being on the right track, when I seek 
in that which should be the ground of that which is.42 
In commenting upon this. word S.orley says that Lotze 
38. See, e.g., MIC, I, 344. 
39. See Valentine, PLTA, 40. 
40. Kraushaar, LTK, 46. 
41. The reference is to the Metaphysik of 1841. 
42. MET, II, 319. 
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does not, however, make this his own actual starting point . 
Instead he starts with interaction, and when his discussion 
is over he brings this idea in like an intuitive impression 
he has not been able to follow through. Therefore, its 
place in his system is uncertain. Doubtless Lotze meant more 
by his dictum than his own work strictly justifies. 43 
Is this Sorleyan judgment sound? Certainly it would 
not be allowed to pass by all of Lotze's commentators. Vida 
Moor~ for example, makes it the aim of her work44 to show 
not merely that Lotze's system is pervaded by his ethical 
views (scarcely distinguishable from his aesthetic ideas45 ), 
but also to show that his most characteristic metaphysical 
doctrines grow out of his ethical conceptions. .li thout them 
his speculative theory of the universe would lack both com-
pleteness and coherence. This same emphasis recurs in the 
conclusion of the same work, where the author affirms that 
"the Good, further defined as Personality," prescribes every 
tenet of his doctrine of the world, of man, and of God . 
"Thus in his own system is embodied Lotze's conviction that 
the beginning of metaphysics lies in ethics. n46 
Is the opposition in these two interpretations as deep 
and irreconcilable as it appears at first glance? The formal 
43. Sorley, MVIG, 3-5. 
44. Moore, EALM. See pg. 1. 
45. Ziegler says that "aesthetics always has the last wora 
with Lotze."- - Art .(l917) , 169. (Author's translation.) 
46. Moore, EALM, 101. Cf. Santayana, LSP, 52; Devaux, 
LIPA, 12. 
truth of Sorley's charge can hardly be doubted. Lotze does 
begin his exposition with interaction rather than with ethics. 
But there is a deeper sense in which the meaning of the term 
starting point may be interpreted. It may refer to the order 
of significance of the data considered rather than to their 
discursive priority. Sorley himself suggests a basis for 
partial reconciliation between the two interpretations when 
he sets forth the object of his own work, which is to build 
upon Lotze's dictum. After rejecting the notion that Lotze 
meant to suggest that reality must satisfy our wants, Sorley 
goes on to give his own interpretation of what Lotze did 
mean. 
It may be held that our final view of reality must be 
based on experience; that thi s experience must be 
taken in its whole range, and must not be arbitrarily 
limited to the data of perception which intelligence 
works up into science; that the appreciation of moral 
worth, or of value generally, is as true and immediate 
a part of our experience as the judgments of percep-
tion; and that it, as well as they, forms a part of 
the data of metaphysics. Further, it may be contended 
that, just as the data of sense-experience are found 
to manifest certain regularities from which "laws of 
nature,n as they are called, may be inferred, so also 
in our moral experience a certain law or order can be 
discovered, with a claim to be regarded as objective.47 
A critical study of Lotze's work will show that he did, 
in actuality, proceed on the line which Sorley suggests. 
Sorley is a legitimate successor in this method. Lotze was 
not able to carry out the program with the completeness and 
consistency which ~·oore suggests, but he did make a substantial 
47. Sorley, MVIG, 7. 
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start. One of his major contributions was a broadening of 
the meaning of empirical method in philosophy. 
iii. Lotze's Style. 
Moving from consideration of Lotze's philosophical 
method, properly speaking, to his method of exposition leads 
in the direction of stylistic considerations. Lotze has al-
ways been known as a mediating figure in philosophy. San-
tayana said of him that he was able to mediate between 
realism and phenomenalism, between positivism and idealism, 
between monism and pluralism, between pantheism and theism, 
between empiricism and rationalism, between optimism and 
pessimism, between socialism and individualism, and yet 
achieve a system freer from contradiction than most. 48 The 
reasons for this lie deeper than Lotze's irenic temperament, 
as will be shown later, 49 but that temperament was im-
/ 
portant in determining Lotze's approach to the problem of 
expounding his philosophy. 
Arbitrary rejection of any commonly-held view was not 
Lotze's way. He appears to have proceeded on the assumption 
that any widely-held view must have claims to validity which 
make it worthy of careful consideration. After consideration 
had been given, rejection for cause might follow; but his 
approach was always gentle and cautious. This point is 
48. Santayana, LSP, 5-6. 
49. See below, pp. 228-229. 
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rather amusingly illustrated when Lotze considers the ob-
jections to a plurality of original faculties in the soul 
which have been raised on the ground that such plurality is 
incompatible with the soul's unity. 50 "Peo-ple have become so 
much accustomed to regard this as the most decisive objection 
to the doctrine of the mental faculties," says Lotze, "that we 
almost hesitate to advocate an opposite opinion." 51 In the 
light of this tendency it is not surprising that Lotze's 
expositions are sometimes tiresomely demanding of sustained 
concentration. It is often no easy matter to be sure whether 
the view Lotze is setting forth is his own or one he is 
preparing to reject. 
Mith regard to Lotze's literary style itself there is 
striking difference of opinion. Santayana--himself one of 
the most admired stylists among modern philosophers--describes 
Lotze's style as "clear and exquisitely finished." 52 James, 
a stylist of no less standing, was e ually an admirer. 53 
Bosanquet, who edited the translation of Lotze's System of 
Philosophy, calls him a "p:reat writer."54 Falckenberg refers 
to the Strei tschriften as "beautiful, n 55 and clearly re-
garded Lotze as among the foremost German prose stylists. 56 
An anonymous reviewer of the Microcosmus said that Lotze 
50. See below, p. 105. 
51. MIC, I, 173. 
52. Santayana, LSP, 1. 
53. See below, pp. 39-41. 
54. Bosanquet, LOG, II, 23~. 
55. Falckenberg, Art.(l913), 
40. 
56. Falckenberg, HL, 13. 
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possessed "a r iah and aopious style" although he was short 
57 
of the preeision and clarity of Schopenhauer, and numerous 
others have given his style high praise--partiaularly when 
speaking of the Microcosmus.58 
This common opinion is by no means unanimous, however. 
Stanley Hall called his style monotonous and unattractive, 
because of sentenaes of undue length and difficulty. 59 Some 
critics of Lotze's System of Ehilosophy concur in the judg-
ment of monotony,6° one even suggesting that the English 
edition of the work "belongs to that small class of trans-
lations which are more readable than their origina.ls." 61 
In general it may be said that Lotze's style is clear 
and lacking in difficulty, save that already mentioned. 
Sentences and paragraphs are inordinately long--1000 word 
paragraphs being not uncommon in the Microcosmus. If the 
thread of the thought is lost it is often difficult to pick 
it up again without returning to its beginning, which is 
usually a long way back. The Microcosmus is the most diffi-
cult in this respect, and yet at the same time it makes much 
the most attractive reading to be found in those Lotzean 
works which are available in English. It has sparkle and 
57. Ch. Quar. Rev., 23,1887), 298. 
58. See, e.g., Sully, Rev.(l886), 418; Anon., Rev.(l886-l), 
292. 
59. Hall, FMP, 65. 
60. See, e.g., Knower, Art.(l933}, 382. 
61. Edgeworth, Rev.(l885), 100. 
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variety of appeal which make the Logic, Metaphzsic, and 
Outlines seem dull by comparison. Lotze's manner is 
generally sober and straightforward, but it is occasionally 
touched by humor. 62 
3. Lotze's Fhilosophical Forebears 
It is not possible here to consider Lotze's philosophic 
filiation in extensive detail, but a catalogue must be com-
piled of those who, directly or indirectly, influenced him 
most. ~everal instructive schematic representations of his 
debts to his predecessors have been put forward. Rehnisch 
suggested that Lotze mediated between, and to some extent 
synthesized, the views of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel on the 
63 
one hand and Herbart on the other. Again, Falckenberg 
suggested that Lotze offered a system combining the monad-
ology of Leibniz with the pantheism of Spinoza. 64 Some of 
the difficulties occasioned by this combination will be 
considered later. 65 Lotze acknowledged his debt to Leibniz 
but not to Spinoza. He certainly followed the latter in 
his emphasis upon an all-embracing principle, but there is 
62. For examples see MIO, I, 596, 627; II, 411, 486, 488, 
56~; ~' II, 137-138; KS, III, 479. 
63. See ehnisch, Art.(l881), 325-329. Eduard von Hart-
mann also put forward this suggestion, and many have 
concurred in its soundness. 
64. Falckenberg, ID!P, 608. Of. Thilly, HF, 495. 
65. See below, pp. 145-150. 
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occasionally did Lotze use Leibnizian terminology, but the 
genuineness of the latter's influence can har~ly be doubted. 73 
The Kantian influence upon Lotze is so apparent that 
the latter has sometimes been regarded from certain points 
of view as simply a Kantian. 74 In commenting upon the 
relationship, ~antayana suggests that it may be said in 
general that Lotz e softens the sharp outlines of the criti-
cal philosophy. "He represents the authority of reason as 
less limited in range, but at the same time as less authori-
tative in its wider sphere." 75 He does not regard the criti-
cal element in Kant as proving that things-in-themselves 
are unknowable. For example, "while maintaining the trans-
cendental ideality of space, [l.otzEi.} holds it nevertheless 
to be a representation of certain spaceless but real relations 
in the transcendent world. '' 76 
Lotze's formal relation to Hegel is chiefly one of re- -
volt. He was a persistent opponent of the "idealism" of 
which he regarded Hegel as the chief representative. 77 He 
renounced Hegelian method utterly and accused Hegel of 
logicism, formalism, and intellectualism. Nevertheless, 
Hegel influenced Lotze positively as well as negatively in 
very important respects. "From Hegel Lotze took the idea 
73. See Ueberweg, HP, II, 312; Thomas, LT- , xxx-xxxiii. 
74. See Stghlin fKLR, ix, 4) who so treats him from the 
standpoint of theory of cognition. 
75. Santayana, LSP, 62. 
76. Kraushaar, LTK, 16. 
77. ::>ee, e. g., MET, I, 119, 178, 204-206; 01', 126; OLEP, 
177-178. 
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that the world is a meani~gful unity, and made it the 
cornerstone of his system." 78 It may be added that Lotze 
failed to do justice to Hegel in failing to recognize the 
very important empirical aspect of the latter's actual 
method. 
Herbart was another opponent to whom Lotze owed much. 
Lotze appreciated the work of Herbart in turning German 
philosophy away from Hegelianism, but he was never a follower 
of Herbart79 and was quite right in denying the often-made 
80 
suggestion that he was a Herbartian. Nevertheless, Lotze 
was, again, influenced more than he himself realizert.81 
From one point of view Lotze's philosophy may be regarded 
as a substitute for Herbart's. "It is essentially different 
and better, yet springs from the same influences and answers 
the same demands." 82 Lotze's work made much more of an 
attempt to include the truth in Hegelianism. 
Of Weisse, Lotze's teacher at Leipzig, it suf fices 
to say that it was chiefly through him that the Hegelian 
influence was media ted. 
4. Lotze's System in Outline 
Lotze himself points out that he uses the term "system" 
in a more modest sense than his predecessors.83 In the 
78. Kraushaar, LTK, 25. 
79. Rehnisch, rt.£1881), 324. 
80. See GDPK, 99-100. 
81. Kraushaar, LTK, 35. 
82. Santayana, LSP, 84. 
83. LOG, ix. 
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light of what has already be en said, this remark wi! 11 have 
to be counted something of a polemic against Hegelianism. 
Certainly Lotz e must be regarded as a systematist of im-
portance even though systematizing does not represent his 
strongest bent. The dominating characteristic of Lotze's 
system in its final outcome is suggested by a remark made 
concerning it by lvaxsein: "Subjectivity is the native con-
dition of all actuality."84 But subjectivity implies pur-
pose and values. The names by which Lotze's system may most 
appropriately be designated are teleological or ethical 
idealism. It might, perhaps, even be called aesthetic 
idealism. 
In discussing Lotze's theory of reality, Thomas8 5 
distinguished three fundamental aspects in Lotze's concep-
tion. The first aspect involves the realm of universal laws 
which rule with binding force all that is real. The second 
realm--that of real substances and forces--presents itself 
not as necessary, but simply as existent in fact. In acting 
according to the laws it produces the manifold forms of 
phenomena. In the third place, there is a plan according to 
which the laws and substances of reality are brought to-
gether in order to realize a definite end. The existence of 
the world involves all, and "it is the unity of these three 
84. 
85. 
baxsein, Art . (1938), 460. 
See Thomas, LTR, 183-198. 
(Author's translation.) 
Cf. MET, I, 18-21. 
32 
in a perfect balance that is of worth or value, and vhich is 
86 
recognized by us as the Beautiful." 
There can be no perfect unity of content, law, and pur-
pose -in any given individual. It can be achieved perfectly 
only in the totality of the world. Lotze did not sink the 
world of individual spirits in the existence of God , how-
ever.87 The unity of the world is a product of God's will 
ffi 
rather t han an immanent development of his nature. God 
works in union with the plurality of souls which constitute 
the world external to God. "The highest principle in real-
ity is ••• that of the Divine Gcvernment." 89 The world of 
facts exists for the world of spirits. Whether or not the 
things of the world of nature have any being-for-self is a 
point which is ambiguous in Lotz e.90 They may have a cer-
tain consciousness of their own life but they do not have 
part in the world of values. 
God stands in intimate personal relations with finite 
spirits. He influences them "by giving them the vision of 
a more perfect moral order."91 For Lotze, the material 
world, thought, and purpose reveal reality in ascending 
86. Thomas, LTR, 184. 
87. See below, pp. 139-144, for a discussion of Lotze's 
monism. 
88. See below, pp. 239 -241. Cf. Thomas, LTR , 194. 
89. Thomas, LTR, 194. Cf . OPR, 95-113. 
90. See below, pp. 131-136, for a discussion of Lotze's 
panpsychism and occasionalism. 
91. Thomas, LTR, 196. 
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order. He was convinced that the moral and religious 
consciousness rules in reality. Therefore, the world has 
a depth of character and meaning which is hidden from every 
other side of man's nature. Unfortunately ethics and religion, 
which should have been the most significant part of Lotze's 
system, never received the systematic treatment they deserved 
at his hands. They, as well as aesthetics, were to have 
been dealt with in the third part of his System of Philosophy, 
but his premature death at the age of 64 cut him off before 
the project could be carried to fruition. Treatment is there-
fore confined to the relevant portions of the Microcosmus and 
three posthumous works, the sketchy Outlines of Practical 
Philosopgy and Outlines of Philosophy of Religion, and an 
92 
article on ethics. 
This brief sketch of Lotze's world view may best be 
supplemented by a series of affirmations each of which is 
characteristic of one aspect or another of his thought. He 
held firmly to epistemological dualism. 93 Materialism he 
regarded as impossible. 94 Yet it is also true that "Reality 
is richer than ~bought, nor can Thought make Reality after 
it.•• 95 He followed Kant on the subjectivity of space but 
not entirely on time. Before the publication of the 
Metaphysic he gave un the full subjectivity of time and 
92. See KS , III, 521-542. 
93. See IC, II, 604; LOG, 457; MET, I, 97-98. 
94. See PPS , 455. 
95. ET, I, 119. 
34 
moved to a more realistic view. Empty time is subjective, 
but succession or duration is rea1. 96 He affirmed the 
operation of mechanism in organic as well as in inorganic 
nature, and, indeed, held that it was necessary to the 
functioning of purpose in the world. 97 The reality of an 
individual soul is constituted by its paace in the world as 
a whole. 98 ''All that was precious in idealism" Lotze kept, 
"but kopt partly as a faith • • • partly as a series of 
inferences gradually reached by confronting these ideals with 
the data of everyday life.n99 
In endeavoring to reduce Lotze's position to summary 
100 form, Gilbert Jones suggested that Lotze is an idealist 
insofar as his first cause is an absolute spirit, a realist 
insofar as he says that this spirit is the ground of the real 
world, a teleologist in that worth and purpose find a place 
in the cosmic process as well as in life on ea.rth, and a 
mechanist inasmuch as he recognizes mechanical law in the 
organic as well as inorganic realms. The use in this way of 
the last of these four terms is highly questionable, and 
Lotze himself would not have allowed it. However, if the 
four terms are held in tension by being used together, 
96. 
97. 
98. 
99. 
100. 
See especially MET , I, 350-354. Cf. MIC I, 230-231; 
II, 709-713. Cf. also Falckenberg, Art.ll895), 209; 
Gooding, Art .(l881), 320; Turner, Art.(l919), 579. 
See obins, LTK, 11; Douglas, Rev.(l886), 70. 
KSi II, 198. Cf. H~ffding, ID~P, 523. 
Wa lace, NTE, 510. 
See Jones, LUB, 26-27. 
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they suggest rather neatly the characteristic emphases of 
Lotze's thought. 
5. Lotze's Philosophical Descendants 
Although Lotze's influence was very deep and widespread 
in his own time and for more than a generation afterwards, 
he did not wield influence in the same way that many other 
system bui~ders have done. He formed no school. ~en the 
term Lotzean, although it has found occasional use, 101 has 
never been widely current. As Lotze mediated between con-
flicting schools before his time, so he influenced divergent 
schools after it. By no means all who have felt his in-
fluence strongly are in basic agreement with his central 
teachings. 
It is a curious fact that Lotze's influence, though 
widespread in his own land and elsewhere on the continent 
of Europe, was perhaps widest of all in the English-speaking 
world. 102 Doubt has been expressed103 whether any other 
nineteenth century philosopher exerted a more formative in-
fluence on American philosophy during the first quarter of 
the twentieth century than did Lotze. Besides being the 
"grand patriarch" of the philosophy of value, he exerted a 
noteworthy influence on American pragmatism throu h both 
101. E.g., Julius Baumann, in his personal remembrance~ of 
Lotze, described Max VVentscher as a Lotzean. See 
Baumann, Art.(l909), 175. 
102. Cf. Devaux, LIPA. 
103. See Kraushaar, LTK , viii-ix. 
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James and Dewey, and on American idealism through Ladd, Royce , 
Bowne, and others. In addition, he left the stamp of his 
thought upon British idealism, especially on Green, Bosan-
quet, and Bradley. In his own land his influence was felt 
on neo-Kantianism and phenomenalism. His work provoked 
study and commentary in Italy, Sweden, and France. 
fithin the scope of the present review it is hardly pos-
sible to give more than a mere catalogue of the names of those 
who have been most influenced by Lotze. Accordingly , such a 
catalogue is offered as a preliminary to some final remarks 
about certain specially interesting lines of influence. In 
addition to those already named, all of the following may be 
taken to have felt the influence of Lotze in one way or an-
other, although the relations of their various positions to 
that of Lotze differ markedly: Adamson, Alexander, Balfour , 
Bergson, Bostr~m , Brightman, Busse, Caspari, Conybeare, Dilthey, 
Dri esch, Duval, Erdmann, Eucken, Fraser, Helmholtz, Husserl, 
Knudson, Korsch , Laird , Lask, C. I. Lewis, Mackenzie, Mivart, 
. 
G. E. Moore , Nettleship, Nunn, Peipers, Pfleiderer, Pringle-
Pattison, ashdall, Rehnisch, Ribot, Rickert, W. Riley, Ritschl, 
Santayana, Schiller, Sorley, Varisco, fard, C. c. J. ~7ebb , 
fuitehead, fuitney, Wilson, indelband, vundt, Zeller. 104 
This list is, of course, by no means exhaustive. In the 
104. See Devaux, LIPA, 23-38; Knower, Art .(l933), 397-398; 
Knudson, PP, 62-63; Schoenf MHL, 12-16; Thomas, LTR, 
204-205; ZBller, Art.(l889J, 108. 
nature of the case no such list could be compiled. But this 
one does su~gest the breadth of Lotz e's influence. 
Bergson's dependence upon Lotze has not been widely 
noted, and, indeed, it cannot be certainly affirmed. All 
that can be said is--as Stanley Hall has pointed out105--
that Bergson "consciously or unconsciously" followed many 
similar lines. Hall affirmed that Lotze's philosophy, even 
more strongly than Bergson's , was marked by an attempt to 
mediate between the scientific and poetic views of reality, 
and to prevent the encroachment of either upon the other. 
Alternation between the two is not enough. The human spirit 
can e made whole only when the two interpenetrate each 
other. The kinship of this to the anti-intellectualism of 
Bergson has also been indicated by Thomas Kelly . 106 
Another who, on the basis of his mature work, has not 
generally been associated with Lotze is Santayana. Yet when 
Santayana did his doctoral dissertation107 on Lotze he was 
most sympathetic to Lotze's conclusions. In considering 
Lotze's arguments for idealism he endeavors to destroy the 
arguments themselves but does not disagree with the conclu-
sion. "They advocate a congenial and probable opinion but 
as arguments they are inconclusive. "108 He subsequently 
indicates that he thinks the true foundations of Lotze's 
105. See Hall, Fll.P, 74-75. 
106. See Kelly, Art.(l93l), 442-443 . 
107. See Santayana, LSP. 
108. Santayana, LSP, 180-181. 
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system are to be found in the demands of the ethical and 
109 
religious imagination rather than in critical arguments. 
antayana commits himself even more definitely when, after 
praising very highly both Lotze and the beauty, sublety, and 
value of his conceptions, he says that "as a formulation of 
the life of nature monism, tempered by indeterminism and 
moralized by an efficient teleology leaves little to be 
desired.''llO It is instructive to note, incidentally, that 
111 Santayana frequently refers to Lotze's system as a 
naturalism. 
The direct influence of Lotze on James is both more 
obvious and better known. In the end James certainly re-
jected emphatically the monistic idealism which he attributed 
to Lotze, 112 but it probably would be no exaggeration to say 
that Lotze had no more enthusiastic admirer than James. The 
edicinische Psychologie, the Microcosmus, and the etapbysic 
made a deep impression upon James's alert and receptive mind 
during its most formative period. It is impossible to doubt 
that Lotze exerted upon James an influence both deep and 
widespread, although the lines of that influence are diffi-
. 113 
cult to determine prec1sely. fuen, during the 1880's, 
James was arguing for the idealistic hypothesis as against 
109. Santayana, LSP, 194. 
110. Santayana, LSP, 262. 
111. See, e.g., Santayana, LSP, 8, 313; and Art.(l890), 210. 
112. Cf. Kraushaar, Art. (1936), 247; Perry, TC WJ, II, 584. 
113. Kraushaar, Art.(l936), 236-238. 
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materialistic raalism, 114 he depended heavily upon Lotze for 
his argument. Later his own emphasis changed, but the 
Lotzean influence did not disappear. 
It was Lotze's combination of empiricism with construe-
tiva power which James specially admired. He shared with 
Lotze the conviction that feeling and will are more funda-
mental than ratiocination. 115 He was heavily influenced by 
Lotze in his theory of emotions, and many aspects of his 
account of the self hark back to Lotze. He once wrote thus 
to stanley Hall: ''It gratified and at the same time dis-
gusted me to see how many choice pages of my everlasting 
t d b L t "116 psychology had been an icipate y o ze. 
The great respect in which James held Lotze is evident 
not only in frequent mention of his name and reference to 
his works, but also in the numerous very flattering descrip-
tions he sets forth. 117 He onca referred to rythe ripeness, 
repose and perfect menta.l digestion of Lotze, who abhorred 
every flavor of rococo, eclecticism or e~sragance of 
expression."118 In the same latter to Hall referred to 
above, he called Lotze "the most delectable, certainly, of 
all Garman wri tars--a pure genius. " 119 The very next month 
114. Sea Parry, TCv'IJ, I, 577. 
115. Cf. Kraushaar, Art.(l936), 254. 
116. The letter was dated September 3, 1879. Sea Parry, 
TCviJ, II, 16. Cf. Kraushaar, Art.(l936), 247-249, 255. 
117. Cf. Kr aush1:.1.ar, Art. ( 1936) , 238. 
118. Parry, TCWJ, II, 109. 
119. Perry, TC1iJ, II, 16. 
40 
James wrote again to Hall, who was in Germany at the time, 
and defended Lotze against certain very sharp strictures 
Which Hall had set forth in a letter appearing meanwhile 
in The Nation. 120 James said in part: 
I must say I feel rather more kindly than you to 
(j:.otze' s) type of man. He keeps flying the standard 
of a rounded mental character, the very notion of 
which would be forgotten if the laboratory black-
guards all had their way.l21 
It is interesting to note that Hall's mature attitude toward 
Lotze122 was very much more favorable than that expressed in 
the .Nation letter. It is a plausible conjecture that his 
earlier attitude arose to some extent from irritation in 
finding that Lotze was not an experimental psychologist, as 
11 f h . t d t d •t• . 123 we as rom 1s own en ency owar pos1 1v1sm. In 
addition to the laudatory references already cited, James 
called Lotze both the ndeepest philosopher" of the day124 
and "the most exquisite of contemporary minds ."125 
The man who did most in America to perpetuate and de-
velop Lotze's views in the immediate field of the present 
investigation was Bowne . He came under the direct influence 
of Lotze while studying in Germany in 1873-1875, and his 
120. See The Nation, 29(1879), 189-190. 
121. This letter was dated October 10, 1879. See Perry, 
TCWJ, II, 17. 
122. As reflected in~~, published in 1912. 
123. See below, p. 175. 
124. See Perry, TC ~iJ, I, 577. 
125. This phrase was used in a letter to Howison, who was 
visiting Germany soon after Lotze's death. The date 
of the letter was September 30, 1881. See Perry, 
TC-dJ, I, 766. 
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first Metaphys ics was dedicated n in grateful recollection 
to the memory of my ftiend and former teacher, Hermann 
L t nl26 o ze. ~he regard was mutual, for Lotze paid high tri-
bute to ~owne 's work and was eager to have him remain in 
GBttingen in order to take a doctorate. Bowne was , however, 
127 
unable to afford the time and expense involved. 
In endeavoring to appraise the extent and nature of 
Bowne's dependence upon Lotze , it is well to begin with the 
former's own words on the subject. In the preface to the 
first Metaphysics he giv es account of his own philosophic 
filiation thus: 
Leibnitz furnishes the starting-point, Herbart sup~lies 
the method, and the conclusions reached are essentially 
those of Lotze. I have reached them, for the most 
part, by strictly independent reflection; but, so far 
as their character is concerned, there would be ro 
great misrepresentation in calling them Lotzaan. 28 
Much later, in a letter dated ay, 31, 1909, Bowne wrote 
that he could not "well be called a disciple of anyone. I 
largely agree with Lotze, but I transcend him. n 129 
McConnell suegeststhat the most obvious difference be-
Wween them lies in Lotze's ?reater stress u~on system as 
against Bowne's greater, and increasing, emphasis upon the 
self. 13° Carrying the point further, Knudson suggests that 
126. Bowne, MET -1, iii. 
127. McConnell , B~B , 37. 
128. Bowne, MET -1, vii. He had earlier acknowledged 
"general obligation" to Lotze in the preface to ST . 
See Bowne , ST , vi. 
129. Knudson , PP , 16. 
130. cConne11, BPB, 115. 
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the insight that reality and personality are identical under-
lias Lotze's philosophy, but he did not make it the organiz-
ing principle of his system. The task of doing so fell to 
Bowne .l31 
6. Lotze 's Reputation 
In the course of t~ general review of Lotze's place in 
the history of philosophy considerable incidental comment 
has al~eady been made in estimation of the significance of 
his career. It is now time to draw together and supplement 
these sug gestions . 
There have been those who unreservedly have classified 
Lotze among the greatest philosophers of all time. 132 This, 
in itself, is not particularly surprising, or even impressive, 
for many men of far less philosophical moment that Lotze 
have had their extreme partisans. But what is most suggestive 
about Lotze's reputation is the high and almost universal 
respect in which he is held by those who oppose him, or at 
least criticize him strongly. For example, those who reject 
his system as an unsuccessful attack upon the absolute 
idealism which they are concerned to defend, 133 yet pay him 
131. Knudson, PP , 85. Cf. 433 -434. Cf. also Jones, LUB, 
106. 
132. See, e.g., Sommer, Art.(l881-2) , 345 ; Stumpf, Art .(l917), 
w. . 
133. Henry Jones (See Art.(l89~ and CAPL.) and A. Eastwood 
may be taken as examples. 
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the respect of regarding him as a formidable opponent. 
Eastwood even goes so far as to say: 
It may be fairly claimed that, in pure philosophy, 
(Jjotz~ is the last in the field; he has pronounced 
his verdict upon all the most important problems of 
speculation; and so wide is the respect he commands 
that, as long as his words are allowed to remain the 
last, they vnll continue to gain acceptance as final.l34 
Although Dewey differs basically from Lotze in his in-
terpretation of experience, as well as in other matt~rs, he 
calls Lotze "one of the most vigorous 13nd acute of modern 
logioians."135 Stanley Hall, who in his younger days--as 
has been shown136 ~-conducted a rather vicious attack upon 
Lotze's anti-positivism, at the same time called Lotze "by 
far the most revered and influential of all living teachers 
of philosophy" in Germany and "one of the noblest living 
humanists."137 He went on to say that Lotze's opinions 
"are among the sanest and healthiest in the history of 
philosophy since ~ ristotle."137 And ma;ny other highly 
respectful opponents could be cited. 138 
During the last years of his life and the period which 
followed his death, Lotze was almost universally re~arded 
as the greatest philosopher of his period in Germany, and 
perhaps in the whole world. In the light of contemporary, 
134. 
135. 
136. 
137. 
138. 
Eastwood, Art.(l892), 306. 
Dewey, EEL, 105. See also 107-lll, 116, 129. 
See Hall, Art.(l879), 190. Of. above, 
Hall, ~rt.(l879), 189. 
See, e.g., Mivart, Art. (1887), 696; Ribot, GPT, 68-95 
(and the preface by James McCosh in the s~ne volume}; 
Simon, Art.(l896), 300. 
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near-contemporary, and more recent criticism of Lotze this 
judgment seems a cautious one. 139 The fact that it was 
Lotze's place to keep the light of philosophy burning during 
a period comparatively dark for the discipline makes most 
critics hesitate to extend his primacy beyond his own time. 
The reasons why his direct and recognizable influence 
has waned with such comparative rapidity in the last genera-
tion may be sug ested again briefly. 140 His mediating method 
avoided the kind of striking, controversy~raising expression 
which helps to fix attention. Secondly, he failed--perhaps 
for this reason--to develop disciples who were bound to him 
by ties of rabid partisanship. Finally, althour.h Lotze 
attacked absolute idealism, he was still an idealist, and 
idealism has continued to have difficult going since his 
day. If the contemporary revival of idealism, stemming from 
many sources, continues to develop, will Lotze's influence be 
revived? In the broadest sense, yes; but, in his own name, 
probably not very much. Lotze 's ideas have proved to be of 
such kind that they can r eadily be carried forward, applied, 
139. In addition to the references already given, the follo~­
ing involve definite commitment to this position : 
Anon., Rev .(l885-2)~ 789; Anon., ev.(l886-l)~ 291-292; 
HBffding, Art .(l888J, 422; Lindsay, Art .(l876J, 363; 
Perry in ffiter, HP, 519; wentscher , Art .(l916), 146. 
The following strongly imply the same judgment while 
failing to commit themselves to it unambiguously: 
Achelis, Pxt.(l882}, 1-2; Anon., Rev.(l884-l), 752; 
Douglas, Rev.(l886), 65; Franquiz, BPB, 73-74; Gooding, 
Art.(l881), 330 ; Knudson , PP, 62-63. 
140. Of . above, pp . 11-12. 
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and re - stated wh~le their origin is forgotten. 
7. Summary 
This chapter is an a t tempt to give a general intro-
duction to the philosophy of Lotze , and to set it in its 
proper relations historically . 
After schooling in Zittau, his boyhood home, Lotze 
received his university training in medicine and philosophy 
at Leipzig. He practiced medicine for a year, and then was 
called back to the University as a lecturer. After five 
years he was called to GBttingen as Herbartts successor. 
There he was to teach for 37 years, moving to Berlin just 
three months before his death . He was a deeply influential, 
though not widely popular , teacher . He succeeded in unique 
degree in combining the new science with the traditions of 
philosophy. 
Lotze's work was empirical . He used synoptic method 
without calling it by that name , and made a very important 
contribution to the broadening of empirical method in 
philosophy by insisting that philosophy should be a coherent 
interpretation of all experience, not merely of sense data. 
Moral and religious experience not only must be taken into 
account, but they give the deepest insight into the nature 
of reality . 
Although there is no unanimity on the subject, the 
consensus of opinion is that Lotze was an excellent stylist . 
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His method of exposition, however , often involved tiresomely 
extended exposition of vie ws other than his own . 
In his philosophical opinions Lotze drew influence from 
many different sources prior to his time . It has been vari-
ously suggested that Lotze synthesized Hegel and Herbart , or 
Leibniz and Spinoza, or combined elements from Leibniz, 
Berkeley, and Kant . Others, from the time of Pla to on down, 
influenced him, but those whose influence was most deeply 
felt were Leibniz, Kant, Hegel , Herbart, and feisse. 
All reality, for Lotze , consists of God and a plurality 
of finite souls which he creates , maintains, unifies, a nd 
governs . At the highest lev el this government is achieved 
through the influence of moral ideals communicated by God to 
men. The status of things in Lotze's system is ambiguous . 
They may have a measure of self-conscious independence of 
God, or they may simply be parts of his activity, but they 
do not belong to the spiritual realm as independent. 
The company of those influenced by Lotze is very numer -
ous, and is divided among widely differing schools of thought . 
In America those who have mediated Lotze's influence most 
significantly have been James, Dewey, Ladd, Royce, and 
Bowne . 
There h ave been a few who have rega rded Lotze as one of 
the outstanding philosonhers of all time. lYt ore impressive 
than this, however, is the universality of deep respect in 
which he was held by his contemporaries, friend and foe 
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alike. It would hardly exaggerate the situation to say that 
at the time of his death he waa generally regarded as the 
leading philosopher of his period. 
During the last generation , however, his influence has 
declined sharply. Among the many reasons for this the 
following may be mentioned: he was a mediator rather than 
a striking innovator; though widely influential, he formed 
no school of disciples; his manner of exposition presents 
some discouraging difficulties; the twentieth century decline 
of idealism has affected him alonr with other idealists. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE BODY 
Lotze suggests1 that it is easy for modern man to look 
back with envy upon the primitive age of the race. Mankind 
in its youth, we fancy, brought nature and mind into an easy 
accord that we can no longer achieve. However, when we 
examine more closely the work of the primitive mythologies 
we find that they fell short of their seaming promise. They 
never truly succeeded in animating the world of things; they 
merely conjured up beside it a second world in which visions 
of the blissful freedom of celestial life stood out in sharp 
contrast against the dark background of real life. But this 
background must be firmly grasped in any satisfying synthesis. 
Man's attempts to attain that firm grasp have been 
various. As long as the investigation of nature started with 
a single principle of life and sought in it a sufficient 
explanation for the development of an organism, it had little 
2 
chance for success. It was necessary to turn to the activ~ 
ities of the smallest parts of an organism and study the 
Whole as the combined activity of countless constituents. 
This led eventually to the application of mechanical physi-
cal science to the Whole domain of nature, a move which, 
1. See MIC, I, Bk. I, Chap. I. 
2. MIC, I, 22. Of. ~. II, 133-134. 
for all its disquieting effect upon the mind, pro~ed a great 
advantage to investigation. In place of a vital impulse 
expressing itself through changing energies in accordance 
with a plan was put a group of simple and indestructible 
forces performing in accordance with general laws. The unity 
of the animating power of nature was thus broken into an in-
definite multitude of elemental forces, but the question as 
to the origin of the existing combinations was left open. 
Often its origin was ascribed to a chance for which no 
special reasons could be found, but the possibility of 
referring it to the wisdom of a divine spirit was not ex-
cluded.3 
Many of the battles of the scientific approach to 
nature had been won before Lotze's day, but he was one of 
its chief defenders in some of the battles current during 
the middle of the Nineteenth Century. As an opponent of the 
vital force theory in biology he was so unrelenting4 and as 
an advocate of the mechanical conception of nature he was so 
eager5 that his true position was often misunderstood. He 
was repeatedly mistaken for a materialist both by friends 
and by enemies of that position. 6 At no stage of his oareer 
did his writings justify this misunderstanding, 7 but in his 
3. ET, II, 134-135. 
4. APT, 19-25; KS, I, 203. 
5. APKL, 36-48; PPS, 145. Consider the title of APT. 
6. See v. oore, EALM, 43. 
7. See, e.g., KS, I, 220; MPPS, 455. 
mature works he felt called upon to compensate for his early 
emphasis upon mechanism by emphasizing its subordinate 
significance. 8 
1. Nature as Mechanical 
It is not the assumption of interconnection which is 
the distinguishing characteristic of the mechanical attitude 
of science. Every age and system of thought has conceived 
of some necessary connection among things, even when the 
oonneotion appealed to has been incomprehensible. The very 
incantations of primitive magio implied a connection w ioh 
would make possible the desired effect. It is, rather, a 
conception as to the origin and me ning of necessary con-
nection that gives mechanical science its distinctive 
character. The connections occur according to law, that is, 
they are intelligible and repeatable. Not only so, but the 
law is universal. It embraces everything. "Each actual 
form of existence is not supposed to evolve state out of 
state according to a law peculiar to itself."9 The various 
spheres of phenomena do not rest upon special predispositions, 
but upon a common universal necessity. This is the 
8. This point is explicitly made in his introduction to 
Microcosmus, where he indicates he will endeavor to show 
"how absolute!~ universal is the extent and at the same 
time how compl&tely subordinate the significance, of the 
mission which mechanism has to fulfil in the structure 
of the world."--MIC, I, xvi. 
9 • MI C , I , 2 7. 
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foundation of the mechanical view of nature. 
There is an additional feature which characterizes the 
essential spirit of the mechanical view of nature: care in 
determining precisely the causes by which the effects under 
consideration are produced. To be sure, this care has not 
always been exercised in praotioe, but the striking advances 
in modern science have accrued only when it has. The searoh 
begins in looking for individual oauees but it cannot stop 
short of the discovery of the starting-pointe of all effects 
--something simple, unohan~le, and calculable behind the 
heterogen ous course of nature. In the actual course of 
developi~ science, the eearoh for these unchanging elements 
soon brought the conviotion that they were wholly beyond the 
direot reach of sense perception. EVidence accumulated that 
there was heterogeneity and constant ohange, fission and 
re-combination where the assisted senses could make out 
nothing but uniform and inwardly motionless existenoe. 
Hence it was necessary to develop the atomio theory to 
aooount for what was going on in a region inaccessible to 
perception. 10 Microscopic investigation suggested this 
line of development for, although it could not reach atoms, 
it had again and again resolved the apparently homogeneous 
into the multifarious. Nor were the atomio speculations of 
the ancients entirely without their influence, for some of 
10. OM, 110-112. 
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the considerations which guided them have retained undimin-
ished force. 
Lotze, like other philosophers of his day, accepted the 
atomic theory at a value which it began to lose a generation 
later, with the experimental confirmation of the electron 
postulate and the discovery of the previously unobserved 
phenomenon of radioactivity. The existence of indestruct-
ible atoms of varying form and size is taken to be an un-
observable but preeminently suggestive fact. Accordingly, 
all changes in the course of nature stop at these smallest 
particles, which provide the unchanging starting points for 
all activity and changes in external relations. Prior 
questions as to the meaning and origin of these particles 
may be raised, but they lie outside the scope of science, 
for science is intent solely upon explanation of what goes 
on within the world of phenomena. It therefore has a 
right to stop with an ultimate fact which indicates a uni-
versal and irreversible trait of the world and throws light 
upon its central quest. 
The manner and terms of Lotze's acceptance of the atom-
ic theory, however, were extremely sound--so much so as to 
offer a remarkable preparation for the unforeseen develop-
ments to come. The atoms, for him)provided the fixed pointe 
for construction of phenomena not because of any absolute 
indestructibility on their part but "because the actual 
course of Nature yields no opportunities for their 
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dissolution. "ll Whatever higher conditions underlay the 
existence of the atoms could be left undetermined as far 
as the interpretation of nature was concerned, far in nature 
they never varied and therefore never needed to be re-
established. Thus no premature philosophical conclusions 
were built upon the presumed nature of the atom. It was 
confined to the status of a scientific postulate uncontradict-
ed by evidence. When the contradictory evidence was dis-
covered and the postulate had to be altered, the change did 
not work shattering effects upon Lotze's philosophic system 
because his approach had been sonnd. He acknowledged that 
whatever alterations in the conception of the atom the 
future might demand could be determined only on the basis of 
the relevant data, and he suggested that much remained in 
store for the future.12 
Whatever conception of the nature of atoms be used, 
the most essential requirement for the explanation of nature 
is to discover the way in which their activity is linked to 
11. 
12. 
MIC, I, 33. 
Indeed, a passage in Metap~sic (~, II, 89-91.) plain-
ly lays a philosophic foun~tian for the possibility of 
denial of conservation of mass. Lotze, of course, knew 
nothing of the transformation of mass into energy. He 
was careful to point out that he was not attacking the 
conservation of mass, a principle which would have to 
stand or fall on scientific evidence, but his meta-
physics clearly led him to doubt its permanence. 
Various other passages (See, e.g., OM, 112; MIC, II, 
137; ~.II, 47, 64.) show a remarkable compatibility 
between Lotze's outlook and subsequent developments in 
modern physics. ~ ee below, 176- 185. 
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definite laws. 13 Lotze points out that comprehension of 
this is what separates modern atomism so widely from that 
of the ancients. We are, he admits, in ignorance as to the 
inner natura of atoms, but whatever that nature may be it 
will never suffice to set anything in motion apart from 
its relation to other things. 14 The basis of this assertion 
is the law of inertia, whereby a body persists in its state 
of motion or rest subject to the exertion of a force from 
outside. 15 Among the various atoms soienoe assumes the kind 
of interconnection from which arises mutually exerted 
forces, as experimentally discovered. How this intercon-
nection oan be, it is not necessary for soienoe to try to 
say.16 Two things only need to be known, or assumed, about 
an atom. First, it cannot be considered by itself. It is 
always acting upon or being acted upon by another. 17 It is 
meaningless to try to say what its tendency is, except in 
respect to some other atom. In the second place, it always 
passes through every operation unaltered. Its relations 
may be altered, but it is unchanged. 
Lotze indicates that he is not disposed to push these 
dicta beyond the realm of the already observed. It is 
possible, he admits, that in departments in which investi-
gation is only beginning evidence may yet appear of a 
13. MIC, I, 36. 
14. ~. II, 21. Cf. Thomas, 
LTR, 61. 
15. ~. I, 363-364. 
16. MBT, I, 9-10. 
17. OM, 108. 
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progressive inner development by atoms.l8 But, inasmuch as 
experience has as yet made no suoh supposition necessary, 
it is fair to assume that, subject to possible limits, the 
tmmutability of elements must always hold good. He had no 
way of foreseeing how narrow the limits might become. In-
deed, it oan hardly be said that it oan be foreseen today, 
for the soope of mutability is being widened day by day. 
Yet the working hypothesis with which Lotze was dealing has 
been affected only at the margin. The oonstanoy of nature 
still tremendously overshadows its more dramatic mutability. 
Lotze said18 that it is not possible to oonoeive a structure 
of nature in whioh living speoies retain the same shapes 
and arrangements of their mutual relations in a course of 
events which presents alweys the· same main outlines while 
the elements themselves undergo constant ohange. That is 
very nearly true. The atomic theory, even in the form 
Lotze knew it, is still a useful working hypothesis. It 
no longer has the u~timate quality for science, however, 
whioh it onoe had. Scienoe has gone even furt~her beyond 
the range of sense perception in devising its hypotheses. 
The atom, still a useful oonoept, is now seen to be highly 
composite. What is ultimate among the composing parts the 
responsible scientists are not now prepared to say with 
finality. 
18. MIC, I, 40. 
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Along with the atomic hypothesis, as basic to the deter-
mination of occurring effects, Lotze puts the laws of motion. 
He emphasizes their purely relational character. Each force 
playing upon an atom acts independently of every other. This 
is not possible except on the assumption that no change takes 
place in the atom. If two persons, on the other hand, are 
bound together by mutual attraction and each enters into 
friendly relations with a third, it is not safe to assume 
that the first relation will be unaffected. Indeed, in many 
oases it will be profoundly altered--because of internal 
changes in the persons concerned. The laws of motion do not 
apply in the psychological realm precisely because persons 
are not unchanging atoms. However, the laws of motion are no 
less instructive in revealing a fundamental aspect of the 
actual constitution of the universe because they cannot be 
transferred to the sphere of the mental life. Their effec-
tiveness in one realm of nature does not require their un-
restricted application to every realm. 
In the mental life, strength of feeling, clearness of 
ideas, force of will seem to diminish in the absence of 
fresh stimuli. Thus it has been easy to assume that every 
force in nature is subject to gradual relaxation and ex-
haustion. The prinoi:Ple of inertia came as a surprising dis-
covery. 4ocordingly, in a natural organism it is necessary 
to refer all changes and developments partly to internal 
movements by which the relations of its own parts are 
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incessantly being modified and partly to changes in the way 
in which it is connected to the outside world. 19 Almost 
everything in nature that interests us moat will be found 
to belong to this variable region. Science must necessarily 
seek to investigate the region through the use of its prin-
ciples although those principles make no place either for an 
20 inner nature or for a true vitality. Science oertainly 
does destroy the image of life as the harmonious fulness of 
one being, for it disoloses its individual features as many 
separate conditions knowing nothing of one another. Organ-
isms no longer live in themselves, but a changing suooession 
of aotions is produced whioh we oall life without being able 
to explain how it is internally fused into one whole. 
Lotze does not suggest that this reproaoh--"of putting 
together externally as in a mosaic pattern that which seems 
to have value for us only as proceeding from a single 
oast" 21--should not be brought against science. However, 
he points out that the oharge has usually been made through 
modes of thought which have failed to produce results as 
indisputable and fruitful as those achieved by the meohan-
ioal science being attaoked. 22 There is reason to hope that 
the path of true knowledge is in following the method through 
19. MIC, I, 47. 
20. ~. I, 9-10. 
21. MIC, I, 48. 
22. Cf. MET, II, 138. Lotze understood clearly how logioally 
irrelevant but psychologically relevant considerations 
often influence philosophical thinking. 
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to the end, rather than in deviating from it. It is true 
that science obscures the unity of life; but, in regarding 
the simple elements with which it deals as lifeless points 
devoid of internal nature but externally ltnked by various 
forces, it is simply ridding itself of unnecessary asser-
tions.23 EXperience has taught that any internal states the 
atoms may have exert no modifying influence on the regularity 
of their working. If so, the internal states of things may 
be left out of acoount in phenomena without being banished 
from the universe. 
To move to a view more inolusive than the soientific24 
is, for Lotze, to bri~ internal states back to a plaoe of 
central importance26 for 
forces do not attaoh themselves to a lifeless inner 
nature of things, but must arise out of them, and ••• 
nothing can take plaoe between the individual elements 
until something has taken plaoe within them. All 
external incidents of union and separation must hence 
rest on or find their reflection in an inner life of 
things; and, even if physical soience breaks up the 
unity of oompound substances, eaoh single part of the 
mosaio whioh she puts instead ie a living point in-
wardly in a state of movemant.26 
23. Cf. Hall, FMP 73. 
24. c~. Thomas, LTR, xlvi-xlvii, 116. 
26. Here Lotze follows Leibniz. 
26. MIC, I, 49. 
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2. Vital Horae Rejected 
The manifestation of life has suoh & power over the 
imagination that it had, in Lotze's day, given great curren-
cy to the conception of a peouliar vital force. Against 
this conception the mechanical view of nature won its way 
but slowly. Lotze held that, however great the difference 
between the spheres of life and of inanimate existence may 
be, the two cannot be attributed to two different sets of 
laws and forces, for life evolves out of inanimate nature 
and returns again to it. As long as this connection holds, 
the realm of life cannot be set up as an alien sphere with 
other modes of action and whol~ dissimilar laws. Rather, 
life is characterized by a peculiar kind of connection into 
which its manifold parte are woven in suoh a way that their 
native forces give rise to a connected aeries of phenomena 
under the influence of external conditione and under the 
same general laws as the rest of nature. "Life must be de-
rived, not from some peouliar principle of action, but from 
a peculiar mode of utilising the principles which govern the 
Whole Physical world."27 Incompletely as we are at present 
able to explain the whole complexity of vital processes in 
this way, said Lotze, 28 we can already see that its main 
outline possesses ma~ advantages over the theories still 
27. ~. II, 137. Cf. KS, I, 198-203. 
28. MIC, I, 61. 
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opposed to it. 
The phenomenon of the corruption of the dead body has 
been seized upon as palpable evidence that nothing but a 
higher force during life keeps the constituent elements 
properly organized. But why should we not rather draw the 
conclusion that only so long as the chemical composition of 
the body yields the proper conditions oan life continue? 
Closer observation pushes the balance heavily against the 
vital force theory. Constantly and in many ways particles 
are bei!8removed from the body in a state of partial dis-
integration, While the very tissues of the body undergo an 
uninterrupted process of decomposition and restoration. 
There is no ground for supposing that this decomposition in 
the living body follows laws different from those of the 
dead body. The difference of the process of corruption from 
the less striking physiological processes of the living or-
ganism is due to the difference in the accessory oiroumstanoes 
conditioning the two processes. 
In the livi~ body the continual o~roulation of fluids 
constantly moves the decomposed elements towards the ex-
oratory organs by means of which they are restored to the 
outside world and their disruptive effects avoided. More-
over the regulated functions of the living body bring to-
gether elements which, in reaction, constantly strengthen 
and renew its fabric, whereas in the dead body all of these 
favorable conditions are absent. Pathological studies of the 
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partial corruption symptomatic of various diseases emphasize 
still fur ther the inseparability of the living and the dead 
from the standpoint of organic chemistry. ''Doubtless ••• 
the same laws of chemical af~inity govern the decay of the 
dead and the vigour of the living body.n29 
More serious doubts may be suggested by the phenomenon 
of new life developing itself with exhaustless energy out 
of that which is passing away. Propagation brings no im-
pairment of life as it is distributed over newly-produced 
organisms, whereas inorganic forces diffused over an in-
creasing quantity of matter show a proportional decrease 
in strength. In children we see an evident increase of the 
vital force. "But," says Lotze, "it is merely first tm-
preseione, not closer examination, that make us see here 
anything more perplexing than in lifeless Nature.n30 He 
gives a series of illustrations from the inorganic realm 
in which force is imparted without loss to ite seemin~sourceor 
with actual increase when other forces are released from 
their equilibrium. Thus, however muoh the propagation of · 
life may presuppose the careful arrangement of harmonious 
activities, it does not give rise to real difficulties. 
The process is simply this: a very insignificant portion 
of the parent organism, which stands in no important relation 
to its vital processes, is detached and becomes the germ 
29. MIC, I, 63. Cf. MET, II, 136. 
30. MIC, I, 56. 
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of the new being. 
Even if we assumed the tr&Il.8fer of vi tal force, the 
amount would be infinitesimal, for the vital anergy of the 
germ is at first very slight and it attains strength only 
after a long course of growth involving assimilation of 
material from the outer world. Propagation depends upon the 
possibility of the parent setting up a germ whioh, although 
trifling in mass, is distinguished by the carefully arranged 
combination and mixture of its constituents, and by this 
means made capable of developing into a living being with 
growing strength, under favorable external conditione. The 
original production of a new being is not an effort which 
appreciably diminishes the parents' energy, although in some 
instances the vital powers of the maternal organism m~ be 
impaired in connection with the early growth of the germ. 
As this suggests, the mystery of propagation is no 
greater than the mystery of growth. But the mystery of 
growth, like that of propagation, is e asily cleared up on 
closer examination. The process by whioh the growing body 
absorbs the substances of the outer world and presses them 
into its service is widely misunderstood. Every atom by 
which the mass of t he body is incr e ased enters the system 
because of the attract i ve force exerted on it by some one 
part. This force, whose exerci se involves no effort on the 
part of the body, also keeps it in its place, where it sets 
at the disposal of the body its own mas s with all the 
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favorable. ihat about the failures in adjustment? What 
31. MIC, II, 26. 32. MIC, I, 61. 
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about death that brings so much life to a premature close 
from entirely trivial causes?33 In the second place, the 
adaptability of the organism, although more subtle and 
delicate, is of the same kind that man builds into his own 
engines and other contrivances. The after-effects of the 
adaptability in both man and engine are such that continued 
existence and partial effectiveness m~ go on even after 
severe adversity has so deranged the faforable circumstances 
as to make continned health or operational efficiency im-
possible. If there were a peculiar curative energy raised 
above natural necessity, it is difficult to see how it 
could ever fail in its designs. 
If it be asked whence the original arrangement in an 
organism proceeds, no answer is to be expeoted from pbysioal 
soience. Conjectures in this matter belong to a different 
sphere. It is not Lotze's intention to deny in the organio 
world traces of wisdom which point beyond the mechanical 
oourse of events to a creative power. 34 But neither is it 
his purpose, while investigating physical science, to seek 
the first origin of life. Vithin the limits of man's obser-
vation no new life arises, rather the maintenance of life is 
dependent on the uninterrupted transmission of certain sub-
stances with their particles in a certain configuration. 
Various forms of the doctrine of vital force are 
33. ~' II, 136. 34. Of. OF, 92-93; KS, I, 220. 
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considered by Lotze. They all arose, directly or indirectly, 
from observation that the reactions of living beings seemed 
not to have their foundation entirely in apparent stimula-
tions, or from noticing that the successive forms into whioh 
they develop without apparent external impetus are not com-
pletely explained by their antecedents. This condition in 
whioh external stimuli are followed by reactions correspond-
ing neither in strength, nor duration, nor form has been 
supposed to divide the living from the lifeless. Only the 
actions of the latter, it has bean asserted, can be complete-
ly developed from the sum of all the given conditions, as 
necessary consequents. 
Again, careful examination shows this distinction to be 
a delusion. Any composite body shows to some extent, the 
characteristics here attributed to living bodies. Whenever 
an external shook falls on a compact whole of many parts, 
the magnitude, duration, and form of the final effect always 
depends upon the internal connection of the parts as well as 
upon the external stimulus. Through the mutual relations of 
the parts the amount of the impression received oan be 
diminished, increased, or distributed in the most diverse 
w~s. It oan set free potential energy or store it up. 
"Every machine has this oapaai ty of excitation. " 35 The 
increasing complexity of machines since Lotze's day has made 
35. MIC, I, 69. 
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hie point more obvious. He held that the body is precisely 
like the maohine in that its great variety of parts with 
their perpetual internal movements mediate between the exter-
nal impression and the final reaotion.36 This he affirmed 
without claiming to be able fully to traoe the great com-
plexity of the intermediate links. But Lotze went on to 
point out that this excitability is not limited to composite 
systems. It is no lese oharaoterietio of the simplest eub-
stratum.37 In the simplest instance of a ohemioal union the 
reaction is due not alone to the stimulus of heightened 
temperature or olose proximity, but to the nature of the 
substances inv.olved as well. The reaction of inorganic 
eubetanoes is usually simpler, but it is not different in 
principle. 
Yet Lotze does not regard the living body "simply as a 
maohine, n38 for, ready as he is to assume that the same uni-
versal laws apply to the living and the lifeless, he finds 
in the mallll8r in whioh these laws are applied in man-made 
machines a pettiness whioh he is reluctant to asoribe to the 
automata of nature. The former depend upon the solidity, 
cohesiveness, or elasticity of oertain substances: properties 
whioh they are unable to create afresh. They require a 
36. But of. ~. II, 135. Lotze considered man-made 
machines eo crude as to be soaroely worthy of compari-
son with the works of nature. See the next three 
paragraphs. 
37. MIC, I, 69. 
38. MIC, I, 70. 
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fixed invariable degree of these properties in order to work 
properly. They are based upon an ingenious interlacing of 
single parts and lack the intimate cohesiveness of living 
organisms. The agenoies of nature show a striking oontrast. 
In short, he finds them incomparably more ingenious, yet 
they rest upon the same universal laws Which hold good for 
the maohines as well. The same kind of activity is exempli-
fied in both oases, but with far greater variety in the 
living organism. The latter works with no merely external 
oambination of means indifferent to one another. Each of 
its elements displays towards its neighbors the whole store 
of those primary conditions whioh are alw~s afresh giving 
rise to the realit.y and marvelous delioacy of its form. 
!Wen where the body makes use of maohine-like modes for 
the fulfilment of oertain tasks, as in the oase of moving 
the arms by means of levers and ropes, the tools are main-
tained 1n perpetual renewal by an unremitting activity con-
sisting in a complicated Chain of direot working of atom 
upon atom. The body is not a maohine, if we link with that 
term the orudity and lack of self-renewal oharaoteristio of 
man's oreative efforts. In organisms the uninterrupted 
stresm of aotion, ever flowing from atom to atom through 
their immediate foroes, brings about a mutuality never 
characteristic of the parts of man-made maohines. 
Eaoh infinitesimal part seems to have a knowledge of 
what is going on in another, and the reciprocal aotion 
of all, kept up unremittingly and not distributed in 
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shooks over distinct moments, gives the development 
that admirable appearance of softness and mild grace 
which sets anything living in such triumphant contrast 
to the spectral disjointedness of the movements o~ 
artificial automata.39 
Thus Lotze finds a sufficiently sharp contrast between 
the products of diNine and human ingenuity without referring 
to any difference in principles of operation of the two. He 
denies that he bas any inclination to look on life as a 
result of an aooidental assemblage of parts. 40 Its origin 
is not under discussion, but its maintenance is asserted to 
be committed to the course of nature without any interven-
tion of special forces. Just as the laws b7 which our 
planetary system operates were laid down and securely estab-
lished before there had been so much as a credible conjec-
ture as to its origin, so it is possible to have a theory 
which will explain the maintenance of life before the mystery 
of its origin is solved. Indeed, it may well be hoped that 
a complete elaboration of the former will indicate the 
direction in which the latter m~ be sought. 
Nature necessarily forms a whole the various parts of 
which can be distinguished not by different laws but by 
different w~e of applying the same s.ystem of laws. All 
hopes of the progress of science, as well as the habits of 
our practical life, rest upon this assumption. The 
39. 
~. 
MIC, I, 72-73. This passage illustrates, in a casual 
w~, Lotze's ready use of aesthetic considerations in 
metaphysical discussion. 
Of. OP, 92-93. 
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stupendousnees of the task of traoing all the workings of 
all the farms of life is admitted, but there is no short-
out. The theory of a single operative vital force is an 
attempt at suoh a short-out. Where could euoh a force be 
inherent save in the sum of living parte and their systematic 
combinations? How oan it alter its mode of operation at 
eaoh moment to effect what is neoessary unless it be sup-
posed that, by regular naoeeeity, it becomes different under 
every altered oiroumetanoe? If this is the way it works, 
then it becomes a part of nature and has no status as a 
separate, superior principle. The universal testimony of 
experience is that it only affects anything by constant 
reaction with the inorganic world. We have no right to 
neglect this testimony; hence, we oan discard the vital 
force as a meaningless postulate. 41 
3. The Organization and Mechanism of Life 
Having shown that life, however immeasurably it may 
surpass all other existence in value and significance, does 
not require any special force for its explanation, Lotze felt 
the more obligated to give an aooount of the arrangements by 
which the constituent parts of the living body are enabled to 
to carry out its complex process of development without 
41. In MET, II, 130-135, Lotse reviewed and summarized his 
earlier writings in rejection of the life force. 
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continual intervention. However, he regarded as presumptuous 
any hope of ever reaching a full solution of this problem. 42 
Over-confident attempts to answer every question would but 
bring reproach upon the view being supported. On the other 
hand, ignorance should not be exaggerated. ~en in Lotze's 
time many vital processes could be traced a long way and the 
fundamental features of the whole distinguished. Accordingly, 
Lotze set himself to trace them. His thorough training as a 
physiologist fitted him admirably for the task. 
The living organism is characterized by various types of 
processes. Some are constant operations and others are peri-
odic, while both kinds are caught up in one progressive 
evolution which is the bo~'s normal course of gradual de-
velopment and eventual decline. The regular operations and 
sequences are interrupted frequently and fortuitously by a 
great variety of external impressions and their internal 
reactions. As neither the times nor order of these im-
pressions and reactions is governed by any fixed law, they 
might be regarded merely as disturbances of the definitely 
shaped oourse of development. However, the most characteristic 
42. Lotze was keenly aware of the limitations of human know-
ledge, not only in its best contemporary achievement. 
and in hie own case but also in its theoretical 
possibilities. He regarded a full understanding of 
reality as beyond the reach of man•s mind (although 
this was never used by him as a justification for ig-
norance). Numerous passages from his works could be 
cited. See, e.g., MIC, I, 192; II, 143, 321-322, 627; 
LOG, 7, 341-344; MET, I, 220; II, 91. 
mark of animal life does not lie in steady, unhampered 
development, but rather in that oapaoity which at every 
moment enables it to direct its vital energy against chance 
impressions. The general possibility of these reactions, 
whioh oould not be individually foreseen and calculated, 
must be regarded as one essential feature of animal life. 43 
The apparent simplicity of life belies the complicated 
interplay of processes which supports it, just as the quiet 
light of a wax candle tells nothing of the complexity of the 
operations by which it is made possible. 
Although progressive development and decline is not to 
be found in the inorganic world, yet we can trace some im-
perfect anticipations of it there. Only in the case of two 
bodies could the reciprocal action of a circular planetary 
motion go on with unceasing regularity. The addition of a 
third body would require the alteration of the orbits and 
greatly complicate the system. Only in periods of con-
siderable length, if at all, would the bodies return to 
their original position with respect to each other. With 
every increase of members the complications of the system 
would mount greatly, even assuming no influences from out-
side the system. Such, for example, is the condition of 
our solar system which forms an independent and isolated 
whole because the nearest fixed stars are too distant to 
43. ~, II, 136. 
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have any appreciable effect. But such is not the case in the 
body of a plant, where every internal interaction is subject 
to mar:w in:fluences from without. If we imagine a system of 
heavenly bodies operating under circumstances which result 
in the constant accession of new constituents we can picture 
a process more closely resembling evolution than is the case 
with our solar system. In comparison, the body, although 
apparently isolated, is "but one half of the basis of life, 
while its complement lies still without form in the uni-
versal current of the course of Nature that is surging up 
around it. "44 
There is another characteristic which would serve to 
distinguish life from a planetar.y system: the extensive 
application of chemical affinities. The peculiar nature of 
its forces serves to protect the living organism in its con-
tinual reaction with the outside world, for the shortness of 
the distance at which chemical affinity and cohesion cease 
to be effective surrounds it with a kind of neuiral zone 
while these same forces hold together its own contiguous 
parts so strongly as to resist even violence from the out-
side. Thus, while a loosely compacted planetary system 
admirably reflects the variations of the rest of the uni-
verse in its own, the living organism tends to return to 
its former condition even after great fluctuations. It is 
44. MIC, I, 80. 
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unchanging but movable, tough but not rigid. 
Another related advantage of the living organism m~ be 
mentioned. The intimate mutual connection of all its parts 
has been so much stressed that it may seem strange to em-
phasize the lack of or limitation upon this characteristic 
as the real attribute of an organism. For particular ends it 
is neutralized by special provisions: a far better warrant 
for the preservation of life than would be found in an all-
pervading connection. The planetary system is the true ex-
ample of unrestrained interconnection. 46 If all the parts 
of the living body were directly connected by reciprocal 
actions so that every slight change of one had necessarily 
to be reflected in all the rest, the arrangement would be an 
abundant and endless source of disturbance to the whole. It 
would not be possible--as is now often the oase--to discharge 
the disturbance by means of its own results without intro-
ducing instability into the whole system. 
Each single part coheres only with a few of its nearest 
neighbors so closely that every state of one part must 
directly affect every other. Single groupe of parts are 
free to develop their form, composition, and texture with a 
degree of independence and to execute their functions 
necessary to the whole without disturbance by the fluctu-
ations of the rest. 
45. See ~. II, 122-124. 
In the living body every chemical change seta to work 
forces not previously in existence and inhibits others. 
Thus each moment lays a foundation for a subsequent develop-
ment, sometimes the continuance of a prior state, sometimes 
the evolution of new ones, sometimes a combination of both. 
This gradual lawing of foundations gives the clue to the way 
in which the organism develops from its germ, without con-
tinual intervention from the outside. Only in propagation 
by means of what is similar is the chain of life carried 
on,46 holding together in the germ the carefully adjusted 
sum of parts from which a new life may evolve under the ex-
citation of external stimuli. If this seems too simple, it 
is well to remem er that a long process leads through count-
less agencies from the invisible germ to the fully developed 
organism, and at each stage of this course possibilities 
arise which were absent in the preceding one. ve are not in 
a position to write a history of these transformations and 
the laws governing them, but we can to some extent take 
account of the resources through which nature bridges the 
gap between the beginning and the end of development. 
The life of a plant has as ita sole task the development 
46. A vigorous controversy over spontaneous generation, in 
which Pasteur was the dominant figure, went on during 
Lotze's lifetime. It continued to smoulder until the 
latter part of the century, but Lotze seems to have 
entertained no doubts that in the present course of 
nature no organism is the direct product of a combina-
tion of elementary substances. 
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of its own form. If the outer world yielded t he sub-
stances requisite for its structure ready-made it would have 
nothi~ to do but absorb them as permanent constituents, 
returning nothing prior to its final total destruction. But 
such is not the case. The plant does not find ready-made 
materials, but must synthesize them from available elements. 
I n the course of this process unused material drops out and 
is restored to the outside world. Other material, such as 
the bulk of the water absorbed, circulates through the plant 
fulfiling its function, and likewise pa.sses again into the 
outer world. Still other material is essential at a certain 
period of growth but becomes dried out or withered up and hence 
detachable after the fulfilment of its office. There is no 
reason to suppose that any of the substances which have 
entered into the solid structure of the plant are subjected 
to subsequent renewal, but the animal body is differently 
placed in this matter. It is "certain that a great part of 
its bulk is constantly engaged in decomposition and renova-
tion by fresh accretions."47 
None of the impressions from the outer world can be 
converted into sensations without the receptive organs under-
going a ohange of st te. None of the movements by which the 
internal life of the animal reaots to these stimulations oan 
be performed without every bodily ohange being prepared for 
47. MIC, I, 87. 
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by multitudes of changes in the relative situation of the 
body's minutest particles. All of these processes can be re-
garded as disturbances of the relations imposed on the con-
stituents of the body by the type of its species, for they 
are not predetermined states of development in a systematic 
sequence. Whether or not it is theoretically conceivable 
that it should be eo, the body never does in practice return 
to its former state. The cohesive forces of solid tissues 
are strong enough to overdome temporary displacement, but 
the exhaustion of the senses and muscle fatigue are enough 
to convince us that the ordinary course of nature forms no 
organs whioh are not gradually worn out in the oourse of the 
reciprocal aotions involved in the fulfilment of their 
functions. Yet it is one of the ends of life to obliterate 
the evidences of wear through processes of repair and 
renewal. This is compassed through an unremitting change 
o~ material. 
Not only tissues which have been destroyed by use but 
also those whioh have remained inert over an extended period 
suffer decomposition--the latter less quickly but no lees 
surely. Provision is made for the replacement of all, and 
thus nature avoids the necessity of meeting each single 
disturbance ith an appropriate remedial reaction. Suoh a 
reaction, if it came only when excited by irregularly re-
curring emergencies, would itself constitute a new disturb-
ance. But what actually takes plaoe is the perpetual removal 
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of the products of decomposition through a steady flUE which 
guards the whole against the convulsions which a momentarily 
devised defense would entail. It is not even necessary to 
produce a specific remedy for every specific disturbance, 
for life practices perpetual preparation for emergency. 
External assaults, through the damage they produce, simply 
hasten the decomposition of that which is already marked for 
discard. Of course it is true that the living body also has 
express provisions for reacting to external impressions at 
particular moments in ways adjusted to the duration, kind, 
and degree of those stimulations, but these measures are 
rendered effective only in conjunction with the continuous 
and general flux of the change of substance. 
As to the precise details of this flux Lotze disclaimed 
full knowledge. He did not even claim a demonstrable right 
to call it genera1, 48 in the strict meaning of that term. 
But in spite of this defectiveness of knowledge he felt cer-
tain in the supposition that decay and interchange of con-
stituents, should it indeed prove general, at any rate pro-
ceeds with various velocities, and that any given moment 
finds a stock of constituents maintaining itself with but 
slowly changing mass in permanent modes of combination. 
~hus it presents"a regulative nucleus for the new formation 
of other constituents which circulate around it with greater 
48. 11 It remains for the future to decide whether this our-
rent has a perfectly motionless ground."--MIC, I, 91. 
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capacity of decomposition and more rapid changes. n49 In any 
case, the inadequacy of our ordinary common sense notion that 
the parts of the body are like the stones of a building, 
given once for all and performing their functions permanent-
ly, is evident. 
4. The Structure of the Body 
Presentation has been given to Lotze's contention that 
all living bodies--including human bodies--are unreservedly 
imbedded in nature. The same natural laws, insofar as they 
are applicable, describe both bodily and inorganic processes. 
Considerable attention has also been given to the interaction 
between the animal body and its natural environment. 
At this point in his argument, as presented in the 
Microcosmus,50 Lotze introduced an extensive description of 
the structure of the human body. It is not essential to the 
purpose of the present investigation to follow that dis-
cussion in detail. Lotze's aim in presenting it was to 
illustrate the large extent to wh ich life executes its 
functions through the same means employed by human mechani-
cal skill. 51 The exposition is lucid and interesting. 
Furthermore, in its broad outlines, it is still satisfactory. 
49. MIC, I, 91. 
50. Bk. I, Chap. V. In none of his earlier works did Lotze 
deal either so directly or so extensively with the 
field of anatomy. 
51. MIC, I, 120. 
Lotze approached his subject with such thorough understand-
ing, both of what was known and what was not known concern-
ing it, that he avoided the pitfalls of knowing too much. 52 
Subsequent developments in anatomical studies have succeeded 
only in elaborating some of the more minute structures. 
However, as regards bodily operations some o~ these 
minute structures, which ware not understood in Lotze's 
day, wield a tremendous influence. The answers to many of 
Lotze's biggest questions were to be found with the discovery 
of the tremendous importance of the minute secretions from 
the endocrine glands. 53 They are the chemical regulators 
of the body, producing a chemical integration of the total 
organism. Knowledge of their fUnctioni~ is by no means 
as yet complete, but the understanding so far achieved 
would have been pleasing to Lotze as a confirmation of the 
soundness of hie rejection of vital force in favor of the 
universality of law. 
Lotze dealt exclusively with the human body because man 
was his subject in the Microcoemus, but he specifically 
64 
acknowledged the place of the human body in the class of 
higher animal bodies. The controversy which raged around 
62. The fact that Lotze was both a recognized authorit,y in 
medicine and an experienced teacher of it is reflected 
in hie accuracy and lucidity. See FalokenbergL HL, 18, 
121; Hallt F.MP, 69; Rehnisch, Art.(l881), 324-~26; 
Art.(l901J, 203-206. 
53. See, e.g., Vaughan, GP, 188. See below, pp . 187 - 1 .91 . 
54. MIC, I, 99. Cf. Kronenberg, MP, 25. 
80 
the work of Darwin and the interpretation of the evolutionary 
hypothesis began65 about the middle of Lotze's philosophical 
career. Although it caused widespread excitement, it left 
him comparatively indifferent. As a result, he was sufficient-
ly r~proaohed for hie indifference so that he felt called 
upon to plaoe a special note of explanation on the point 
at the end of Book IV when be revised the Microcosmus. There 
he gratefully acknowledged the research of Darwin but indi-
cated that the kind of detailed information gathered by that 
scientist had no place within the scope of his own work. 
On the other hand, Lotze affirmed that he had, some time 
before the appearance of Darwin's work, considered the rise 
of adapted forms out of ohaoa "by those ver7 means which have 
sinoe under the names of variation and selection of existing 
varieties through the struggle for existence become popular 
topics of the d~." 56 In any case he saw the whole thing as 
a question of the manner in whioh God's creative power works 
and brushed aside, by reference to his previous arguments, 
every attempt to use evolution as an instrument for r~ing 
intelligence out of the universe. 67 
55. 
56. 
57. 
With the publication of Or~in of §Pecies in 1859. 
KIC, I, 626. Microcosmuss numerous passages which 
take for granted the evolutionary concept, and even use 
the term. Some examples: I, 374, 376, 396, 410, 448, 
457, 461-462, 467, 623; II, 128, 134-138, 142. 
In~' II, 167·160, Lotze re-stated hie position. The 
discovery of the principles which have been active in 
the evolutionary development is a metaphysical task, 
whereas the discovery of the manner of the development 
is a scientific task. Philosophers should be prepared 
8 
Walter Loewig sums it up fairly when he says that 
Darwinian thought was consistent with Lotze, even though the 
latter paid it little heed. 58 The keen scientific interest 
of Lotze's younger days waned somewhat in the face of his 
mature concern for ethics and religion; 59 otherwise, for all 
his explanations, it would be difficult to understand his 
comparative indifference to the Darwinian work. Nevertheless, 
there is no reason to doubt the completeness of Lotze's 
acoeptance of the evolutionary principle. 
5. Preservation of Life 
As has been shown, the preservation of the bodily form 
and the successful ongoing of vital operations depend every-
where on the direct interaction of particles so minute that 
we cannot observe them directly. The chemical processes 
whioh support our life go on incessantly without obtruding 
themselves upon our oonaoiousneSB. 60 The processes which do 
make themselves obvious to us as signs of life, such as 
breathing, pulse, and heat radiation, are but the manifesta-
tions of mediating activities which provide a continuation 
to receive with gratitude the assured results of Darwin 
and others pursuant of the latter task, engaging in it 
themselves only to warn against unfounded assumptions of 
philosophic origin when they threaten to rob science of 
its fairness. Meanwhile, man is important according to 
What he is, not aooording to the manner of his origin 
or the nature of his ancestry. 
58. Loewig, TKPL, 74. 
69. See G. Jones, LUB, 82, and v. Moore, EALM, 3. 
60. OP, 83. 
8 
of conditions favorable to the invisible pl~. It is a 
peculiarity of life that, by means of the fixed modes of 
connection in which it combines the elementary substances 
into relations, "it directs and compels their inherent forces 
to unwonted results." 61 It is therefore necessary to study 
each individual process as well as their mutual effects in 
co-operation. Bodily disturbances can be successfully re-
moved on~ if they somehow set in motion activities which are 
antagonistic to themselves. Likewise a bodily craving can 
be satisfied only if it sets on foot the processes for re-
moving the lack which called it into being. These compen-
satory mechanisms may be purely local, as in the case of an 
elastic part which increases its resistance in proportion to 
the amount of distortion, or they may be, and usually are, 
more generalized. If the body consisted of parts each of 
which had to care only for its own preservation, the former 
would be sufficient; but such is not the case. Life 
characteristically uses the needs and disturbances of one 
part in order to excite operations in the others, and derives 
from the process incidental advantages for the whole. The 
nervous system provides for the binding into reciprocal action 
of particles whose situation and structure would not other-
wise allow it. To call this type of adjustment organic and 
the simpler type physical does not imply any difference in 
61. MIC, I, 121. 
8 
the efficient forces involved; it simply indicates a more 
systematic application in the former case. There is yet a 
higher type of adjustment, which lies beyond the scope of 
the present chapter but should be mentioned here. 
The disturbed part cannot always find the means of 
remedy in itself; often it does not find them even in 
the resources of the nervous system, to which it turns 
for aid; but its disturbance becomes converted into 
feeling and sensation of the soul, and, quitting the 
too confined physical region, the excitement is carried 
on in tba t of the mind in order to SUDllOO n all the 
resources of insight, to ••• react on the bodily 
organs, with the acquired help of a resolution, and 
to • • • open up to them ways of satisfaction g~ich 
they would not have discovered for themselves. 
The course of Lotze's inquiry, as thus far traced, is 
sufficient to dispel any notions as to the unity, independ-
ence, and constancy of the living form. It would be diffi-
cult, as Whitehead later emphasized, to establish local 
63 boundaries which separate an organism from ita environment. 
~hen does water that is drunk or air that is breathed cease 
to be one and become the other? What of the par~ly digested 
contents of the alimentary canal.? Are the inorganic salts 
which circulate in the blood and penetrate the cells to be 
considered part of the organism? Associated with the body 
are always materials about to be assimilated and others 
ready for discard. Thus the organism is no more a unity in 
terms of time than in terms of apace. It is constantly 
changing. Tomorrow's organism may be identifiable with that 
62. MIC, I, 123-124. Cf. EVans, Art.(l910). 
63. MIC, I, 136. Cf. Hall, FMP, 77. 
84 
of today, but it will not be the same. Furthermore, the idea 
that the highest forms of nature are those with the greatest 
stability is a delusion. In aotuality, the higher forms have 
more states than the lower, and owe their strength to the 
ingenuity with whioh they meet the increased variety of their 
wants. Living bodies are not animated by a simple moulding 
impulse; life's manifold play of events is not attaohed to 
a rigid substratum. 
However muoh we may admire stable unity and self-
contained wholes, or however much we may desire to think of 
ourselves as stable, for ethical reasons, soienoe provides 
us with no basis for separating our organism sharply from 
the rest of nature. 
6 . Summary 
The running battle of words and ideas through which the 
scientific approach t o nature gradually won acknowledgment 
was well advanced by Lot ze' s time, bu t it was far from over . 
Lotze hims elf played so vig or ous a role in it that he was 
often mistaken for a me chanist. He argued strongly for the 
application of a mechanical conception to every aspect of 
nature. This did not mean that he r egar ded mechanism as 
philosophically ult i mate. Clearly he did no t. But he did 
regard it as the most fruitful worki ng principle for the 
study of nature . 
Specifically, Lotze was a powerful opponent of the 
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vital force theory in biology. He argued that the same 
universal regulative principles operate in the living and 
the non-living realms of nature. It is only superficial 
observation which leads to the supposition that the two 
areas are essentially different. The various parts of 
nature are distinguished not by different sets of laws but 
by different wa~s of applying the same laws. All scientific 
procedure is based upon this assumption. 
After having rejected every form of special vital force 
Lotze felt obligated to trace the workings of universal law 
as far as possible through the complexities of organic life. 
He found the leading characteristic of the animal organism 
to be its adaptability to its environment. Some elementary 
analogies to this capacity to react to unforeseen eventuali-
ties can be found in the inorganic world, but animal life 
brings it to much higher development. The various parts of 
an organism offer a curious combination of mutual connection 
and relative isolation. Thus the characteristic remedial 
action with which an or~anism responds to a stimulus can 
often be provided for locally, without appreciable disturb-
ance to the whole . This adaptability is made possible by a 
continuous interchange of material , which underlines the 
intimacy with which every organism is identified with its 
environment. 
In the Microcosmus Lotze illustrated his contention 
that all living bodies are imbedded in nature by giving an 
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extended and accurate account of the anatomy and physiology 
of the human body. Because of his thorough medical training, 
his exposition was consistent with the best contemporary 
work in these fields. It was consistent also with the work 
of Darwin, to which, however, Lotze paid surprisingly little 
heed. 
Lotze's work was sufficient to dispel every notion of 
an organism as something independent, unified, and constant. 
Fixed boundaries between a body and its environment cannot 
be drawn. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE SOUL 
It is clear from what has already been said that Lotze 
regarded the body as a specialized instrument of mutual con-
tact between the soul and nature, of which the body was 
part. In the long run this was the real reason for his 
interest in the body. The body had functional value for the 
soul, which was the object of his dominant interest. As 
Ladd has pointed out,l more of Lotze's work dealt with the 
soul than with any other subject. It will be necessary to 
investigate with care how Lotze conceived of the relation be-
tween the soul and the body, but that matter is reserved for 
the next chapter. The task of the present chapter is to 
state as accurately as possible what Lotze meant by the soul. 
Soul was Lotze's characteristic term for the human self. 
Accordingly, soul will be used throughout the expository por-
tion of the investigation. However, Lotze did not use it 
exclusively. It will therefore be necessary, from time to 
time, to consider its relationship to self, ego, subject, 
person, mind, and other related terms. 
To state Lotze's understanding of the nature of the soul 
with exactness in simple form will not prove as easy as might 
1. In his preface to Lotze, OP, vi. See also Ladd, Rev.(l886), 
324, and Ribot, GPT, 72. 
88 
be supposed from the extensive use he makes of the concept. 
The very wealth of material on the soul, indeed, is one of 
the reasons for the difficulty in pinning down its definition. 
But a deeper reason for the uncertainty lies in an ambiguity 
in Lotze's though t.2 Is the soul an "essence" which "mani-
fasts" itself in the conscious life? Or is it the conscious 
life itself? This is a matter which calls for painstaking 
investigation. 
Lotze does, in a casual manner, of fer a simple defini-
tion of the soul as "an existence of some special nature 
underlying the phenomena of the inner life as their subject 
or cause." 3 This is quoted by the translators of the 
Microcosmus in a connection which seems to imply that they 
regard it as Lotze's working definition of the soul. 4 But if 
it be so regarded, it is rather misleading, in addition to 
being too vague to be of much value. Furthermore, the con-
text does not suggest that this is Lotze's critical defini-
tion. It is used to identify a conception ascribed to the 
"imagination of man" without Lotze either oommitting himself 
2. In this matter, as in others, Lotze refrained from claim-
ing completeness and finality. Indeed, he asserted that 
the question as to what we are can never be answered to 
our perfect satisfaction.--OPR, 68. 
3. MET, II, 166. 
4. MIO, I, 53ln. A parallel definition in a similar context 
is to be found in the Microoosmus itself. The soul is 
''an element of peculiar nature, differently constituted 
from the materials of the frame, (whic~ lies at the base 
of the world of sensations, of emotions, of volitions, and 
by its own unity binds them into the whole of a rounded-
of:! development.n--MIO, I, 144. 
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to it or disavowing it. Elsewhere5 he more plainly makes a 
definition his own when he calls the soul "an indivisible 
being whose nature is capable of developing ideas, feelings, 
and efforts." In any case, however, Lotze's view is not to 
be discovered through search for a summary definition, but 
only through scrutiny of the multifarious uses to which he 
put it. 
1. The ~stance of the Soul 
Before considering the nature of the soul Lotze felt it 
necessary to raise the question as to whether or not the soul 
exists, and to consider the evidence by which its existence 
was most commonly taken to be proved. That Lotze himself had 
no doubts on the matter is effectively shown by the remark 
with whioh he closes his section on the soul in the Micro-
cosmus. 
Among all the errors of the human mind it has always 
seemed to me the strangest that it could come to doubt 
its own existence, of which alone it has direct experi-
ence, or to take it at second hand as the product of 
an external Nature which we know only indirectly, only 
by means of the knowledge of the very mind to which we 
would fain deny existence.6 
Lotze's method was persistently empirical and, as this 
passage clearly shows, he recognized that salves are the data 
which make possible the inferential knowledge of whatever 
5. MIC, I, 290. 
6. MIC, I, 263. 
9 
7 
else there may be. Nevertheless, despite his own personal 
outlook, in both the Iv icrocosmus and the Metaphysic Lotze 
gave careful attention to the arguments for the existence 
of the soul. 
Is there, Lotze begins by asking, 8 a genuinely stable 
point within the perpetual flux of nature which engulfs the 
whole nature of man? Is the body but a home and an environ-
ment for t his stable point, and changing nature but a source 
of stimulation to its unified growth? Mankind generally has 
answered these questions with an unvarying aff:irmative. 9 
Lotze considers that so universal a prejudice could hardly be 
without strong grounds, 10 but he gives it no status save that 
of a prejudice prior to express inquiry into i t s truth. 
The reasons f or the universal popular accept ance of be-
lief in the soul he thinks reducible to three, of very differ-
ent value. 11 The first of these is the appeal to freedom, said 
to characterize the mental life in distinction from nature, 
Which is marked by necessity. This appeal carries little 
weight. 12 For, on the one hand, no one supposes freedom to be 
a universal characteristic of the mental life. The course of 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
ll. 
12. 
Cf. Tennant, PT, I, 13, and the discussion of " Situations 
Experienced and Situations Believed-in'' in Brightman, POR, 
347-350. 
MIC, I, 143. 
Indeed, only as na doctrine of scientific schools 11 has 
the contrary ever been seriously considered.--MET , I I, 166. 
MIC, I, 144. 
MET, II, 166. 
Cf. Lichtenstein, LW, 51. 
ideas, emotions, and efforts in the souls of men and animals 
alike is subject to connection according to law. If it were 
not, psychological inquiry would be useless. The most that 
can be claimed for freedom, according to Lotze , is that it 
applies to the resolutions of the will . 13 On the other hand , 
in turn, the conviction of universal necessity in nature 
(to which, as has been indicated, Lotz e himself holds) is 
not a fact of observation. In vast tracts of nature the 
inner connection remains a supposition. ~hus freedom pro -
vides no ground for a firmly-based distinction between the 
soul and nature . 
The second reason leading to the conception of the soul 
is the long-observed complete "incomparability" of inner 
processes --sensations, ideas, emotions, desires-- with 
spatial motion, figure, position , and energy. No matter 
what quantity or complexity we may attribute to movements 
they can never pass into sY1eetness, brightness, nor loudness. 
v'ie shall never succeed in analytically deducing the 
feeling from the nature of its physical excitant; we 
can only connect the t wo synthetically; and the 
physical event does not become a condition of the 
rise of the feeling until the sum of motions in which 
it consists meets with a subject which in its own 
nature has t~e peculiar capacity of producing feeling 
from itself. 4 
Howev er, the conclusions drawn fr om this incomparabili-
ty of physical with psychical processes must not be pushed 
13. 1~ ~T, II , 166; MIC , I, 146. 
14. IviET, II, 167. Cf. MIC , I, 148-149. 
too far. 15 All that follows necessarily is that each type 
of phenomenon has its own special ground of explanation ; 
nit would be going too far to assert that the two principles 
• necessarily belong to two different sorts of sub-• • 
stances." 16 The theory has been put forward that the mental 
and physical arise as two primitive qualities of one aleman-
tal reality. · gainst this thsory there is nothing decisive 
to be said as long as observation of the psychical life 
17 
remains purely external. No center of psychical life 
appears until the inner experience of the unity of conscious-
ness is t aken into account. 
This leads to "the third and the unassailable ground , 
on which the conviction of the independence of the soul can 
securely rest." 17 It is the decisive fact of experience, 
which "compels us in the explanation of mental life to put 
in the place of matter an immaterial form of being as the 
subject of the phaenomena. n 18 :Vi thout the unity of conscious-
ness the sum total of our internal states could not even be 
made the object of self-observation. Thus the universal 
prejudice for the soul's existence is found to rest on solid 
grounds . There is no such thing in the realm of facts as a 
sensation without a subject, no more than there is a 
15. Thomas (in LTR , 99) interprets Lotze as giving greater 
weight to the argument than the relevant passages in 
1ffiT would sug~est. 
16. MET , II, 168. 
17. MET , II, 169. 
18. Iiil C, I, 152 • 
movement without a moving mass . 19 It is utterly unwarranted 
by experience to take the abstract sensation as a starting 
point either because it ap ears the most convenient one 
ava ilable or because its relation to its subject is 
puzzling. 20 
In affirming this Lotze does not intend to suggest tha t 
in every single act of feeling or thinking there is an ex-
press consciousness which regards the sensa tion or idea 
21 
simply as a state of the self involved . I t is agreed by 
everyone that absorption in the content of a sensuous per-
ception often makes a person forget himself in view of it . 
But this very fact could not be recognized by him unless he 
22 
was afterwards able to retrieve wha t wa s at first omitted. 
Furthermore, any comparison presupposes the indivisible 
unity of that which does the comparing . The inner world is 
built up not as a mere collection of idea s existing with or 
after one another, but as a world in which the individual 
members are held toge t he r and arranged by the relating 
t . •t f . 1 . . 1 23 ac 1v1 y o a s1ng e pr1nc1p e . In short, Lotze does not 
argue for the existence of the soul by asserting that our 
consciousness of the unity of our being is a guarantee of 
that unity., He argues, rather, that the very fact tha t we 
19. MET , II, 169 . Of . OM , 131. 
20. OP, 93 . 
21 . MET , II, 170. 
22 . MIO, I, 154 . 
23 . Of. Wentscher, Art . (l916), 147 . 
appear to ourselves at all, or other things appear to us, 
indicates that we must be capable of unifying manifold 
phenomena in the indivisibility of our nature.24 
2. The Nature of the Soul 
Knowledge that the soul exists, then, according to 
Lotze, is the least doubtful of all our knowledge. To doubt 
it is to cut the ground from under all other knowledge as 
we11. 25 But to be sure of the existence of the soul is not 
yet to understand its nature precisely. It simply gives 
assurance that the investigation can be fruitful. How is 
the soul to be conceived and with what faculties is it 
endowed? 
24. MIC, I, 157. 
25. Although the form of hie treatment is very different, 
Lotze thus goes back to the famous philosophical 
starting point of Descartes, which was anticipated 
several centuries earlier by St. Augustine. Descartes' 
method, of course, differed strikingly from Lotze's. 
He sought a mathematically certain base for philosophy. 
He wanted axioms in order that he might construct a 
deductive system on a mathematical pattern. Lotze's 
method was much more empirical. (See above, pp. 19-25.) 
Further, it is plain that Descartes had not freed him-
self from the scholastic conceptions of substance. 
Having established the certainty of his own existence 
he proceeded immedia tely to take that as tantamount to 
the establishment of the existence of a substance 
whose essence it is to think. (See Descartes, MSP, 
33- 34.) For Lotze's views on substance, see the fol-
lowing pages. 
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i. The Soul as Substance. 
Lotze found in the unity of consciousness not only the 
conclusive evidence for the existence of the soul, but also 
the lea ding clue as to its nature. He acknowledged the 
relation of his conception to that of Leibniz26 although he 
did not customarily use the latter's terminology, and there 
are other important differences. v7.hen he did speak in 
Leibnizian terms, Lotze suggested that the soul may be 
considered a central monad, :Erima inter 12ares, superior in 
quality and position to the other monads which compose the 
whole being of man. 26 It has the most intense mental life 
of all the monads and is able to master the others. 
Lotze's own preference, however, is to call the soul 
'tan indivisible and simple substance." 27 The term is used 
with caution in the eta:Ehysic because of previous experi-
ence of having it misunderstood, 28 although used "in all 
innocence." 29 Accordingly, Lotze is careful to explain 
the precise sense in which be uses the term. 
a. Lotze's Use of Substance. In passing on from the 
given fact of the unity of consciousness to description of 
26. 
27. 
28. 
29. 
MET, II, 172-173. 
MET, II, 173. Cf. MP PS, 145. 
In MET, II, 173-176 Lotze complains that his use of 
the term in previous writings has been misunderstood, 
e.g., by his good friend Fechner. 
MET, II, 173. 
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its subject as substance Lotze intends only to signify that 
as substance ".which possesses the power of producing and 
experiencing effects."30 Substance applies to a thing in 
virtue of its having performed something, but not to the 
ground, or means, or cause which would make tha t performance 
intelli gible. The view involving one universal substance, 
a grain of which is embodie d in each individual thing 
as the ground of its distinction and experience, is un-
tenable. 31 
The fact of the unity of consciousness is eo ipso at 
once the fact of the existence of a substance: we do 
not need by a process of reasoning to conclude from 
the former to t he latter as the condition of its 
existence,--a fall~cious process of reasoning which 
seeks in an extraneous and superior substance 
suppose d to be known beforehand , the source from which 
the soul and each particular thing would acquire the 
capacity of figuring as the m1it~ and centre of 
manifold act io ns and affections . b2 
Despite these difficulties with the term, Lotze holds 
to substance as a designation for the soul. His reason for 
this is to be found in his desire to emphasize supremely 
the soul's unity. Only an indivisible unity can produce 
or experience eff ects at a11, 33 whereas the term substance 
cannot, in strictness , be applied to any multiplicity . 34 
elying on the fact that the imagination is accustomed to 
30 . T, II, 174. 
31. Of. Pringle - Pattison, IGRP, 287-288 , also Evans, 
Art • ( 1910 ) • 
32 . MET , II, 175. Of. Sorley, MVIG , 4. 
"3 . Unity of being is also made the basis of Lotze's argu-
ment for God as "Persona l Existence." Se e O"PR, 52, 55 . 
34. MET , II , 175. Of . MIO , I, 159. 
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connect the idea of unity with the idea of substance, Lotze 
chooses to continue to identify the latter with the former , 
despite the need to describe and repudiate some of its common 
meanin~s . For him substance is nothing but a title to be 
attached to everything which has the power to act and to 
be acted upon, to experience dif f erent states, et in their 
interchange to do work as a permanent unity. 35 
b. Contr ust with Scholastic Soul Substance . That 
Lotze rejects the scholastic conception of soul substance 
while continuing to use the term is i mplied in what has 
already been said , but the matter needs to be made more 
explicit. The substantiality of the soul is not an entity 
which precedes the development of the soul, it is rather 
what the soul itself has become . It might be said to have 
won substantiality . 36 " very soul is what it shows itself 
to be, unity whose life is in definite ideas, feelings, and 
efforts. n 37 This is its true essence, rather than any 
fancied "ha.cd and indissoluble atom" 38 or indestructible 
real existence serving as a core in the mid-current of 
events. The identity of the subject of inward experience 
is all that Lotze requires, for "so far as , and so long as, 
the soul knows itself as this identical subject, it is, 
35. OP, 113. 
36. Zschau, HLE, 4 . 
37. Ml."'T, II, 181. vf. STR, 140. 
38. M'T , II, 175 . 
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and is named, simply for that reason , subs t ance . '139 
The scholastic soul substance stands in striking con-
tras t to this Lotzean conception. It ha s no pl a ce whate ver 
in the conscious life , but rath er is inferred from conscious-
ness as a necess -r y substratum. 40 One of its most im-
portant functions --perhaps the chief one -- is to guarant ee 
the immortality of the sou1 . 41 This it can do becaus e it is 
unchang ing and indestructible de spite the fitful uncertain-
by of t he consciou s life . This capaci t to guarantee 
i mmorta lity Lotze deni e s to his substance in the mos t 
; s pecific ter ms . 
To r a tionalize i mrnortali ty by 1ae ans of an indestructible 
subs tance underlying consciou sness or acting as its kernel 
would make immortality as read ily applicable to animals as 
to men, and no more plausible than pre - existence . 42 Lotze 
says plainly tha t any idea of substanc e in which indestruct -
ibility is necessarily involved cannot be applied to the 
43 
soul, because we have no wa rrant for assuming that what 
now is will necessarily always be . The matter of im~or-
tality rests , r a ther, upon faith in the permanence of 
4.: 
values and the goodness of God. Substance which is simply 
a title atta che d to what ha s the power to act and be 
acted upon as an enduring entity is no gua rante e of · 
39 . \lET , II, 179 . 
40 . Aquinas, BfA , I , 720, 
727-728, 746 . 
41 . See Aq uinas , B./A , I, 
731; Gilson, SidP, 169 . 
42 • O"P , 113 . 
43 . MIC, I, 389 . 
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immortality. 44 
Lotze further objects to ''universal psychic substance" 45 
because it provides no intelli ible grounds whatever for 
explaining the differences between various souls. He re-
gards the search within ourselves for an inexpressible, 
insoluble, real something which briTI?S the clear fulness 
of known mental life into some kind of dependence upon 
itself as a "perverted way of thinking.n46 
In view of what has been said the question may well be 
raised as to whether or not Lotze did well to retain the 
word substance. Santayana says that Lotze abused the term 
47 
substance in applying it to the soul and, if that puts 
the matter too strongly, it must at least be agreed that 
Lotz e's use of it had unfortunate and confusing results 
outweighing what he gained by using it. His declared in-
tention was to illuminate the conception of the soul; but 
the net effect, on the other hand, was to confuse it. 
Instead of decreasing the burden of explanation necessary 
44. OP , 113-114. Cf . MET , II, 182. 
45. IC, I, 540. 
46. viC, I, 547. 
47. Santayana, LSP , 116- 117. Santayana says that both 
Herbart and Lotze identified soul and substance, and 
both made mistakes in doin so. But the mistakes were 
not the same . lhile Lotze abused the term substance, 
Herbart abused the term soul. "Herbart' s soul-substance 
••• is a substance but not a soul, while Lotze's is 
a soul but not a substance."--117. If substance be 
taken to signify an unchanging real entity, Santayana 
as certainly correct in denying t ha t Lotze's soul 
could be included wi thin the cate~ory. 
10 
to make Lotze 's view clear, it increased it, and thus had 
48 
the effect of defeating his purpose. Furthermore, it 
helped to leave the whole matter in a state of some 
ambiguity, to which it will be necessary to give attention 
later. 49 
Nevertheless, something can be said in effective defense 
of Lotze's use of the term. His difference from the scho-
lastics was no superficial one, but a basic metaphysical 
dif f erence. lle rejected their metaphysical dualism , and 
held the soul to be that "real ex istence" 50 which alone is 
worthy to be called substance. He had only t wo alternatives: 
either to repudiate the term as meaningless because used in 
such a confusing variety of ways, or to make use of it on 
his own terms, letting it stand for that which alone is 
true being . In the light of the net result, it may be said 
that his cho ·:hce of the second alternative was a mistake; 
but it is understandable when the important place of 
the term in the European philosophic tradition is con-
sidered. 
48. See P owers, KBLS , 5, for a simila r judgment. 
49. See below, pp. 112-120. 
50. MET, II, 176. The problem of the one-and-the-many is 
logically involved here; however, full discussion of 
it is deferred until the next chapter. Individual 
souls were not substances in their own right f or 
Lotz e, even as they were not real ex istences in their 
own ri ht . But they were dependent upon a supreme 
being of t he s ame nature . It alone could be called 
substance in the sense of being tha t upon which all 
else is dependent, but whi ch is i n its turn dependent 
upon nothing else. 
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ii. The Soul as Being-for-Self . 
A second identifying characteristic of the soul, for 
Lotze , is its power to recognize itself. This is more 
immediately and obviously involved than is substantiality 
in Lotze's argument for the existence of the soul . The 
word "soul" is simply the term which represents all beings 
which have experience of their own inner states in the form 
of idea s, feelings, and acts of will , 51 and such states are 
never to be met with in fact exce~t as the sta tes of some 
subject which is ca pable of recognizing itself. 52 
This ability to recognize states as our own is all that 
53 is re uired for laying the foundation for personality, or 
for earning the title of substance. 54 The soul is not, 
however, an "impassive substance," but is a self-recognizing 
subject of its phenomena which retains memory of its past 
experience along with impressions of the present and is 
able to combine them all into a unity . 55 Existence- for-self 
is not only the essence of personality , it is the highest 
form of existence. 56 
51. OP, 146. 
52. ;ET , I I , 16 9 , 17 2 • 
53. OPR, 64-65 . 
54 . MET, II, 179. 
5 5 • l\ I C , I , 18 7 • 
56 . Sommer, ~ rt . (1881), 352 . Cf . MIC , II, 646; obins, 
LTK, 86-87. 
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iii. The Unity of the ' oul. 
The very possibility of bei~g-for - self , however, is 
dependent upon the unified nature of the soul . hat Lotze 
believes this is evident in his demonstration of the soul ' s 
existence from the fact of the unity of consciousness . 
If the soul were not a uni ty , knowled?e (indeed, even per-
ception) would be impossible . Thus the very fact of per -
caption gives Lotze an unshakeable assurance of the unity of 
the soul . de know of no such thing as perception without 
a subject, 57 and the very conception of a subject implies 
self- recognition. This is all that is needed to establish 
the conclusion, for Lotze shows that the existence and 
unity of the soul depend not on our a~pearing to ouselves 
as a unity but on nour being able to appear to ourselves 
at all . " 58 
Every mode of cognition involves a relating activity 
ani an act of relation would be unthinkable we e not the 
soul a unity . Thus Lotze calls such unity "the prime re -
quisite for every act of relating . n 59 It is a unity of a 
kind different from that of every form of being other than 
mind . It does not involve merely a mechanism of reciprocal 
action , but a relating activity driven by a striving after 
57 . l ... ~T , II, 169 . 
58 . ~IC, I, 157 . f . 163. f • al so I~ !.T , I I , 1 71 • 
59 . LIC, I, 229 . 
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an orderly whole in interpreting the complex of impressions 
vmich it receives . 
Lotze clearly regarded unity as a more basic and signif-
icant attribute of the soul than substantiality. he plainly 
subordinated the latter to the former and explained60 that 
he only used the term substantiality in order to emphasize 
unity , relying on the fact that the imarination is accustomed 
to connect the idea of unity with the name substance . He 
reco~nized ~nd acknowledged difficulti e s in this identi -
fication but considered that they could be minimized and 
were, in any case , outweighed by its values . That Lotze 
was mistaken in this judgment and unfortunate in his 
terminology at this point has already been sug~ested, 61 
but this in no way affects the validity of his primary 
emphasis upon the unity of the soul . 
iv . variety in the Soul. 
Lotze's primary emphasis , then , is on the unity of the 
soul, but this unity is very far removed from "the un-
yielding rigidity of an impassive substance . n 62 Lotze 
starts with experience , and insists that we have no other 
insight into the nature of the soul than nthat which is 
afforded by inference from the observed facts of our 
63 consciousness . " But our conscious life presents a vast 
60 . ~ffiT , II 175 - 176 . 
61 . ~e e pp . io0-101, above . 62. 63 . IC, I, 187 . IIC, I, 168 . 
104 
and literally ever- changing variety of states and actions . 
This variety is so obvious and so impressive that many 
have been led either to deny the unity or explain away 
the variety . Both of these alternatives are rejected by 
Lotze . 
a. The Faculties of the tioul . Lotze specifically 
considers and rejects64 the contention that any plurality 
of the original faculties of the soul is incompatible with 
its unity . o nition, feeling, and will cannot be derived 
from each other, yet they are misconceived when spoken of 
as if they were ready- made dispositions impressed on the 
soul side- by- side but without any other mutual connection. 
They are not to be regarded as having com~on rootage in a 
single primitive mode of mental life, yet no more can they 
be considered as growing from distinct roots and occupying 
separate realms of the soul , each unconnected with the 
others . 65 
It is evident that every train of ideas has points of 
junction \tith pain and pleasure , desire and aversion. But 
what, exactly, is the relation between them? Is the idea 
the complete efficient cause of the feeling? Or only the 
exciting occasion or conditionin~ circumstance which 
64 . ~ Ic, I, 173-174 . 
65 . I IC, I, 177-178 ; II , 7 7. Of. Kalweit, PBGL, 16- 17 . 
Kalweit was correct in asserting that Lotze made the 
faculties subject to reason, for Lotze regarded reason 
as more than cognitive . See MIC , I , 244- 245 . 
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co-operates wi th a su~plementary cause? Only a careful anal-
ysis of t he relevant data can provide the basis for a de-
cision. Such an analysis lea ds Lotze to the latter of the 
t 1 . 66 wo cone us1.ons . 
If we consider t he cognitive faculty in the exercise of 
its activity we shall be able to find no point at wh ich 
cognition begins to develop into fe lings of pain and 
pleasure . If, on the oth er hand, it seems evident t hat a 
conflict in ideas mus t surely cause pain to t he soul and 
lead to remedial eff ort, rffi[ection shows t ha t what we hav e 
here is conclusive evidence that we are more than cognitive 
beings . Our internal experience ha s long accustomed us to 
this association; and this familiarity, Lotze insists, 
enables us to overlook the gap at each link in the series, 
where a new f a ctor enters. 
The merely cognitive soul would find in itself no 
reason for regarding an internal change--even were it 
one fraught with risk to the continuance of its 
existence--otherwi se t han with the indifferent keen-
ness of scrutiny with \vh ich it would look upon any 
other conflict of forces; further , should a feeling, 
arising from other sources , set itself alongside of 
the perception, the merely feeling soul would ~ et 
even in the intensest pain find in itself neither 
reason nor capacity for going on to an effort after 
alteration ; it would suffer, without being roused 
to will.67 
The fact tha t these conditions do not arise in actuality 
indicates that the faculties of feeling and will, as well as 
66 . IC, I, 178. 67. LIC , I, 179. 
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co~nition, are inherent in the soul. The various capacities 
are not produced b~ the train of events but merely roused 
to utterance in it. 
b. The Soul cting as a Jhole . Nevertheless, while it 
must be recognized that there is "a plurality of modes of 
psychic manifestation not reducible to one another," 68 it 
can never be forgotten that the mind is not three, but one. 
The soul makes no partial entry into its own manifestations, 
but the whoilie soul energizes every mode of its action. It 
is never true that one side of the soul expresses itself, 
but the whole may express itself in a one-sided way . ?.Van 
though that partial expression cannot utter the whole nature 
of the soul, the whole nature is active in it . Lotze 
acknowled~es68 that divine intuition would be required to 
know this certainly, whereas all human knowledge is heuris -
tic. However, the evidence which experience has gradually 
brought to light seems to Lotze to support his view. 
The soul's position with respect to its own internal 
states is similar to that with rapect to external stimuli. 
It resides completely in neither and can respond to both 
with an energy not derivable from them. 69 comparison 
between mental life and organic life suggests an instructive 
difference. The latter arises from essentially distinct 
68. IC, I, 181. 69. IC, I, 182. 
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parts united externally according to the universal laws of 
nature, but there are no detachable atoms in the psychic 
life. The soul is not a "passive stage" for the "free 
motions" 70 of its states. r.ro be sure, Lotze does not deny 
to mechanism a place in the mental life, 71 but he does deny 
it complete sway . The train of ideas is more than a series 
of states governed in their recipocal actions by universal 
laws. There is another ever-present element which wields 
an influence from time to time and renders the process 
creative rather than predictable. There may be series of 
changes in which it does not interfere, but they are not 
universal and their extent can be determined only by accurate 
internal observation. 
c. Limits of the Soul's Variability . The soul, it has 
now become clear, is capable of excitation. It does not 
come into action spontaneously, but in reaction to foreign 
stimulation. 72 Thus real effects upon the nature of the 
soul are constantly being wrought by external stimuli . It 
is not possible to vindicate it from the char e of mut~bili­
ty. " The soul in action is different from 1Tha.t it was when 
at rest.n73 It cannot be compared to the conception of an 
70. IC, I, 183. 
71. See below, pp. 164-165. 
72. Cf . Plato in the~ (Plato, DP, I, 361- 366 .) and the 
Phaedo (Plato, DP, I, 456-457.). 
73. MIC, I, 185. 
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unchanging atom which (according to the physical theory 
current in Lotze 's day) was regarded as internally invari-
able while entering into changing external relations. In 
the chan ing impressions received an observer--or subject, 
or soul--truly changes. 11 "very single sensation is an 
alteration in the soul's being.n 74 
If this variability be freely granted , what , if any, 
are the limitations within which it exercises itself? 
That there are limitations is evident, according to Lotze, 75 
when one considers that nothing whatever is so utterly 
changeable and impotent as to receive its form entirely 
from external impressions. 11 traces of its former nature 
can never be entirely obliterated. The present state of 
anything is always one of the concurrent conditions deter-
mining the effect of the next impression. The soul, how-
ever, is not only the entity to which its own phenomena 
occur, but--as has already been nointed out--it knows 
itself as such. Thus it does not merely present a consist-
ent series of changes which would enable an external ob-
server to recognize it as a unity, but it likewise recog-
nizes itself as a unity--a unity of a much more significant 
kind. 
The specific limitations upon the mutability of the 
soul are to be found in the regularity of sensations, other 
74. IC, I, 187. 75. ] IC, I, 186-187. 
109 
corporeal necessities, and what may be called the mental 
mechanisms . - ed remains red; extreme pressure and heat are 
always painful; and the laws of memory , association of ideas, 
and judgment show remarkable steadiness. The influences 
which play upon the soul necessarily ~roduce changes, but 
they do so within a context of consistent exercise of 
energies which seems to gain in dexterity with the changes. 
So far are the alterations of the soul from passing into 
chaos that they tend to fall into the background of interest 
in comparison with the more si nificant consistency of 
internal development within which they occur. 
v. The soul as Unity in l"ulti:plicity. 
The soul , for Lotze , was a nunity in multiplicity." 76 
He found in it the solution of the age-old problem of 
change-and-i entity. In concluding the ontological section 
76. "That which n. e., the soui) is not only conceived by 
others as unity in multiplicity, but knows and makes 
itself good a s such, is, simply on that account, the 
truest and most indivisible unity there can be.'' 
--~ .. T, II, 179. Cf . IC, I, 551; II, 623. lthou h 
he makes no reference to Lotze\ filliam ~tern uses the 
very same phrase (see GP , 329 .J to define person, as 
well as his now more famous phrase "uni tas multiplex." 
(See PP , 5-7, and GP, 73, 349, 436, 447, 529.) Both 
Lotze and Stern use the phrase in the same general way, 
however there is one important difference in the refer -
ence of the unity which both employ. For Lotze the 
unity is a unity of consciousness which clearly does 
not include the body. Stern, on the other hand , in-
cludes the organism in the unitas multiplex which is 
the person (see GP , 70.), while the more restricted 
term "mind" is reserved for the unity of conscious 
experience. (See GP, 77-78.) 
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of his ' etaphysic Lotze looked back over t he course of his 
argument and s a id, 
vihen we set about cons t ructing a Being which in the 
chan e of its sta tes should re main one , it was the 
experience of spiritual life ••• which came to our 
aid, and by an unexpected actual solution of the 
problem convinced us that it was soluble . 77 
Lotze re garded the problem as insoluble by any theoret-
ica l mea ns- - apart from this immedia te axnerience of its 
solution. The sp iritual subject a lone not only distinguishes 
sensations, idea s, feelings from itself but a t t h e same time 
knows t hem as its own sta tes and "by me ans of its own unity 
connects t he seri es of successive ev ents in the compass of 
memory . " 78 How this is possible cannot be explained--it can 
simpl y be experienced--but its uni ue significance can be 
grasp ed through reflecti on . 79 This "spirit" or "spiritual 
subject" is precisely that "permanent subj act of its change-
able phenomena' which Lotz e else where 80 designates as t h e 
soul . The soul deriv es what is most e s~ential to it , its 
"charac tar, 11 fro "that quite peculiar • • • law which 
a ppertains to the coherency of all its manifestations , n81 
a law which always remains identical while the occasions 
77 . MET , I, 226 . Cf . Kelly, Art . (l931), 443 ; Knudson , PP , 
84 . 
78 . 
79. 
so . 
81 . 
MET , I, 223. 
Lotze's belief t ha t t his unity of appearin~ to oneself 
unified is the only real unity there is leads him on 
to postula te (in Met, I, 224) the notion that thi~s 
have souls . Cf . Thilly, HP , 496 . 
OM, 2. 
a , 44. 
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for the manifestations change variously. 
This capacity to combine manifold phenomena into the 
unity of consciousness not only compels us to assmne the 
existence of an indivisible, supersensible soul which is no 
part of the body, but it also leads us to interpret the real 
universe in terms of this, the only reality directly known 
to us . 
3 . Is the Nature of the Soul Knowable? 
The soul is constantly active; but is it activity? 
Such an idea was unsatisfying to Lotze . Pure activity 
meant for him dissolution into ceaseless flux, whereas the 
soul must provide the power to unite and re~ulate a complex 
of action, passion, and reaction, and be an existent , agent , 
operant "no less far remove from ceaseless flux into 
activity than from the rigidity of a nucleus never entering 
on motion. " 82 
The soul is conscious ; but is it consciousness? ~his 
question is difficult to answer for Lotz e with confidence 
and perhaps i mpossib le to answer certainly, but it must be 
considered with care . It is related to the question in the 
previous para raph, and much evidence can be adduced for 
an answer just as definitely in the negative as that given 
above , but there is also contrary evidence which throws both 
82. MIC, I, 551 . 
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answers in doubt. In the l~t etaphysic Lotze appears to ar~ue 
vigorously tha t t he soul is activity. It seems unintelli-
gible to him that 
we should supp ose we do not know the soul, because, 
although we know all its acts, we are unluckily ig-
norant of the elastic sphere to which, according to 
Kant's comparison, the nature manifested in these acts 
is attached; or that instead of seeking the living 
reality of the soul in its production of ideas, emo-
tions, and efforts, we should look for it in a name-
less nbeing,'t from which these concrete forms of action 
could not flow, but in which, after some manner nev~S 
to be explained, they are supnosed to participate. 
Earlier in the Hetaphysic84 he plainly declares activity 
and essence to be identical. 
Furthermore, Lotze not infrequently uses consciousness 
as a term eauivalent to soul, or implies the equivalence by 
indicating tha t the soul (or ego, which is another equivalent 
term for him) includes the realm of that which is immediately 
experienced, and excludes all else~5 He is free also to 
ridicule the idea of a soul-core consisting of m1conscious 
substance. He suggeststha t the soul having, in its inter-
course with the sense-world, become accustomed to the use 
of such abstractions as unconscious and selfless substances 
turns, as it wer e, suicidally against itself, and 
imagines tha t it can comprehend its own nature only 
by help of these ontological notions which from the 
very beginning had significance only in as far as 
they were reflections--though pale and faint--of the 
mind's ovvn nature . And finally, it reaches the point 
83. bET , II, 180-181. 
84. ! L.:.~T , I, 99. 
85. See I. IC, I, 296, 306- 309, 337, 365; II , 680; MET , II, 
181; OPR, 56; OP, 79-80. Cf. Knudson, PP, 73 -74; 
Lange, LILD , 4; Lemcke, SML, 60-61; Raub, SL.v, 5. 
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of no longer understandi~ its own self, and hits upon 
the device of enriching its nature by a core of un-
conscious substance \tith which in imagination it en-
dows itself, and in which it tries to induce self-
consciousness by an ingeniously devised system of 
stimulation. 86 
Leonhard St~lin87 has asserted that Lotze dissociated 
things-in-themselves and phenomena as completely as iid Kant 
and thereby rendered his own identification of souls with 
the former of no value . "On the principles laid down by 
Lotze," said he, nthe attempt at a cognitive determination 
of what the thing-in- itself is must be regarded as a contra-
diction. "88 It may be said with confidence that StiDllin has 
not correctly interpreted Lotze's intention, but is there 
justice in his charge? It must be admitted that passages, 
such as the following, can be cited which ive it some 
support . 
After raising the question as to what the soul is in 
itself, apart from its actions, Lotze replies that "it would 
be simplest to confess our conviction that what the soul is 
we never shall know. " 89 He refrains from maki~ such a 
confession, but seemingly only because this would place 
souls in a condition different from other things in respect 
to the matter, whereas the difficulty is no more easily 
86. 
87 . 
88. 
89. 
1, IC, I I, 654 . 
An unfriendly 
from the fact 
and, in turn, 
Stllhlin, K.LR , 
MI C, I, 189. 
critic whose interest in Lotze derived 
that the latter was influenced by ant 
exerted an influence upon itschl . 
137. See 131- 137 . 
Cf. 543 . 
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removed with regard to material thi~s . 
If we complain that we never come to discern the essence 
of the sou l as it is i n itself, and apart from all the 
special conditions t ha t deter mine it to special mani-
festations, we must include in the same complaint our 
ideas of all other thing s . 90 
On t he face of the matter this would seem to support 
St~lin's contention. 
~ gain, although in passing from his discussion of the 
existence of the soul to its nature in the I. icrocosmus Lotze 
refers to it as an "unknown being , " 91 the context suggests 
that it is to become known on examination of the empirical 
evidence. 
1/e have no other insight into the nature of the soul 
than tha t which is afforded by inferences from the 
observed f a cts of our consciousness . .le h ave thus to 
conceive its nature as it must be in order that it 
should pass through what we know in ourselves as 
its states, and nerform what we find in ourselves 
as its actions . 91 
Here is no assertion that the soul is unknowable but 
the last sentence does suggest that the soul is in some 
manner concealed under experience rather than residing in 
it . The soul is nthat which is to support our inward life.'' 92 
But what is its nature. Can it be known? Is it simply a 
necessary but vaguely conceived assumption? Lotze is 
definite on the point. ~he essence of the soul- - in itself, 
90. ~IC, I, 189. 
91. LIC, I, 168. 
92. ET, II, 173 . See also IC, I, 546, 548 , and the 
"p eculia r essence" of OP , 146. 
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apart from its manifestotions--is unknown. "Just as impos-
sible as to tell how things look in the dark, is it to know 
what the soul is before it enter~ on any of the situations 
in which alone its life unfolds . " 93 But the case is no 
different with any other thing . 
The most significant point is , however, that this search 
after the Kantian lJing - an- sich , the ttobject which we can 
never find " has little interest for Lotze . All value and 
' 
significance lie in the manifested soul . Lotze even goes 
so far as to call this the soul ' s 11 true essence," 94 yet he 
cannot shake himself entirely free from concern for that 
primitive essence without which no mental life could have 
developed. 94 Re regards it as "an indispensable , y et in 
itself worthless prerequisiteu 94 to the development of the 
sou l life. Sl ewhere he calls it a nstill undeveloped 
predisposition11 to mental life. 95 Row this can exist and 
develop as it does is an impenetrable enigma, akin to the 
question as to \vhy there is something rather than nothing . 
Lotze affirms the b~rrenness of considering it, but finds 
himself unable completely to turn away from it . Thus , 
despite his vi . orous rejection of the conception of the 
soul as a substantial core or underlying substratum of 
conscious experience, 96 Lotze introduces a conception 
93 • l• I C , I , 19 0 • 
94. LIC , l, 191. 
95. L IC, I, r. ,.. 7. 
96 . See above p . 98, and cf . LIET, II, 175 . 
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somewha f reminiscent of it. 97 Likewise he opens himself in 
a measure to the formal char~e of makin ~ the soul unknowable, 
although this accusation , as put by St~lin, seems to miss 
the most important aspects of his thought . 
The more characteristic Lotzean emphasis, however, is 
that the soul is knowable, for that which it trul~ is is 
exhibited in its manifestations. Psycho logic al investiga-
tion, therefore, is a direct study of the nature of the 
soul because the manifested soul lies open before it. his 
insipht probably reveals the clue to £otze•s keen interest 
in psychology . 98 His own study had led him to regard the 
soul as always active and always unified. It includes only 
"what it c n grasp in the unity of a single act. " 99 Newly-
produced impressions pull back others from unconsciousness 
d . t d. bl 1 f . t• lOO accor 1ng o 1scovera e aws o assoc1a 1on. 
If the cantral import of Lotze 's thou ht be rightly 
interpreted here, it seems plain that he regarded the 
activity of anything as the truest possible expression of 
97. Lotze's distinction between the soul's primitive 
essence and its manifestations does not correspond to 
his distinction, made elsewhere ( ! IC, I, 252.), be-
tween the "empiric Ego" and the "true E'go ." The former 
is transient, for it is the soul at any given time 
under a particula r set of circumstances, the "datum 
self" (see Brightman, o_ , 227-228 .); the latter con-
sists of the permanent habits and peculiarities of the 
soul in question. See below, pp. 232-233. 
98. See below, pp . 175-176 . 
99. I IC, I, 214-215. Cf. 200. 
100. See below, pp. 215-223, for discussion of the unconscious. 
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its nature . Thus the true reality (or "true essence," as 
Lotze s a id) of the soul is to be found in its concrete ideas, 
emotions, and efforts, not in a noumenal substratum.101 It 
did not trouble Lotze, and he su~gested that it should not 
trouble others, that it is impossible to tell what the soul 
is apart from its activities . But what , on Lotze's showing, 
is this soul- in-itself but a useless abstraction? Is there 
any place for it--even the modest place he allows-- in 
reality? 
It has been shown that Lotze himself did allow it a 
place in reality--albeit a minor one. It has also been 
suggested that on the basis of his own principles Lotze 
probably should not have done so. There is ¥et another 
passage--a noteworthy one--which throws light on this 
matter . The passage occurs just prior to the final conclusion 
of the Metaphysic. 
If the soul in a perfectly dreamless sleep thinks, 
feels, and wills nothing, is the soul then at all , 
and what is it? How often has the answer been given, 
that if this could ever happen, the soul would have 
no beiTI?! .lliy have we not had the courage to say 
that, as often as this happens, the soul is not'? 
Doubtless, if the soul were alone in the world, it 
would be impossible to understand an alternation of 
its existence and non-existence: but why should not 
its li:fe be a melody with pauses , while the primal 
eternal source still acts, o:f which the existence and 
activity of the soul are a single deed, and :from which 
that existence and activity arose? From it again the 
soul would once more arise, and its new existence 
would be the consistent continuation o:f the old, so 
101. Cf . Moore, EAL11, 82. 
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soon as those pauses are gone by, during which the 
conditions of its reappearance were being produced by 
other deeds of the same primal being .l02 
In this passage Lotze would appear to have reached the 
logical fulfilment of his own position. There is no place 
here for a primitiv e essence which continues to exist while 
the soul ceases to exist, and if it comes and goes with the 
manifested soul it becomes a surplus concept--a fit object 
for Occam's razor. In the passages cited elsewhere ~otze 
appeared to retain it because it fulfilled for him the func -
tion of making it possible for the soul to develop . Here 
that function is cared for directly b- the nprimal being11 
without reference to any unknowable pr i mitive essence. 
Consistent with his principles , Lotze pretends to no know-
lege as to how this is brought about. 
It remains to be indicated tha t a slight shift in Lotze ' s 
thought on thE matter appears to ha ve taken place during the 
1 tt Of h].·s 11.·fe. 103 It t k d h f a er years was no a mar e c ange o 
opinion, but merely a change of emphasis and gradual elimina-
tion of ambiguity. 111 of the passages thus far considered 
which cling unmistakably to a primitive essence underlying 
the soul life are to be found in the 1'icrocosmus. Even 
102. LET, II, 317. f . /, iegler, Art .(l917) , 167. 
103. The date of the first volume of the Microcos mus (1856) 
and that of the ~1 etaphysic (1879, two years before 
Lotze's death) mark the outside limits of the period, 
although subsequent editions of the llicr ocosmus 
might be considered to push the forward limit later. 
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there this conception occupies a place of little real sig-
nificance in Lotze ' s thought . It is the manifested soul 
which is always at the focus of interest . But when it 
comes to the passages in the Metaphysic the primitive 
essence, the unknown nature of the soul, ha s all but 
disappeared \nthout a trace . ~ssence has become identical 
with activity . 104 Lotze never quite clinches the matter in 
a way which removes a ll doubt, but the preponderant impression 
of his work is that the soul is what it manifests itself to 
be: a complex of thinking , feeling, and striving unified 
in conscious experience •105 
This is the form of existence which man discovers him-
self to be, and which, when he reflects on it , proves to be 
the key to reality. It r eaches its perfection only in the 
personality of God , the nerfect person. 106 
4 . Summary 
More of Lotze's work dealt with the soul than with any 
other subject . It was largely because of his interest in 
the soul that Lotz e was interested in the body , which he 
regarded as the soul ' s specialized instrument of contact 
with nature . Yet it is not easy to say with assurance just 
what Lotze considered the soul to be . Becaus e he never gave 
104 . MET, I, 99 . 
105 . Of . Kalweit , PBGL , 16- 17 . 
106 . ' ee lviiC, II , 686- 688 ; OP , 56 - 69 . Of . Allport , PER , 
r.l ; Cohan , DGL , 24 ; Cressey , Art . (1893), 100; Fauth , 
Art . (l872) , 532 ; Xnudson , PP , 52 . 
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a satisfactory brief definition, it is necessary to take 
into account his entire thought whenever ambiguity appears 
which is difficult to resolve . His deepest ambipuity 
centered in the question: Is the soul something w~~ mani-
fests itself in the conscious life, or is it the conscious 
life itself? 
Before considerinr the nature of the soul Lotze 
analyzed and evaluated the arguments for its existence. 
The arguments from freedom and from the incomparability of 
mental with spatial occurrences he regarded as weak . How-
ever, the argument from the unity of conscio Qsness he re-
garded as unassailable . . sensation presupposes a subject. 
A comparison presupposes the indivisible unity of that which 
makes the comparison. The possibility of the combination of 
manifold phenomena in one experience presupp oses and in-
dicates the existence of a unified and unifying nature - -
the soul. 
In discussing the nature of the soul Lotze called it a 
substance. He did so in order to emphasize its unity, for 
he regarded substance and unity as linked together in the 
popular imagination. He did not, however, accept the 
scholastic conception of soul substance as an unchanging 
real entity underlying the conscious life without entering 
into it. For him substance was no more than a title to be 
applied to any entity having the power to experience and 
exert effects . On the whole, Lotze's use of the term substance 
12] 
was unfortunate for it tended to confuse rather than to 
clarify his conception of the soul. The true identifying 
characteristic of the soul for him was its power to recog-
nize itself, and this is dependent for its very possibility 
upon the soul's uhity. All knowledge, every act of relating, 
even perception would be impossible were it not for this uni-
ty of the conscious subject. 
In emphasizing the soul ' s unity, howeier , Lotze did not 
in any sense s oak either to explain away or to minimize the 
soul's rich va riety of states . The soul has three faculties 
--cognition, feeling , and will --no one of which can be re -
duced to the others. Each is equally inherent in the soul, 
yet the soul is not three--it is one, and it always acts as 
a whole. There are no detachable psychic states. 
~he mutability of the soul is undeniable. ~he soul is 
capable of excitation, and every changing impression--indeed, 
every single sensation--brings an alteration in its being. 
And yet the soul ' s variability is not unlimited. It is 
limited by the regularity of bodily functions and sensa-
tions, as well as by mental mechanisms . In short, Lotze 
found the soul's "unity in multiplicityn to be the empiri-
cally discoverable solution of the age-old problem of 
chan~e-and-identity. 
Although Lotze denied that the soul is unconscious 
substance or has an unchanging core, he yet left a trouble-
some ambiguity in his work on the question as to whether 
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or not the true nature of the soul is knowable . He affirmed 
that it is conscious, but failed to indicate with unambigu-
ous clarity that it is consciousness . The clmrge that Lotze , 
in the last analysis , made the soul unknowable by separating 
phenomena and things- in- themselves as completely as did 
Kant cannot be certainly refuted , but the balance of the 
evidence is against it. Some Lotzean wor~s can be counted in 
its favor, but the most characteristic emphasis of his work 
pointed in the opposite direction. His interest centered 
almost entirely in the manifested soul , yet he was unable to 
turn entirely away from an unknown something--a predisposition 
or prerequisite--which makes the soul ' s development possib~ . 
In the light of Lotze 's latest thought --as re flecte d in 
the Metaphysic , and particulatly in the passage where he 
denied that the soul continues to exist when unconscious--
it may reasonably be concluded that Lotze should have let 
Occam~. razor shear away the unknowable primitive essence 
which he never quite succeeded in eliminating . In the 
latter part of his life bisthought moved in this direction. 
The logical fulfillment of this trend was to regard essence 
as identical with activi ty. 
The soul , for Lotz e, was a complex of thinking , feeling, 
and striViTif': unified in conscious experience--a complex 
which not only is real , bnt which supplies the key to all 
reali t~ . 
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CHAPTI!l V 
THE RELAT ION BET~EN SOUL ADD BODY 
Lotze emphasized the importance of maintaining an em-
pirical method. He resisted every attempt to achieve a 
standpoint which transcends the human and somehow substi-
tutes for it a higher truth. Insight comes rather through 
returning to human experience and endeavoring to interpret 
it as coherently as possible. As has already been indi-
cated,1 Lotz e regarded the soul as immediately aware only 
of its own existence. Unlike Berkeley, he considered sensa-
tion a part of the soul. External nature, of which the body 
is part, is known only indirectly through the soul's experi-
ence. fhese facts were not used by Lotze as grounds for 
rendering doubtful the existence of external nature. He had 
no inclination toward such doubt. But they did render ridicM 
ulous in his eyes any attempt to use that which is inferred 
to discredit that which is immediately experienced and which 
provides the basis for the inference. 
Soul and body both exist. One we know immediately and 
the other indirectly--both on evidence sufficient to leave no 
reasonable doubt. But what is the relation between the two? 
Now that Lotze's views on the nature of each have been con-
sidered in Chapters III and IV, it is neccessary to raise the 
1. S e e a b ov e , p. 9 5 • Cf. MIC , I, 263, 272. 
question of their mutual influence. 
1. The Bond between Mind and Matter 
The most common form in which this question was raised 
in Lotze's day echoed Descartes' use of the pineal gland, 
and filled Lotze with impatience. What, it was asked, is 
the bond which unites soul and body? Lotze felt that the 
question could hardly have been put in a manner more pre-
judicial to clear understanding. 2 Is a bond needed to unite 
the two externally because there is no inherent connection? 
If such a bond is needed, how can it possibly be effective 
in producing reciprocal action between things not thus 
connected? And if the realities for which we have empirical 
evidence do not cohere, what reason is there to suppose they 
will attach themselves to an imagined entity? Indeed, how 
does such a conception add in any way to the intelligibility 
of interaction? 
To all these questions Lotze had emphatic answers. 
Such a bond is not needed, nor is it intelligible or in any 
way useful. 3 
We shall in the end have to confess that the ultimate 
elements are not rendered capable of reciprocal action 
by any pre-existing bond, but that the reciprocal 
action is itself what holds them together, and fits 
them to bind together other things, the mutual 
affinities of which are too weak to unite them in the 
face of opposing obstacles.4 
2 . MIC, I 273 . 
3 . 0~, 102; 1ffiT , II, 190-191. 4. MIC, I, 273-274. 
l f 
Reciprocal action is empirically observable in a rich 
variety of manifestations. How can it be supposed to take 
its rise from "this miserable idea of one universal bond"?5 
Lotze granted that some attempt must be made at explaining 
the manner in which body and soul were united in the first 
formation of life, but he clearly did not regard a universal 
bond between mind and matter as an aid in that direction. 
2. The Problem of Interaction 
In confronting the problem of the interaction between 
soul and body Lotze faced what has been called the most 
difficult and also, perhaps, the most fundamental problem 
in philosophy. 6 In view of that fact it might be asserted 
that Lotze took the matter in a surprisingly lighthearted 
manner. From one point of view the problem is not a serious 
one for him because the very fact of interaction overrides 
every other consideration, 7 so that interaction is more a 
solution than a problem. Lotze will not allow the outcome 
of the discussion to be that the interaction is impossible, 
for such a conclusion dashes upon the rock of the contrary 
fact. "Life acts on the soul through sensation, and the 
soul on life through will. " 8 Interaction takes place, and 
5. IC, I, 275. 
6. See, e.g., Kronenberg, MP, 29. 
7. C f. o ore , EALM, 84. 
8. Becher, DE, 58. (Author's translation.) Lotze regularly 
used "life 11 to mean organic life, and Becher is here 
following his usage. 
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any chain of reasoning which comes out with a denial that 
it is so has jumped the track somewhere. 
This oversimplifies Lotze, perhaps. There is more to 
be said on the matter than has yet been said, but the over-
simplification does sug est Lotze's persistent empirical 
emphasis. Facts are controlling. "No theories can change 
9 the facts." ~hey are not to be explained away on the 
basis of any a priori considerations. Interaction is, to 
be sure, not given in experience, but it is an inference 
necessitated by many of the facts of experience, unless 
those facts be distorted or explained away on the basis of 
metaphysical presuppositions. 
i. The Ultimate Inexplicability of Interaction. 
Our peculiar difficulty over the problem of interaction 
between the soul and body arises , Lotze suggests, because we 
can imagine only homogeneous things acting upon each other. 
Actuall~ however, our difficulty goes far deeper than we 
realize. We fancy propulsion, pressure, attraction, chemical 
affinity, and the like to be the "explaining conditions of 
reciprocal action" in the physical realm where as they are 
merely "forms in which in an inexplicable manner the action 
takes place."10 The complete homogeneity of two balls helps 
our imagination to picture the communication of motion in 
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9. ~. I I, 315. 10. MIC, I, 278. Cf. Hume, ECH, 63. 
their impact, but ultimately it does not throw light upon 
how it comes to take place. 
In considering a complicated and at first altogether 
incomprehensible machine we suppose that we have at last 
solved all problems when we discover how and where each 
wheel works into another or transfers its own movements in 
fixed directions to other parts. 11 ·Vhat we have done, 
however, is simply to analyze a big mystery into a number 
of small mysteries, each ultimately as inexplicable as the 
first. The usefulness of the analysis for other purposes 
is not denied, but it does not bring us closer to an under-
standing of how interaction can take place. 12 
In all these matters science is engaged in searching 
out what it is that actually does take place, and under what 
conditions. How it is that it comes to take place remains 
an incrutable mystery beyond the reach of science. To be 
sure, the imagination has handles of which it can take hold 
in dealing with the material constituents of the body which 
are not available When dealing with the immaterial soul, 
but is there any reason why science should not search for, 
and find, discoverable regularity in one kind of inter-
action as well as another? Lotze thinks not. The diffi-
culties which the imagination finds, or fails to find, 
signify nothing. Lotze is so sure of the soundness of this 
11. MIC, I, 276. 12. See OP , 98. 
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judgment that he makes it independent of his own metaphysical 
conclusions. 
Perhaps the subsequent course of our investigation will 
bring us to a point of view at which the heterogeneity 
of the immaterial soul and of palpable matter will have 
disappeared; but even should it not disappear, it does 
not--strictly speaking--magnify the difficulty.l3 
Trying to explain the general possibility of interaction 
between the soul and the body is as pointless as trying to 
discover a bond which unites them. There is no such thing 
as reciprocal action in general, or connection in general. 
~ery action is particular. Thus , even if the general 
possibility of interaction were explained, the need to study 
each particular kind of action would in no way be mitigated. 
The work of science, therefore, is cut out for it, and may 
proceed on the assumption of the equal inconceivability of 
all types of interaction. It can give up "the attempt to 
discover how and by what means effects are produced by their 
causes"
14 
and direct itself wholly to the more useful 
question as to what effects do universally and regularly 
proceed from what causes. 
ii. Lotze's Occasionalism. 
To the theory thus implied Lotze gives the name 
occasionalism. In doing so he recognizes the need to 
13. MIC, I, 279. 
14. MIC, I, 280. Cf. Hume, ECH, 70. 
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define the term, to distinguish it from uses to which it 
has been put by others, and to deny that it is properly used 
aa a term of reproach. Occasionalism, says Lotze, is the 
doctrine that all "we naturally regard as the productive 
cro1se of an effect is merely the occasion on which--how we 
15 know not--this effect appears." Science is but an 
accurate study of the occasions on which phenomena occur, 
with a view to discovering which phenomena are linked to 
which occasions. There is no reason why this method need 
be confined to the physical sciences. It can be extended 
to the study of the reciprocal action between soul and body. 
Despite his strictures upon the use of the imagination 
to override empirical evidence, Lotze uses his own imagina-
tion to go beyond empirical evidence when a useful oppor-
tunity presents itself. Notably, he uses it to reach a new 
conception of the physical atom--one much closer to the under-
sta nding of the atom which lay in the future than to that 
current in his own day. He gives up the conception of actual 
physical contact between atoms in collision in f avor of 
repellent forces mutually aroused by near approa ch. The 
phenomenon of collision t hus would be "merely the result of 
an inter n al direct understanding of things among themselves, 
in virtue of which they make their states act on one another 
according to universal laws."16 This concept--the product 
15. MIC, I, 280. 16. MIC, I, 281. 
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of his own speculative imagination--seems to Lotze to render 
mutual influence between the soul and atoms of the nervous 
system just as plausible as mutual influence between two 
different physical atoms. It also fits in with his final 
word on the whole problem of interaction: "From an onto-
logical point of view I regard a certain sympathetic rapport 
as the ulti~ate ground of every possible interaction.nl7 
The Lotzean conception of matter pictures seemingly 
solid, exte~ded material as a system of unextended being s 
Which fix one another's positions in space by t heir mutual 
forces and produce the phenomena of impenetrability and 
continuous occupation of space by the resistance which 
18 they offer--"as if to the intrusion of a stranger" --to 
any attempt to make them change place. Not only striking 
resemblances to (as well as differences from) twentieth 
century atomic theory are here called to mind, but also 
the conception of panpsychism, in which Lotze followed 
Leibniz. 
iii. Panpsychism and Occasionalism. 
It has been pointed out by various students of Lotze19 
17. MET, II, 200. Of. MET , II, 300. Of. also Calvert, PWS, 
47; Ward, RE , 256-257. 
18. MIC, I, 358. 
19. See Knudson, PP , 76-77. Schwedler (Art. [l902) , 159-160) 
and Wentscher (Art. @901] , 224 and Art. li916) , 148) are 
in essential agreement. Of. also Majumdar, Art.(l929), 
465. Thomas (LTR, 93-94, 176), after pointing out that 
131 
that he endorsed panpsychism in his earlier years, but later 
moved to occasionalism. This judgment is undoubtedly correct 
in a general way, although it puts the matter rather more 
simply and unambiguously than does Lotze himself. With 
Lotze it is more a shift of preference than a repudiation 
of one solution of the problem of interaction in favor of 
another. 
Occasionalism is plainly avowed as early as the 
publication of the Microcosmus and the Streitschriften, 20 
yet panpsychism is not directly repudiated even in the 
Metaphysic. 21 Near the end of the ontological section of 
the work he traces the line of reasoning which gives rise 
to panpsyohism, indicates that it is beyond direct empirical 
confirmation or disproof, and then at some length compares 
it with occasionalism as a solution of the problem of inter-
action.22 But having done so, he indicates that from the 
standpoint of his inquiry it is of little importance to 
23 
choose bet ween them. Later in the same work he again 
sug~ests that physical atoms have their own psychical life, 
which is, however, inaccessible to our direct experience. 24 
20. 
21. 
22. 
23. 
24. 
Lotze paid very little attention to the sub-human souls 
and gave them no place in the spiritual realm (see MIC, 
I, 248), suggests (LTR, 203) that he quietly gave up 
panpsychism. 
1856-1864 and 1857~ respectively. Lotze even uses the 
term in 1842, in A~T, 62. 
Published in 1879. 
See MET,I~ 224-226. 
MET, I, 2~6. 
MET, II, 173. 
1?;2 
Still later--indeed at the close of his work--in a passage 
that is difficult to interpret with confidence, he seems to 
incline in the direction of occasionalism. He sets forth 
the conviction that, if reality is a world of atoms and move-
menta of atoms, it can never develop from itself a trace of 
mental life, but rather forms nothing but a system of 
occasions in connection with which conscious life is won 
upon its own unique basis. 25 
The matter is thus laftin an inconclusive state, but 
the impression is gained that the position toward which 
Lotze inclines in his mature judgment is occasionalism. 
And it is no longer that casual or methodological occasional-
ism of the Microcosmus and the Streitschriften, which Ernst 
Tuch has called26 practical but not metaphysical; but rather 
it appears to be a full metaphysical occasionalism in keeping 
with his developed idealism. It would seem plausible to 
suppose that the occasionalism Lotze had in mind was the 
conception sat in opposition to panpsychism, without the 
expr ession of a definite preference, as noted above. 
Furthermore, the general outlines of Lotze's metaphysical 
position are consistent with such a supposition. 
In the discussion referred to27 Lotze raises the 
question as to whether it is necessary to retain the con-
ception of things, even on panpsychic terms. Two realities 
25. hffiT, II 316. 
26. Tuch, LSO, 24-26. 
27. MET, I, 225-226. 
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he affirms unequivocally: the existence of spiritual beings 
like ourselves which are permanent subjects, and the unity 
of the being in which these subjects have their ground and 
the source of their peculiar nature. Why, asks Lotze, 
should there be in addition a world of things which gain 
nothing for themselves from existence but simply serve as 
a system of occasions for the production in spiritual beings 
of representations which have no likeness to their productive 
causes? "Could not the creative power dispense with this 
roundabout way and give rise directly in spirits to t h e phe-
nomena which it was intended to present to them?" 28 Wby is 
it necessary to imagine an unseen and unseeable world as a 
means to t h e presentation of the world that is seen? Why 
should ther e not be complete ~orrelation among the several 
activities which the one Being carries on in the many spirits 
so that each individua l view of the world is ha rmonious with 
the others? ihy is not a reciprocal condi tionedness on the 
part of the innumerable actions within the one Being a 
satisfactory substitute for an imagined interchange among 
the things? 
If the suggest~on of these questions be accepted the 
changes of the image of the world within us would issue 
directly from the activities of the one Being rather than 
from many independent sources of operation bringing about 
28. MET, I, 225. 
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the changes externally to us, and Lotze might be character-
ized as holding to a continuously-established harmony, in 
contrast to Leibniz's pre-established harmony. Thus real 
operative atoms could be dispensed with except as a term for 
facilitating expression: it being understood that atoms are 
but persistent actions--connected according to the same laws 
of reciprocal action which are taken to apply to supn osedly 
independent things--of the one Being which is the ground of 
the world. 
Although Lotze does not, as has alre ady been pointed 
out, unambiguously embrace this view, the form of his 
questions strongly suggests that he accepts it as his own, 
and other considerations already cited tend to confirm the 
judgment. This is metaphysical occasionalism in the fullest 
sense of the word despite the fact that Lotze says, earlier 
in the etaphysic, 29 that occasionalism cannot be accepted 
as a metaphysical theory. 
The clue to Lotze's rdluctance to call his position 
metaphysical occasionalism is to be found in the original 
associations of the term. Descartes had regarded mind and 
body as two wholly heterogeneous substances, separated in 
nature by an abs olute and unfilled interva1. 30 Thus even 
his postulate of the divine assistance failed to make 
29. MET, I, 147. 
30. See Descartes, MSP, 16-17. 
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interaction between soul and body satisfactorily conceiv-
able.31 The doctrine of occasionalism was developed by 
Geulincx and, in a somewhat more mystical form, by ale-
branche in order to bridge the gap. Geulincx said that on 
the occ[.sion of a bodily change God calls forth the cor-
responding idea in the soul, while on the occasion of the 
soul's willing God moves the body accordingly. 31 The 
metaphysical dualism here taken for granted was rejected by 
Lotze, thus his doubts about the use of the term are not 
surprising. His occasionalism cannot be understood apart 
from its setting in his idealism. 
i v. The Conception of l aterial Being Abandoned . 
Vfuat has just been said strongly suggests that Lotze 
finally abandoned even the panpsychistic conception of 
material being. But, even if this conclusion be open to 
doubt, it is unmistakably clear that Lotze rejected every 
attempt to justify nthe common notion of a Thing without 
a Self.n32 Things are real through their immanence in 
33 God, but they have no independent reality. Lotz e's 
realistic idealism is ultimately no less idealistic than the 
forms of idealism against which he protested. ffiatter itself, 
31. 
32. 
33. 
Ueberweg~ HP, II, 
MET , I, ~26 . Cf . 
IC, II, 645~647. 
MIC , II, 644-645. 
42, 54. 
~' I, 226-229; MIC, I, 355-358; 
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34 
together with space, is "an appearance for our per caption" 
arising from the effects which a supersensuous being of like 
nature with us has upon the soul. Things are real, but 
their reality is of a special kind. They are actions of 
the one Being. 
An anonymous reviewer of the Metaphysic puts Lotze's 
main metaphysical conclusion thus: nonly beings who have men-
tal life have independent existence, and things without mental 
life, or material things outside of us, ••• are only mani-
festations of (jibe universal substance' sJ activity. n 35 But 
the matter can hardly be put more emphatically than by Lotze 
himself: 
Every single thing and event can only be thought as an 
activity, constant or transitory, of the one Existence, 
its reality and substance as the mode of being and 
substance of this on Existence, its nature and form36 as a consistent phase in the unfolding of the same. 
It thus becomes apparent that the problem of interaction 
between soul and body is ultimately but a special case under 
the problem of the one-and-the-many for Lotze. The body is 
a part of nature. It stands in a relation of interaction 
with the soul similar to, but more intimate than, the soul's 
37 interaction with other parts of nature. All nature consists 
34. MET, II 190. 
35. ~Tc., 57(1884), 1206. 
36. , I, 184. 
37. " te must admit, even for our own bodily life, the com-
plete validity of the principles on which the world of 
sense is interpreted ~y the mechanical system of 
inq_uiry into Nature."--MIC, I, 26. 
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of actions of the one Being. Vfuat, than--for the question 
can no longer be put off--is the exact nature of the relation 
between finite souls and the one Baing? Henceforth the term 
God can without hesitation be used for this Reality, or one 
Existence, or Supreme Being, for Lotze unreservedly identi-
fies it with God in the final analysis. 
The true reality that is and ought to be ••• is the 
living personal Spirit of God and the world of personal 
spirits which He has created. They only are the place 
in which Good and good things exist; to them alone 
does there appear an extended material world, by the 
forms and movements of which the thought of the cosmic 
whole makes itself intelligible through intuition 
to every finite mind.38 
3 . Lotze on the One-and-the-Many 
Consideration of the relation between God and the human 
soul brings up what is certainly one of the most puzzling 
points in the interpretation of Lotz e. Some things, however, 
are clear. ~hare can be no such thing for Lotze as unre-
lated existence,39 and pluralism of any kind, he is con-
vinced, implies unrelatedness. There cannot be, as Royce 
was later to argue, 40 a multiplicity of independent things. 
If there were, reciprocal action would be impossible, 41 but 
38. MIC, II, 728. See below, pn. 237-241. 
39 . MIC, II, 586. 
40. Cf. Royce, WI, I, 136-138. 
41. For some important passages on this question see MET,I, 
165-169, 217; II, 139 144-150; MIC, I, 381, 390; II 
596-601, 624-625. Lotze considers "transeunt" operation 
as always unintelligible. "Immanent" operation within 
one Being is alone thinkable. 
obviously it is not impossible. Therefore, all elements of 
reality must be regarded as parts of a single existence, 
although they may be separate relative to our apprehension. 
This position Lotze does not hesitate to describe as 
"Monism. " 42 
i. Lotze's Monism. 
\Vas Lotze justified in using the term? He certainly 
advocated no such rigorously unified world view as did 
Spinoza, or evan Hegel. It is evident from what has already 
bean said of the individual soul--and mora must yet be 
said--that it was not regarded as determined by God. Lotze 
evan makes it clear that God cannot foreknow the results of 
the free choices of man. 43 
Lotze's usa of ' the term monism bas lad to a diversity 
of opinion in interpreting him. Some have charged him 
with panthaism44 while others have absolved him of it.45 
42. 
43 . 
44 . 
45. 
See, e.g., MET, I, 165, 217. 
MIC, II, 708. 
Lotze was often so accused by his contemporaries. Sea, 
e.g., Trommsdorff, LBP, 11; Tuch, LSO, 44-48. As lata 
as 1932 Wolf calls his system an "idealistic panthaism.n 
--Art .(l932) , 35. 
Sea, e.g., and anonymous review inCh. Quar . Rev ., 
20(1885}, 239. Kronbaim takas a mediating position 
which likewise has the affect of vindicating Lotze . 
nLotza's monism is no pantheism, but, like the philos-
ophy of Malebranche, a panenthaism."--Kronhaim, LLED, 
41. (Author's translation.) Malebranche held that 
God is the place of spirits. We see all things in 
God through participation in his knowledge . Sea Ueber-
wag, HP, II, 54. For further discussion of panenthaism 
see below, pp. 148-150 . 
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Certainly Lotze himself was unwilling to accept the 
character i za ti on. 
The conceptions which we have formed concerning the 
meaning of the Real have removed us so far from the 
circles of thought in which Pantheism moves, that it 
is not possible to g ive a brief explanation of our 
relation to it.46 
He regarded pantheism as something dreamy and mystica1, 47 
which was prone to include the material as well as the 
spiritual in its unity and to suppress empirically discovered 
individuality. He repudiated it emphatically. 
Others who are not disposed to accuse Lotze of pantheism 
are inclined to criticize him for his use of the term monism. 
James Ward calls Lotze's position a "cheap and easy monism" 
. 48 
arising from a "short and ea sy method with p lur al1.sm." 
Lest this criticism itself seem unworthily "cheap and easy" 
it should be pointed out tha t Ward had a good deal more to 
say on the subject, and he did not dismiss Lotze so summarily 
as his remark suggests. In writing to vil1iam James on 
December 11, 1898, he had cited Lotze as the one who, among 
sane thinkers, had struggled hardest with the problem of the 
one-and-the-many--but even Lotze had been unable to make it 
clear. 49 The difference between Lot ze and Ward is to some 
46. MIC, II, 677. 
47. IC, I, 414-415. 
48. 1Vard, RE, 222. 
49. The letter is quoted in Perry, TCWJ, II, 135. vard 
concludes: "So here: 'our wills are ours we know not 
how,' and perhaps even with Lotze, this is the l a st 
word." 
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extent one of terminology . 1ard says that Lotze's unity is 
merely a logical unity, 50 and to resolve a logical unity into 
a personal individual which includes many persons as modifi-
cations seems to contradict rather than to explain the facts. 
It is true that the many are more than a logical unity, says 
Ward, but they are a unity of a different order from a person 
--just as a regiment is a unity, but is not a soldier. The 
existence of the many and their relatedness are not separable 
facts for "modern pluralism." Plurality implies unity and 
unity implies plurality. "But this fact, says Lotze, is an 
inexhaustible wonder. Unquestionably the universe is an 
inexhaustible wonder . Still after all a wonder is not a 
contradiction." 51 
v{illiam James's criticism of Lotze's monism is comparable 
to ard' s. I t is tersely stated in his "Syllabus of Philos-
ophy 3 (1902-1903):" 
Lotze's proof of Monism by interaction. ~urely verbal: 
call them 'one,' they can, call them 'many' they can't, 
inter act. The real question is, Jhat is interaction 
known as? Yhatever it be, it came, whether it came 
with the one, or in the many.5z---
Others either cr iticize or feel moved to explain Lotze's 
terminology. Valentine says that the degree of independence 
which Lotze grants to the finite soul renders the term 
50. 
51. 
52. 
See -lard, RE, 223. 
i{ard, E, 2 23 . For an analysis of {ard' s treatment of 
the one-and-the-many, see Bertocci, EAG , 108-114. 
Quoted in Perry , TC ~VJ , II , 748. 
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nabsoluten unacceptable as a name for his Supreme Being. 53 
Sorley adopts Lotze's use of the term monism, but acknow-
ledges that such use is not widely accepted, and is strong-
54 ly objected to by some. Knudson acknowledges that Lotze's 
argument for monism could equally well be taken in support 
of a more rigorous monism than Lotze intends. His refer-
ence to Lotze's system as a "limited and derived plura.lism"55 
ma.y be taken as an implied criticism of Lotze's terminol-
ogy.56 
Perhaps the most sweeping criticism of Lotze at this 
point ever set forth by a sympathetic critic has come from 
F. c. s. Schiller. 57 After paying tribute to Lotze and 
acknowledging his own debt to him, Schiller proceeds to try 
to show the following: (a) that Lotze had no ground, on 
his own principles, for seeking an underlying unity of 
things; (b) that his argument in reaching it is unsound 
and in conflict with his own truer insights; (c) that, in 
any case, the conclusion throws no light on the problems it 
is supposed to solve; (d) that the abs olute arrived at is 
not essentially connected with the religious conception of 
53. See Valentine, PLTA, 23-24, 27. 
54. Sor1ey, MVIG, 378n. 
55. Knudson, PP, 200. 
56. See below, pp. 144-145, 239-241, for discussion of 
Lotze's ~iew of creation. 
57. "Lotze's Monism," originally published in Phil . e~., 
5(1896), 225-245, but later reprinted in Schiller's 
volume, Humanism. 
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God, nor with Lotze's treatment of that conception; and (e) 
that, even if it could be so connected, it would contribute 
nothing to philosophy of religion.58 He expands and seeks 
to justify each of these points, but the first is, perhaps, 
the most significant. Interaction, says he, is implied in 
the fact that there is a world at all. Therefore, to ask 
for an explanation of it is to ask another form of a 
question which Lotze himself rules out as meaningless: 
~hy is there something rather than nothing?59 
These criticisms of Schiller's may be minimized as the 
product of a debater's complex, but they do underline the 
fact, already suggested, that Lotze's terminology here, as 
in some other instances, is not happily chosen. So eager is 
he to deny a fundamental pluralism that he fails adequately 
to safeguard himself in his use of and argument for monism. 
The place of verbalism in the strictures considered is sug-
gested by the fact that no one of the critics considered is 
in fundamental disagreement with the Lotzean position. Every 
criticism is essentially an internal criticism. The strong 
opinions expressed reflect differences of emphasis. Lotze 
sought to emphasize the metaphysical connection of things. 
For that purpose he used the term monism. He did not 
accept the implication of rigorous unity which that term 
58. Schiller, Art.(l896), 225-226. 
59. Schiller, Art.(l896), 228. 
had previously carried. His use of the term--at least 
60 
without more careful qualification--was unfortunate. 
ii. Lotze's Pluralism. 
The exact nature and extent of the qualifications 
which Lotze should h ave placed upon his use of monism, 
however, remain to be investigated. The individual soul 
as being-for-self is not in any absolute sense outside the 
infinite, but it does possess a relative independence. 61 
The Infinite Being produces nout of itself" souls which are 
62 
then able to receive stimuli from outside themselves. 
It is only "things without self and without consciousness" 
. 63 
which are fully immanent 1n God. Things Which exist 
for themselves--Le. , souls--do have what Lotze is willing 
to call an ''existence outside the Infinite." 64 It is not 
that the achievement of self follows upon detachment, but 
rather "it is so far as something is an obj act to itself, 
relates itself to itself, distinguishes itself from something 
else, tha t by t h is act of its O\vn it detaches itself from the 
Infinite.n64 The figurative expressions of inside and 
60. Bowne's argument for a "fundamental" or "basal monism" 
is essentially the same a s Lotze's, but he is much 
more careful to guard himself against misunderstanding. 
See Bowne, THE, 59-63. 
61. 0 ' 155. 
62. IC, I, 390. 
63. MET, I, 228. 
64. Mr.!T, I, 229. 
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outside are applicable respectively to things and souls in 
relation to God. 
Whatever is in condition to feel and assert itself as 
a Self, that is entitled to be described as detached 
from the universal all-comprehensive basis of being, 
as outside it: whatever has not this capability will 
always be included as 'immanent' within it, however 
much and for whatever reasons we may be inclined ~g 
make a separation and opposition between the two. 
iii. Lotze's Synthesis of ' Onism and Pluralism. 
If we define unqualified pluralism as the theory that 
reality consists of many independent bein s and unqualified 
monism as the theory that reality consists of one individual, 
then it is evident that Lotze's theory is neither. From 
the standpoint of unqualified pluralism, Lotze's system may 
be regarded as a monism. He did not hesitate to call it 
such. But it is equally apparent that from the standpoint 
of unqualified monism--quantitative as well as qualitative--
Lotze's system may be regarded as a derived pluralism. 66 
He avoided the term pluralism because of its implied denial 
of unity. He affirmed both unity and multiplicity at the 
same time, thus retaining within his system an unresolved 
tension. In defending his position he turned to Plato67 
65. MET I, 229. 
66. In terms 9f Hindu philosophy Lotze's position is closer 
to the visistadvaita (qualified non-dualism) of 
rlamanuja thart to the Advaita (non-dualism) of SaiDkara 
or the Dvaita (dualism) of adhva. See Bernard, HP, 
7-12. 
67. See~' I, 174, where he quotes an extended passage 
from the young Socrates in the Parmenides. 
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for support in the suggestion that unity and multiplicity 
are no more mutually exclusive than are sameness and 
difference when two things are being compared. 
Lotze found the soul to be a unity in multiplicity. 68 
In a sense the phrase might be applied to the whole of 
reality--but with a difference, for nothing associated with 
the human soul bears the same relation to it as the soul 
does to God. This relation might well be described--
although Lotze does not use the phrase--as independence-in-
dependence. ~he nearest analogy to it within human experi-
ence--not to be held fully adequate--is the child-parent 
relation, which has had such a significant influence in the 
development of Christian thought. 
The power of God is immanent in all of the phenomena 
of the universe. 69 Every finite thing possesses the 
capability of action only through his power, 70 yet the 
choices of finite souls are not determined by God . ~lliat 
is their relation to him? 
Traditional Christian theism has difficulties for Lotze 
because of its metaphysical dualism. 71 It seems to him to 
break up on the problem of interaction. Accordingly , he 
rejects it. But equally he rejects panthe ism. Indeed, he 
68. ~ee above, p . 110. 
69 . IC, I, 375. Thus Lotz e ruled out any suggestion of 
confining God's power to special miraculous channels. 
70. IC, I , 382. 
71. See hliC, I, 412-414. Of. earlier references to 
scholasticism and Cartesianism. 
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clearly thinks less highly of it than he does of traditional 
theism. 72 Nature is both an accumulation and an organism: 
73 it is an organic economy. Lotze accepts the divine omni~ 
presence in the sense first set forth by Bruno . God is 
equally and wholly present at all points in nature. Distance 
is no bar to his power, nor does the encompassing of dis-
tance add anything to the fulness of his being as imma-
terial, formless energy to which infinity of extension is 
nothing. 74 
fuat is Lotze 's final word on the relation of the 
one-and-the-many? 11 true reality "is the living personal 
Spirit of God and the world of personal spirits which He has 
75 
created." The extended material world is a means through 
the forms and movements of which the cosmic mind makes 
itself intelligible to every finite mind. The reality of 
the finite minds and their self-existence have precisely 
the same si nificance . Realness is not to be thought of as 
a consequence following from self-existence and therefore 
distinct from it. Self-existence is the whole positive 
content of the finite mind's reality and independence. 
Independence cannot be regarded as "some different kind 
of formal relation to the Infinite into which that which 
possesses self-existence ha s yet to enter." 76 fuile yet 
72. See MIC, I, 414-417. 75. 1/IC, II, 728. 
73. IC, I, 418. 76. MIC, II, 658 . 
74. IC, I, 291. 
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rema1n1ng "immanent in the Infinite as a state, activity, 
or modification of it," 77 the finite soul directly in 
its existence-for-self has obtained its realness and 
independence. It does no go on to detachment from the 
Infinite. 
The relation of the one to the many, then, is a per-
78 
sonal relationship in Which the many are in some sense 
states, modifications, or activities of the one, but not 
maintained in uniformity by it, as is the case with material 
things which are also activities of the one. The body may 
be viewed as a specialized means of communication in this 
personal interchange. It is the means, par excellence, 
through which the cosmic mind makes itself intelligible to 
the finite mind . But the question as to how the intelli-
gibility is achieved, as to how interaction between the soul 
and body is possible, Lotze does not claim to answer. 79 
All that can be said of any causal action is that on the 
occa sion of a change in one object a change t a kes place in 
another. It is not possible to tell bow. 80 
77. 
78. 
79. 
80. 
81. 
Lotze 's ))Osition has been called panentheism. 81 The 
IC, II, 658. 
Different from the case with material things. See 
Kraushaar, LTK, 73; Najumder , Art.(l929), 465; 
ventscher, Art . ( 1916), 147-148. 
MIC , II, 701. 
Of. Thilly , HP~ 497; Ueberweg, BP, II, 316 . 
By Kronbeim. ~ee above, p. 139n. 
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term is appropriate insofar as it indicates Lotze's effort 
to mediate between pantheism and pluralism. However, Lotze 
did not use the word himself and is not necessarily to be 
associated with all opinions included under it . Among 
contemporary philosophers, Charles Hartshorne has used the 
term in connection with a vigorous quest for a mediating 
position. 
According to Hartshorne, God orders the universe by 
taking into his own life all existing currents of feeling . 
He is the most irresistible of influences precisely because 
he is the most open to ~nfluence . 
All creatures • • • defer to God because they sense 
him as the one who alone is adequately moved by what 
moves them. He alone not only knows but feels ••• 
how they feel, and he finds his own joy in sharing 
their lives, lived according to their own free 
decisions, not fully anticipated by any detailed plan 
of his own. Yet the extent to which they can be per-
mitted to work out their own plan depends on the extent 
to whi h they can echo or immitate on their own level 
the divine sensitiveness to the needs and precio~s 
freedom of all. In this vision of a deity who is not 
a supreme autocrat, but a universal agent of 'per-
suasion,' whose 'power is the worship he inspires' 
( vfui tehead), • • • we may find in our task today, the 
task of contributing to the democ~atic self- ordering 
of a world whose members not even the supreme orderer 
reduces to mere subjects with the sole function of 
obedience.82 
This position Hartshorne calls both npanentheism" and 
and "surrelativism," but he denies that it is pantheistic. 
82 . Hartshorne, D , 90. If God "feels" in the feeling of 
his creatures as they feel, then this presents a crucial 
difference from Lotze's position; but if it is simply 
that the "divine sensitiveness" is greater than that 
of the creatures, such is not the case . 
149 
Three views, he says, are logically possible: 
(1) God is merely the cosmos, in all aspects insepar-
able from the sum or system of dependent things or 
effects; (2) he is both this system and something 
independent of it; (3) he is not the system, but is 
in all aspects independent.83 
The second of these views is panentheism, and it mediates 
between pantheism and traditional theism. Certainly Lotze 
stands with Hartshorne here, but also Hartshorne has not yet 
solved Lotze 's paradox of independence-in-dependence. 
4. The Body in Hela tion to Sensations and Volitions 
Consideration has been given to the metaphysics of 
Lotze 1 s solution to the problem of interaction between soul 
and body, but it is desirable now to return to a closer 
examination of the details of the process itself, for it ie 
upon them that Lotze built his theory. His early emphasis 
upon, and life-long interest in, physiology and psychology, 
and their relation to each other, afforded him abundant 
empirical data to use in building his theory. It was not 
his way to build his solution upon general considerations, 
but rather to proceed from a detailed consideration of the 
relevant facts. 84 
Every sensation is an internal phenomenon of the soul 
which can never be communicated to it from without, although 
83. Hartshorne, DR , 90. 
84. See, e.g., APT , 59-71; MET, II, 291-310. 
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a bodily impression elicits it.85 ~he body seems to do nothing 
more for sensations than to receive the impressions from 
without, "and so bring them into closer contipuity to the 
soul's sphere of action in a form favourable to easy and 
exact tr nsmission. n 86 The bodily impression is merely the 
occasion upon which the sensation arises from the nature of 
the soul itself. The modes through which the bodily life 
influences the mental are undoubtedly complex and various, 
but the former can never convey ready-made to the latter 
either consciousness in general or any particular sensation 
or thought. ~he external influences are but Si?nals for the 
evolution of internal states according to unchanging laws. 
"The whole world of sensation is an internal development, nA? 
but the internal development is nom under the control of the 
soul. The soul cannot even, for example, combine two sensa-
tions--although it can relate them.88 They arise in accord-
ance with laws which it does not regulate. 
Our im~ediate consciousness knows neither the nature of 
the external stimuli that occasion sensations nor the means 
by which their impressions on us are effected. It is the work 
of science to discover the nature of light and sound waves, 
and also the processes which they evoke in our nervous systems, 
85 • 
86. 
87. 
88. 
. Ic, I, 282 . 
· IC, I, 318 . 
MIC , I, 283 . Lotze su gests that we shall never know 
how the physical impulse passes into the sensation. See 
L..uT , I I , 2 03 • 
OP, 40-41. 
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but nothing comes into our consciousness except the sensation 
of tone or color itself. And what is true of sensations is 
true also of willing . The soul knows nothing of the means by 
which movements are executed at the behest of the will . 89 
Again, it is the work of science to ferret out the ways of 
motor nerves and muscles . kany moti ons do not result from 
volition, but take place as a result of emotional excitement 
or other causes without, or even against, volition.90 
Thus psy chic sta tes--both voluntary resolutions and non-
voluntary feelings and ideas--are made the starting points of 
processes which are carried out with mechanical certainty 
quite apart from any co-operation from the soul, or even 
from any knowledge on its part that such a process is possible . 
Accordingly, Lotze attaoks91 the simile in which the body is 
likened to a ship and the soul to its steersman. steersman 
knows much more ab out the working of his ship t han t he soul 
doe s of the working of its body. The soul is no arbitrarily 
ruling power whose will is law to the body . volition is not 
to be confused with accomplishment . vill itself no more ex-
tends to the body than it does to external nature beyond the 
body . It is confined to the soul . 
Lotze thus clearly believed that neither the means by 
89. MET, II , 300. 
90. Lotze also recognized what he called ( IC, I, 123) 
organic adjustment, in which response to stimulus takes 
place without the co- operation of t he soul . 
91. MIC , I, 285-286 . 
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which sensations arise nor those by which volitions become 
effective are either devised or watched in detail by the 
soul. It merely receives their effects on the one hand 
and initiates them on the other. 
5. Influence of the Soul on Bodily Form 
Even as the soul cannot be regarded as the steersman of 
the body, it cannot be regarded as having co-operated in the 
building up of the corporeal form. The form of the body is 
prepared at a period prior to the emergence of the mental 
activities characteristic of the sou1. 92 However, the 
necessary rejection of any role for the soul in the initial 
construction of the body need not carry with it the rejection 
of all influence by the soul upon bodily development. Indeed, 
Lotze left the way fully open for the development in psycho-
somatic medicine which has taken place since his time. 
Lotze held that this influence of the soul is important 
and that it goes back to the earliest stages of the soul's 
life, manifesting itself through the ninchoate emotions, 
still unconnected with any definite reactions, that agitate 
the undeveloped soul of the growing organism. n 93 The soul 
is constantly constrained by its relation to other elements 
in the co-operative process of growth. 94 The depth of the 
92. MIO, I, 287. Of. MET, II, 139-140. 
93. MIO, I, 288. 
94. Of . l~T, II, 134-135. 
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soul's nature gives it a significant place, but Lotze did not 
claim to be able to estimate the actual extent of its in-
fluence. In the full-grown body the soul's power to mould 
form is certainly slight. It is exerted mostly in an in-
direct manner through alteration in such operations as heart-
beat, respiration, and digestion. It may be more readily 
said to affect the bearing of the body than its form. 
1fuile we willingly allow that the ennoblement of the 
mental life in the end ennobles also the bodily form, 
that its degradation tends to the deterioration of the 
latter, we aTe inclined to limit to this the influence 
of the soul. ~b 
6. The Seat of the Soul 
Nothing in Lotze's conception of the soul suggests 
space or space relations. The soul is clearly unextended, 
and therefore occupies no space . However, it interacts with 
the body which is involved in space, so the question naturally 
arises as to whether position can be ascribed to it. 
i. The Position of the oul in the Body. 
Lotze sees no difficulty in ascribing position to unex-
tended being, 96 but he wants it clearly understood what posi-
tion means: nTo be in a place means simply and solely to exert 
action from that place and to experience the actions of effects 
97 that reach that place.n Accordingly, by definition, it 
95. MIC, I, 289. 97. ~' II, 284. 
96. MIC, I, 290; OP, 165. 
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is "a downright error" to hold that there can be any meaning 
in the assertion that "a thing is in a place, and consequently 
ac uires capability for a particular direction and extension 
of its action." 98 In the light of this definition of position, 
Lotze holds tha t "every theory must search out a seat for the 
soul." 99 Such position will be determined by the actions of 
the soul, and will consequently be limited to the body for 
all save believers in clairvoyance (of whom Lotze was not 
one) •100 '' We are aware only of what affects the body, we move 
it alone; through its instrumentality the outer world acts on 
us, and we act on it."101 But the spatial reference of the 
soul must be still more limited, for corporeal states which 
do not excite any part of the nervous system can be of no 
direct concern to the soul. 
Thus it becomes clear that the great mass of the body--
all, indeed, save the nervous system--is essentially no 
differently placed with respect to the soul than is the 
outer world. Both affect it indirectly. Furthermore, the 
end is not yet, for a distinction must be made between the 
conducting parts and the more essential parts of the nervous 
system itself. The whole system of nervous transmission 
98. MIC, I, 293. 
99. MIC, I, 291. 
100. As to extrasensory perception in general, Lotze did 
not rule it out on a priori grounds. He did, however, 
assert that it had never been clearly associ a ted with 
an advance in knowledge. See OP, 144. 
101. MIC, I, 295. 
15 
is but a means of conveying to and from the central organs 
the impulses of impression and volition. At most, then, the 
soul can be in direct reoiprocal action only With the central 
organs of the nervous system. Lotze, however finds it 
necessary to go yet a s tep further. Observa tions in cases 
where the spine has been severed from the brain have made it 
clear that the functions which the spine discharges do not 
involve consciousness. Accordingly, the soul•s102 direct 
reciprocal action must be limited to the brain--which 
therefore may be regarded as the soul's seat. 
Can the matter be carried still one step further, and 
the seat of the soul be located at some one point within the 
brain at which all sensory and motor nerves combine? No, 
says Lotze, because ''as yet anatomy has not been able to 
find any such point, and there is no hope of its doing so 
hereafter . " 103 And, in any case, the search for such a 
point could not lead to the discovery of a geometrical point. 
The junction of nerve fibers, no matter how small, would 
always have some cubic capacity, which would be difficult 
to reconcile with the indivisible and non-spatial soul. 
Returning to the meaning which Lotze assigned to 
location in a fixed place, it will be recalled that the term 
102. In the relevant passages Lotze clearly uses soul and 
consciousness as equivalent terms. See, e.g . , MIC, 
I, 296-297. 
103. MIC, I, 298. 
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involves no more than the capability of entering into re-
ciprocal relations with such real elements as may be 
resident there. If the soul may be supposed to be in mutual 
relations with many such elements, then its place can be no 
less manifold . The seat of the soul must remain a plurality 
of points with the aue stion left open t;\S to whether or not 
they can be presented to the i agination as a unity. The 
coul cannot be thought of as moving from one point to an-
other, for it would need to be in r eciprocal action with all 
the points at once in order to know when to move where. 
~fuy has one set of tissues been chosen over others 
for the special privilege of direct relationship to the soul? 
Lotze professes no certain knowledge on all aspects of this 
matter, but he is quite sure that the basis of choice de-
pends upon functional rather than substantial differences. 104 
To sum up as well as to extend Lotze's view in this 
matter, it may be said that he rejected the analogy between 
the soul's relation to the body and God's omnipresence in 
th . 105 e un1verse. He r e jected the analogy suggested by 
action-at-a-distance with diminishing force. 106 He rejected 
the idea of one central point of contact, literally conceived, 
between the soul and the body. 107 The soul stands in direct 
and ungraduated interaction with a limited number of elements, 
104 . 
105. 
IC, I, 302. 
OP, 105-106. 
106. 
107. 
OP, 106-107. 
OP, 107, 111. 
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not with the whole world, nor with the whole body, nor even 
with the whole of the nervous system. These elements, Lotze 
infers, are in the brain, but he professes no exact knowledge 
as to their nature or location. These will be discovered if 
knowledge of the direct links of communication in the com-
merce of the soul with the rest of the world becomes suf-
ficiently exact to reveal them. The elements concerned, 
because of other functions which they serve as well, are 
distributed in space; therefore the seat of the soul com-
prises a plurality of points. 108 Each of the points is of 
equal value wi. th the rest. The soul is present at each of 
them with equal completeness, but not without variation of 
function, for the soul exercises a diversity of activities 
which can only mistakenly be compressed into the "formless 
109 idea of a single outgoing force." 
There is no danger to the unity of God in the conception 
of his omnipresence, even though he is wholly present at ea ch 
of the infinite number of points which form the theater of 
his activity. No more is there danger to the unity of the 
soul in the multiplicity of its spatial seat. If the imagi-
nation be naturally and unavoidably drawn to symbolize the 
unity as well as the multiplicity in a spatial way, the true 
seat of t he soul may be regarded as the geometrically or 
108. MET, II, 290; OP, 109-110. 
109. MET, II, 290. 
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dynamically central point among all those involved. Such 
an idea is harmless as long as it be recognized that it has 
"no objective meaning.nllO 
ii. The Validity of Lotze's View. 
The question must once more be raised as to whether 
Lotze has done well in his choice of terminology, and again 
it is difficult to avoid the impression that he has not. 
Assigning a spatial seat to the non-spatial soul has in-
creased Lotze's burden of explanation rather than decreasing 
it. He is equal to the task of making his view finally clear, 
but he has made matters more difficult both for himself and 
for his readers by introducing what, in the last analysis, 
can be regarded only as a figure of speech, but which app ears 
something else on the face of the matter. 
Lotze, who was--as we have seen--a metaphysical idealist, 
asserted the subjectivity or ideal character of space. 111 
How can the soul, in which space is but a subjective form, 
itself find a seat in that very space? The term can certain-
ly be taken in no more than a symbolic or figurative sense. 
When the matter is carefully examined, it will be seen that 
no real spatial contact is achieved between the soul and 
body for Lotze in any case. The nelements" in the brain 
which house the points of the soul's seat are not themselves 
110. MET, II, 291. 111. See, e.g., OM, 87. 
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points. They encompass cubic capacity just as surely as 
would the hypothetical single nerve junction which Lotze 
rejects and would be no more readily hospitable than it to 
the non-spatial soul. The truths in this general area which 
Lotze was concerned to defend should have been more clearly 
stated by him, without importing the confusing symbolism of 
the seat. These truths may be stated in three propositions. 
First , no external limitations are to be placed upon 
physiology in its study of the body. It should be encouraged 
to push its discoveries as far as its methods will take it. 
Second , when it has done so it will be no closer to dis-
covering the soul than when it began. We can never trace 
• the passage of a physical stimulation into a conscious 
sensation. Third, yet the body and the soul do unmistak-
ably interact. 112 
112. In the light of what has already been said it may be 
of interest to note Villiam James's criticisms of 
Lotze • s treatment of the seat of the soul in 1 PS . 
They are to be found in the penciled comments inter-
leaved between pp. 114 and 115 in James's personal 
copy of MPPS , now kept in the Houghton Reading Room 
of iidener Library at Harvard University. James 
described the whole course of Lotze's thought on the 
matter as empty, but expounded it somewhat as follows: 
Lotze attributes locality wi thout extension to the 
soul, placing it at a point in an amorphous mass of 
matter. The soul dashes from point to point, an 
action which assumes in advance a dynamic connection 
which would make mobility unnecessary. The criticism 
implied in this last remark is unjust, for the same 
point was made by Lotze himself in explicit terms. 
His conception was such that it was not necessary 
for the soul to dart from point to point . Here is 
the relevant passage from MPPS: "All of these 
160 
7. Forms of Reciprocal Action between Soul and Body 
It is not necessary for the purposes of the present in-
vestigation to give detailed consideration to Lotze's treat-
ment of the forms of reciprocal action between soul and body, 
but one of his points of interpretation should be given 
attention. Lotze holds that retention and reproduction of 
impressions can be achieved only by the undivided unity of 
the soul. It is not possible to a number of co-operating 
considerations are brought forward on the supposition 
that there is a fixed seat of the soul. The prejudice, 
however, that the soul oan receive its influences only 
in immediate cont~ct with stimulated nerve ends and 
the impossibility of showing a central point which 
would unite all of these ends have led to another 
assumption, namely, that the soul is situated in a 
mobile position in the brain. It supposedly does not 
remain calmly seated until the stimulus reaches it but 
hastens to the stimulus and collects impressions 
offered to it at the ends of the stimulated fibers. 
It is to be hoped that no one will object that the 
tissues of the brain will offer resistence to its 
mobility. It is possible to ime.gine that they can 
permit the soul to penetrate them in more than one 
way, so that its movements would not be hindered. 
However, it is clear that the soul, if it is to hasten 
to the nerve end which has just been s timulated, must 
already previously have received warning of this 
stimulation. It must therefore already stand in some 
kind of dynamic connection of interaction with this 
end in order that it may, as a consequence, achieve 
the spatial connection of contact ~th it. If, 
however, the first is the case, then the second no 
longer appears necessary. On the contrary, the 
hastening to direct contact would at the most have the 
purpose of a strengthening of that interaction which 
would have to be able to take place even without con-
tact, because it is the ground of the latter. 
Therefore mobility of the soul does not appear 
necessary."- -LIPPS , 121-122. (Author's translation. ) 
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particles of the brain. He feels sure of this because 
recollections are so often synthetic images casting familiar 
figures in forms under which they have never actually been 
previously observed. Any attempt to account for the 
retention of conceptions (which may be expressions of internal 
relations as well as images of objects) through corporeal 
copies can but confirm "the necessity of including memory 
among the operations derived immediately from the soul's 
peculiar natur e.nll3 
In brief, Lotze denies that bodily organs can be re-
garded as the efficient causes of mental phenomena. He is 
not, however, unmindful of the bearing of disease and in-
jury upon this matter. His view is that the bodily organs, 
while they do not produce the mental life, yet have the power 
to provide an obstacle to it on being themselves disturbed. 
It is incomprehensible that a corporeal organ, which does 
not itself possess the capacity of consciousness, should 
confer that capacity on the soul. Yet the tendency of 
certain organic injuries to impair, derange, or even blot 
out the consciousness is plainly attested by abundant 
empirical evidence. In support of his interpretation of 
this evidence Lotze points to the implausibility of supposing 
that sleep results from the exhaustion of the central organs, 
which are thereby rendered unfit for further generation of 
113. IO, I, 328. Of. MET, II, 310-313. 
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consciousness. How readily sleep can follow the vigorous 
exercise of the powers, and how clearly can its accidental 
interruption show that exhaustion had not taken place after 
all! It is plausible to suppose that a growing feeling of 
exhaustion becomes an obstacle to a train of thought and 
gradually drains interest away from its continuance. On the 
other hand one who awakens from a profound sleep gives 
the impression that he is gradually being set free from 
obstacles. 
Accordingly, Lotze concludes that consciousness need 
not be "generated by an organ," injury to which causes its 
cessation; rather it is an "inborn capacity of the soul" 
which "may be opposed by impressions from innumerable 
quarters that unfavorably affect the soul's inward con-
dition. n 114 
Lotze's treatment here illustrates his tendency to 
deal with the same subject at different levels in different 
contexts, without fully correlating the results. At the 
deepest level he regards consciousness as generated by 
divine causality. It is an inborn capacity of the soul 
only because of the divine causality. But not all of his 
statements are written as in the light of this basic 
conception. 
114. MIC, I, 330. Cf. Krestoff, LMS, 64-65. 
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8. The Psycho-Physical Mechanism 
One important Lotzean conception bearing upon the re-
lations of soul and body has not yet been considered. It is 
the psycho-physical mechanism. The conception was first 
introduced by Lotz e in the edicinische Psychologie under the 
name physico-psychical machanism, 115 and so used in the 
Microcosmus116 and the Streitschriften. 117 But in the 
etaphysic h e accepted with gratitude Fechner's "pleasanter'' 
and less awkward phrase for the same idea, namely, psycho-
physical mechanism. 118 
Lotze holds the psychical life to be, in important re-
spects--although not completely--subject to law. The un-
mistakable regularity with which the psychical life is in 
countless instances realized after the same patterns cannot 
be denied. rVhen the same processes are repeated numberless 
times in every soul it points to connections following 
universal laws. Any doubts one may have concerning the ten-
dency of this discovery in the direction of universal neces-
sity do not avail to deny so plain a set of facts. But Lotze 
goes further and applies to the commerce between soul and 
body a series of thoughts similar to thmse which apply to 
the interaction of physical elements. The soul is regarded 
115. See M~S, 66-122. 117. Sea STR, 89-121. 
116. Sea, e.g., MIC, I, 344. 118. See MET , II, 187. 
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as a unified existence and the body as a number of other 
interconnected existences, but the two are always observed 
in interconnection with each other. 119 The psycho-physical 
mechanism allows each side a sphere of interaction, but at 
the same time each has a field of activity of its uwn wherein 
the other has no constant participation.120 The mental life 
arises from the interaction between the two: it is the 
experience of the soul, "but stirred to actual existence 
by the influences of the external world.nl21 
The familiar objection that the incomparability of mind 
and material makes interaction impossible Lotz e meets once 
122 
more in two ways. First , he argues that the strength of 
the argument rests essentially upon a failure of the imagi-
nati on rather than in any basic lack of intelligibility in 
what is proposed. Then he goes on to argue that there is no 
real gulf of incomparability between mind and the material 
world a~way, for when the latter is truly understood it 
can be seen to be 1'nothing but an appearance for our 
perception." 123 
Soul and body form a complex double, but united , life. 
Nevertheless man's personality is to be found in the soul 
119. MET, II, 166, 183. 
120. MET, II, 194. 
121. MET, II, 187. See above, pp. 150-151. Cf. Krestoff , 
LMS, 63, 83. 
122. MET, II, 187-189. 
123. MET, II, 190. Cf . MIC, I, 364. 
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alone, while the body is only the echo or appearance of its 
action. The body remains a part of the soul's external 
world, albeit the part with which it is most intimately 
bound up. 124 
9. Beginning and End of the Soul's Life 
Lotze is not insensible of the questions raised by the 
soul's intimate relation to and interaction with the body. 
How and when does the soul come into being? How is the 
marvel achieved in the propagation of the race that every 
soul finds its body and every body is quickened by its 
spirit? Vhat happens when--as surely it must--the partner ... 
ship dissolves? What happens to the soul of whose "desti-
nation to endless development we seem to have a ple dge in 
the significance of all that it has undertaken and accom-
plished in union with the body"?125 
Characteristically, Lotze does not for a moment suggest 
that final and certain answers to these questions are to be 
expected . Nevertheless , they are of such pressing moment 
that they cannot well be avoided, and, accordingly, he 
gives them consideration. 
124. MET, II, 191. 
125. MIC, I, 370. 
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i. Origin of Souls. 
There is no reason why the thought of a soul having a 
b · · t b "d d 126 N t th "d that eg1nn1ng mus e avo1 e • o more mus e 1 ea 
127 its formation is a gradual process be shunned. fuen the 
soul does arise it does so in constant conjunction with the 
physical development of the organism with which it is 
identified. fuat are their reciprocal relations? That 
Lotze did not rega rd the soul as a collateral effect of the 
physical forces of the body has been made clear. But there 
is no difficulty involved in the concep tion of God creating 
the soul in conjunction with the body--except, perhaps, a 
difficulty of the imagination. God is not to be thought 
of as far removed in space so that he is called upo n to ma ke 
a journey in order to exert his influence, not yet is he 
present everywhere as a homogeneous and formless substance 
penetra ting all, bu t h e is constantly and indivisibly present 
in the full inner wealth of his nature at every point of 
space providing the basis for interaction between body and 
soul, even as he does for any t wo atoms. 127 Therefore, every 
idea of external conjunction between soul and body can be 
discarded, as can the search for a given moment at which the 
soul enters into a development entirely physical prior to 
that time. 
126. MIC, I, 390. 127. MET, II, 184. 
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Body and soul are both gradually wrought under the 
incessant care of God. The soul is a growing being which, 
in Lotze's view, gains both in the significance of its 
substantiality and the intensity of its unity. 128 If one 
were able to observe the process, as he can organic life, 
with a microscope, he would no doubt observe psychical life 
steadily developing, starting with extremely faint begin-
nings. The process is just what one would be led to predict 
on the basis of that materialistic view which fails because 
of the unity of consciousness which the process actually 
develops. EVen as an organism develops, a soul appropriate 
to it is "made or created by the absolute" not "out of 
nothing' but nto satisfy the imagination we may say from 
itself, from its own real nature ."129 The "Infinite" 
expresses the inherent truth of its own being through the 
simultaneous development of soul and body. nThe soul 
originates neither in the body nor in nothing; it goes forth 
from the substa~ce of the Infinite.n 130 It is not a case of 
ready-made minds being arbitrarily distributed to infant 
germs. Just as the bodily or~anism is the descendant 
of parental organisms, so the creation of souls follows a 
self-imposed law which binds the generations together. 
128. 
139. 
130. 
The whole but teaches "how unsearchable are the ways 
MET, II, 185. 
MET, II, 186. 
MIC, I, 391. 
Cf. MIC, I, 390. 
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of God. n 131 By faithful observation we can here and there 
get a glimpse of the direction in which the spiritual order 
tends, but its observation will never be possible with the 
same exactness that can be achieved in viewing natural 
phenomena. 
ii. Immortality. 
The soul, then, arises gradually at the behest of God 
and in conjunction with the body, but by a process which 
cannot be traced in full detail. What, on the other hand, 
is its aestiny? In addressing himself to this question 
Lotze distinguishes three ways through which men have sought 
t th 1 f · t 1·t 132 Th f. t th o assure emse ves o 1mmor a 1 y. e 1rs pa may 
be passed over nuickly. It is the way of analogies, similes, 
and images through which the "doubting imagination" 132 seeks 
to reassure itself. Immortality can never be sufficiently 
grounded in this way, although the method is not entirely 
without suggestiveness. 
The second way--that of endeavoring to show that 
immortality "flows inevitably from the nature of thingsn 132--
is likewise rejected by Lotze. 133 It has already been shown 
that Lotze emphatically denies that the soul's substantiality 
guarantees its immortality and affirms that substantiality 
131. MIC, I, 391. 
132 . IC, I, 388. 
133 . See above, pp. 99-100. Of. also IC, I, 389; OP, 113. 
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so conoeived as to guarantee immortality must be denied to 
the soul. He even goes so far as to say that ''the question 
of the immortality of the soul does not belong to meta-
physic."134 This statement considered by itself, however, 
is somewhat misleading, for the considerations which Lotze 
proceeds to indicate as relevant would now be considered to 
fall within the field of metaphysics. The principle which 
he sug gests is the general idealistic conviction that every 
created thing will continue so long, and only so long, as 
it belongs to the meaning of the world. That mankind is not 
prepared to apply this criterion with any exactness is 
obvious, but so far as he is able to apply it he is dealing 
with metaphysical considerations. 
This sug estion itself leads to the third way in which 
men have sought to assure themselves of immortality: by the 
assertion that immortality must be provided by the ruling 
powers of the universe in order to meet the demands of 
justice. fuile Lotze does not concur in this statement of 
the matter, he does suggest that it is only from arguments 
Which fall under this general heading that the mind can 
derive any justifiable expectation of immortality . 
For Lotze , the existence of souls, the peculiarities 
of their nature, and the rights which seem to pertain to 
them are all unconditionally the product of the one 
134. MET, II, 182. 
170 
creative power in the universe.l35 There is no warrant 
whatever for assuming that what once is must necessarily 
always be. As finite souls are the creations of God, we 
can but suppose that their individual destinies are in 
accord with his will. "That will last forever which on 
account of its excellence ••• must be an abiding part of 
the order of the universe; what lacks that preserving worth 
will perish . "136 If man could project himself into the 
creative center of the universe he could see fully the 
application of this supreme law of our destiny, but he 
cannot. All that he can see is that immortality is a 
uestion of value, and his only reliable assurance of it is 
grounded in his reasons for believing in the goodness of 
God. If God re spects value, immortality is well grounded . 
10. Bummary 
Lotze regarded interaction between the soul--that which 
alone is known immediately, the conscious experience--and 
the body--a part of nature--as an inescapable fact. Con-
sidered as a problem, therefore, it could be known in advance 
to have a solution. Lotze's solution was embedded in his 
meatphysical system as a whole. Nominally he accepted pan-
psychism, but he paid little heed to sub-human souls and 
135. 
136. 
MIC, I, 388. 
rei r, 389. 
98- oo. 
Of. HBffding , HMP, 523; oore, EALM, 
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his emphasis on panpsychism declined as time went on. On 
the other hand, the importance of occasionalism in his system 
increased, until it may be said to have been his final 
solution of the mind-body problem. 
He never himself acknowledged that occasionalism could 
be regarded as a metaphysical theory. The reason was that 
he wished to distinguish his theory clearly from traditional 
occasionalism, which had been metaphysically dualistic. 
Lotze's system on the other hand was a thoroughgoing 
idealistic qualitative monism. All of nature, including the 
body, consisted of the actions of God. Accordingly inter-
action between the soul and the body could be seen to be 
interaction between the soul and God, and the problem could 
be subsumed under the problem of the one-and-the-many. 
Lotze's solution of this problem was misleadingly 
called monism by him. ctually it was a derived quantita-
tive pluralism in which the finite spirits were created, 
correlated, and maintained by God, yet by the fact of their 
existence-for-self were in possession of a measure of 
independence. 
In considering the details of interaction between soul 
and body, Lotze thought it neeessary to assign a spatial 
seat to the non-spatial soul. This he found, on the basis 
of anatomical and physiological data, to be a plurality of 
geometrical points in the brain at each of which the soul 
was fully present--without dif f erence of degree but with 
17 
difference of function. However, because careful examina-
tion of this Lotzean view shows it to have had only symbolic 
meaning, the use of the term "seat" may be judged to have 
been ill-advised . 
Lotze held th~t the bodily processes cannot be regarded 
as the efficient causes of consciousness, however they do af-
fect it. Disease, injury, and ~rowing fati~ue in bodily or~ans 
have the power to impair and obstruct the conscious life, even 
though it is not from the bodily organs that it arises . The 
two form a complex inter - related life . he conscious life is 
a product of the soul entirely, yet it is stimulated into 
being by contact with the outside world . The body is an in-
strument which has the effect of channeling these stimulations 
to the soul. ~he soul, in its turn, can be said to have 
significant influence upon the form and functional effective-
ness of the body, although it cannot be held to have had an 
important share in the establishment of either . To a part 
of the inter-related life of body and soul the term psycho-
physical mechanism may appropriately be applied . 
The soul and the body, according to Lotze, develop to-
gether. It is not possible to identify a time at which their 
association begins. The question of the destiny of the soul 
at the death of the body is dependent upon God's will, and 
therefore upon the soul's place in God's realm of values . 
1 
CH.AJ?TER VI 
EVALUATION OF LOTZE'S VIEW 
An exposition of Lotze's conception of the soul. and 
of its relations to the body, to the physical universe, and 
to God has now been completed. The incidental criticism to 
which Lotze's views have been subjected in the course of 
this exposition must now be supplemented by a more compre-
hensive critical evaluation of his conception. That need 
sets the task of the present chapter. 
In the accomplishment of this task it will be necessary 
to review briefly the advances which have been made in 
various fields of scientific investigation since Lotze's 
da¥• This must be done in order to judge the be aring of 
these developments upon the validity of Lotze's view. In so 
far as he thought about what the future might do to his work, 
Lotze would have expected such appraisal. This can be in-
ferred from the f act that he aimed to be empirical, in the 
broadest sense of the word. It has already been shown1 that 
he made a substantial contribution to the development of 
empirical method in philosophy. Any sincere advocate of the 
empirical method must expect that those who come after him 
will use his own method to modify his own conclusions. 
1. See above. p~ . 21 -~5 . 
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But something more specific than this generalization 
is meant in suggesting that the bearing of subsequent 
scientific developments upon Lotze's view must be considered. 
In many respects he built directly upon scientific results 
current in his day. He was not himself an experimental 
2 
scientist, but he was thoroughly trained in science and 
had a keen (though gradually declining) interest in it. 
Accordingly, it is necessary to consider how subsequent modi-
fications in the scientific results upon which Lotze depended 
bear upon his conclusions. 
Clearly the science of physiology is one which will re-
quire consideration. It was here that Lotze received his 
chief scientific training, and it is this science which 
relates most intimately to the bodily foundation of the 
human soul. It overlaps psychology at the most clearly 
scientific level of the latter discipline. It will be 
necessary, of course, to deal with psychology at various 
levels, for its treatment of the soul is the thing which 
justifies its maintenance as a separate discipline. To be 
sure, it is with Lotze's metaphysical conception of the 
soul that the present investigation is primarily concerned. 
Nevertheless, all psychological approaches are relevant. 
Lotze himself must certainly be counted a s one of . the most 
important psychologists of the mid-nineteenth century. 
2. Cf. Boring, REP, 250-251, 255. 
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Psychology was the only subject upon which he lectured during 
each of his 37 years at GBttingen, 3 and is reported by his 
colleague, Rehnisch, to have been his favorite lecture 
subject. 4 
However, before considering physiology and psychology 
it will be of interest to give consideration to the general 
composition of the material world. Reference has already 
5 been made to Lotze's view of matter. It may now be given 
more exact comparison with the conceptions of contemporary 
physicists. 
1. Lotze and Twentieth Century Physics 
Lotze died before the dawn o'f the "modern age" in 
physics; nevertheless, he showed remarkable prescience con-
cerning the future of scienti'fic development. 6 Among 
physicists in particular there was a tendency toward the 
end of the nineteenth century to consider that mankind was 
on the verge of finally rounding out its knowledge of the 
physical universe . Lotze did not share this opinion. He 
regarded the discoveri es prior to his time as no more than 
a "splendid initiation" 7 of man's rule over the forces o'f 
rna tter, to be followed by a rapid and indefinitely prolonged 
3 . Boring, EEP, 253. 
4. See OP, vi. 
5. see above, p. 54. 
6. See, e.g., MIC, II, 299-300. 
7. MIC, II, 299. 
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succession of new discoveries. He seems likewise to have 
foreseen, to some extent, both the advantages, in terms of 
comfort and convenience, and the problems which these 
discoveries would bring. 
The false sense of aclose approximation to complete 
mastery of their field with which physicists tended to 
approach their work in the years before and after Lotze's 
death prepared the ground for one of the most dramatic de-
velopments in the history of natural science. Just when 
physics thought its work was done, save for refinements, it 
was treading upon the threshold of a new era. The year 
1896, with the discovery of both X-rays and natural radio-
activity, symbolizes the birth of the new world of physics. 
Only two years earlier Michelson had said of the science 
"that most of the grand underlying principles have been 
firmly established ••• that the future truths ••• are to 
be looked for in the sixth decimal place." 8 And yet 
Michelson himself had played an important role in preparing 
for the change which he did not foresee. Just a few years 
earlier9 he and Morley had conducted their famous experiment 
to determine the absolute velocity of the earth through the 
ether. When a nil result was obtained some confusion and a 
8. Quoted in Oldenberg, lAP, 345. Taylor, PRY, 768, gives 
approximately the same quotation but ascribes it, 
surprisingly, to the year 1899. Neither cites an 
exact source. 
9. Published in 1881, the year of Lotze's death. 
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variety of explanations were engendered. But the true sig-
nificance of the experiment was not appreciated until Ein-
stein made tt a clue to one of the chief cornerstones of the 
new age, with the publication of the special theory of 
relativity in 1905. 
There are two points at which the new developments 
throw a light upon Lotze's views which is of at least pas sing 
interest. One concerns his view of the atom, and the other 
his emphasis upon mechanism in nature. 
i. The Atom. 
Historians of physics usually dutifully trace the 
th•ory of the atom (Gr. atomos, not divisible) back to 
Democritus who gave it a name in accordance with his con-
ception. However, prior to the work of Dalton at the be-
ginning of the nineteenth century atomic theory is re garded 
as a speculation without suff icient correlation to observed 
facts. Dalton used the hypothesis to interpret the ba sic 
facts of chemistry. By the middle of the century the theory 
of gases brought confirmatory evidence from a different 
direction, and placed the theory where it stood in Lotze's 
time. At the end of the century (1897), J. J. Thomson dis-
covered the atomic structure of free electricity, and thus 
laid the groundwork for the division of the indivisible. 10 
When (in 1901) Planck suggested the quantum structure of 
10. Cf. Oldenberg, IAP, 343. 
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radiation, the third foundation stone of modern atomic 
structure was laid. 11 
In 1911 Rutherford inferred a nuclear atom from the 
scattering of alpha particles by thin metal films, and Bohr 
followed this lead by pr ojecting the first solar-system-like 
model for the atom in 1913. This notion of the atom as a 
minute positively charged nucleus surrounded by planetary 
electrons was dramatically different from the ninete enth 
century conception. It was soon modified, however, by 
Sommerfeld's substitution of elliptical orbits for the 
circular orbits of Bohr, and neat fixed orbits of any kind 
had to be abandoned when the atom was reconstructed in the 
light of wave mechanics, after 1925. 
Following Anderson•s12 discovery of the positron13 in 
1932 the experimental observation of the "interconversion 
of matter and energy,"14 earlier predicted on theoretical 
grounds, quickly followed. It was found that a photon can 
be transformed into a positron and an electron--"the 
materialization of energy"15--while the two can, in the 
reverse process, combine to form the energy of gamma rays--
"the annihilation of matter. "15 
fuioh of the various particles that have been discovered 
11. Dampier- ~ihetham, HS, 402; Eddington, PPS, 28. 
12. And ~ackett's, independently. See Richtmyer, IMP, 
665-666. 
13. A positively charged particle of the same mass as the 
negatively charged electron. 
14. Taylor, PBY, 846. Cf. Oldenberg, IAP, 345. 
15. Semat, IAP, 319. 
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are most basic and the building stones of the atom is a 
matter upon which the final word has not yet been spoken. 
However, the intarconversion just mentioned suggests that 
none of them may be ultimate. Material particles may be 
regarded as a form of potential energy. 
fhile it would be misleading to suggest that Lotze 
foresaw the twentieth century developments in atomic theory, 
he did anticipate them in several respects. He did not, 
for example, regard the atom as indestructible by its 
nature.l6 He acknowledged that the conditions which would 
give it opportunity for dissolution had not been found in 
nature but, by implication, he left open the possibility 
that they might be found. In discussing the possibility 
of the divisibility of the atom, 17 however, he seems to 
suggest the infinite divisibility of the energy of which 
the atom consists, and thus is at variance with the impli-
cations of the quantum theory. But before this can be made 
clear it is necessary to expound Lotz e's view briefly. 
Lotze denied extension to atoms, and regarded them as 
"immaterial existences that from fixed points of space 
control by their forces a definite extant without in the 
strict sense occupyi~ it. nlB The forces exerted upon each 
other by these "llllextanded points" determine their separating 
16. MIC, I, 33. 
17. MET, II, 64-65. 
18. MIC, I, 35 . Of. MET, II, 63. 
180 
distances and relative positions, explain their vibration 
toward one another in the most varied forms of motion, offer 
observable resistance to change, account for impenetrability 
and apparent continuous occupation of space, and describe 
the outline of the extended figure which includes the atoms. 19 
Lotze saw no reason why the force s attached to a given 
position must be regarded as indivisible. They may be 
separated and become atta ched to new centers in ac cordance 
20 
with new conditions to which they become subject. The 
"degree of intensity" of each of the new sets of forces 
"or, to put it shortly, the mass of each"21 will be diminished, 
but the sum of all the masses, or intensities, will remain 
the same. 
Thus the relationship of Lotze's treatment of atoms to 
his idealistic argument is faitly clear. Mass is for him 
a form of energy. It is, as has already been indicated, 22 
an action of God. It certainly cannot be said that his 
conclusion has now been reached on scientific grounds--in 
the nature of the case, it never will be--but it can be 
said that the physics of this century is more compatible 
with it than that of the l a st. 
19. MIC, I, 358, 347, 35. Cf. MET, II, 40. 
20. MET, II, 64. 
21. MET, II, 65. 
22. See above, pp . 137 - 138~ 
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ii. Mechanism and Causality. 
23 Frequent reference has already been made to Lotze's 
emphasis upon mechanism in nature. Lotze was not a mechanist; 
he was an empha tic teleologist. But he believed that pur-
pose was realized in nature through mechanism. These point s 
are summed up in one of the most often quoted passages from 
Lotze's writings when, in the introduction to the Microcosmus, 
he indicates that he will endeavor to show "how absolute1y 
universal is the extent and at the same time how completely 
subordinate the significance, of the mission which mechanism 
has to fulfil in the structure of the world.n24 
Vha t bearing upon Lotze's mechanical view of nature do 
modern scientific developments have? What status remains to 
it in the light of what has been called "the decline of the 
mechanical view of nature"~ In the latter part of the nine-
teenth century it had become the unanimous conviction of 
scientific leaders that all of nature could be interpreted 
in mechanical terms. Indeed, it was only in that century 
that this view had come to its full flower, and it has been 
shown how Lotze played a role in one aspect of the flower-
ing.26 
23. 
24. 
25. 
26. 
The first doubts on t he matter occurred just prior to 
See above, e.g., p . 5 • 
MIC, I, xvi. 
Taylor, PHY, 761. Of. Tolman, Art. (1947), 5. 
See above, nu . 60- 70. 
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27 the turn of the century. They were soon confirmed in the 
quantum theory of radiation which rendered the usual 
mechanical explanation inadequate. Up to that time it had 
been regarded as essential that every acceptable scientific 
theory be mechanically pioturable. Now that requiremen t has 
been dropped; the only essential feature is that a theory 
center in a consistent body of mathema*ical relations. "If 
the concepts are mechanically picturable, that is not 
necessarily objectionable, merely superfluous as far as 
scientific theory goes. n28 These implications of the quantum 
theory were not grasped immediately, but developed gradually. 
Heisenberg's uncertainty principle--"that a combination of 
exact position with exact velocity is not observable" 29--
was introduced in 1925, and led, through the contributionsof 
a number of workers, to the development of the wave mechanics 
within a year or two. Meanwhile relativity contributed to 
the change with Einstein's special theory in 1905, and 
30 general theory in 1915, plus later contributions by others. 
Does this development require the surrender of the con-
ception of causality? Here is a matter upon which agreement 
ha s not been reached. However there are some points of 
agreement, and other points of instructive disagreement. 
There can be no doubt that the cla ssical conceptions of 
27. See Taylor, PRY, 762-763. 29. Eddington, PPS, 35. 
28. Taylor, PHY, 767. 30. See Eddington, PPS, 28. 
cause as inevitable necessity are no longer fully applicable, 
but this does not necessarily mean that the concept must be aban-
doned altogether. ax Planck says31 that physicists have di-
vided into two groups over the question as to whether causality 
is still a useful concept. The indeterminists, whom Planck 
thinks are probably a majority, hold that there is no genuine 
causality in nature; the impression that it does exist is an 
illusion resulting from certain discoverable approximate 
rules. Basically, every "physical lawn is as much subject 
to probability and its validity as much confined to statis-
tical methods as is the case with the wave mechanics. 
On the other hand, the determinists, in order to main-
tain their position, must confine causality to a "world 
image 11 which can never be applied with absolute accuracy to 
the real world of nature. Planck thinks that the quantum 
theory constitutes a real stumbling block for this theory, 
but he does not accept the other alternative either. Instead, 
he endeavors to mediate between them. ~he law of causality 
can neither be demonstrated nor refuted logically. 
It is neither correct nor incorrect; it is a heuristic 
principle; it points the way, and in my opinion it is 
the most valuable pointer we possess in order to find 
a path through the confusion of events, and in order 
to know in what direction scientific investigation 32 must proceed so that it shall reach useful results. 
This view is evidently more subtle than that of Lotze, 
for it takes into account considerations of which he knew 
31. See Planck, PP, 43-83. 32. Planck, PP, 82-83. 
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nothing. But its functional value is exactly the same as 
Lotze's mechanical conception of oausality. It is worthy of 
note that Planck's view in this matter is in accord with 
that of Philipp Frank33 who ordinarily misses no opportunity 
to express opposition to what he calls Planck's ''metaphysical 
conception of physics. 't34 Tolman points out that in physical 
processes uncontrolled disturbances are introduced by the 
very act of observation. 35 In the classical physics these 
disturbing effects were too small to be noticed--save for "the 
personal equatiorr' in astronomy--but now they cannot be 
escaped. There is no dodging the fact that in the light of 
the Heisenberg uncertainty principle it is impossible to 
predict the future of any physical system exactly. This does 
not, however, have the effect of telling decisively ether 
for, or against, , causal connection. 
2. Physiology 
In general, it may be said that Lotze's method was sound 
enough so that very few of his scientifically based con-
elusions now have to be taken back. He was empirical, widely 
informed, and cautious in drawing conclusions. To be sure, he 
was not above being taken in occasionally by an old wives' 
tale. Two examples may be cited from the field of human 
33 . See Frank, BEP, 195-197, 18. 
34. See , e.g., Frank , BPP, 11-12. 
35. Tolman, Art .(l947), 5. 
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genetics. He considered it a safe generalization with re-
gard to human births that more boys are born than girls 
when the father is older than the mother, and that the ratio 
increases with disparity in age . 36 Again, after noting that 
intermarriage between different races always produces inter-
mediate types and tha t intermarriage between thes e half-
breeds and individuals of the white race often gives rise 
to "forms of great beauty and also of good mental endowments," 
Lotze went on to sug gest that it "remains doubtful whether 
marriage exclusively among themselves would go on being 
fertile indefinitely." 37 
In Lotze's defense it should be said that he not only 
lived long prior to the development of the theory of genes, 
but even before Mendel gave genetics its first scientific 
formulation. 38 It is evident even in these absurd errors 
that Lotze's intention is to be empirical. Although it is 
true t hat the final judgment in the second case appears to 
be the uncritical acceptance of common prejudice and may 
have been made in ignorance of the existence of largely 
endogamous Eurasian communities of several generations 
standing in India and elsewhere, the first error is intended 
to be little more than a statement of empirical evidence in 
generalized form. And the surprising thing about Lotze's 
36. MIC, I, 501. 
37. MIC, I, 521-522. 
38. Although Mendel's actual experiments were begun during 
the 1860's, his work did not become generally known 
until 1900. See Dampier- iVhetham, HS, 347. 
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work is not the fact that it contains some errors of judg-
ment, but that it contains so few. His whole approach to 
scientific facts and their interpretation is remarkably 
open to the future. 
Thus Lotze's physiological work still makes very in-
structive reading. It is almost wholly free from positive 
assertions which subsequent investigations have proved 
false. Its chief shortcomings concern important subsequent 
developments which Lotze did not anticipate and lines of 
development which he seems by implication tobave anticipated 
without justification, inasmuch as they have not yet, at 
least, been realized. In the former category perhaps the 
most striking matter is the remarkable development in the 
field of endocrinology. In the latter category attention 
must be g iven to the nervous system, with particular 
reference to nervous conduction and to cerebral localization. 
i. The Endocrine System. 
It has already been pointed out in reviewing Lotze's 
treatment of the body39 that the most important physiological 
development since his day ha s been the discovery of the 
tremendous importance of the internal secretions of the 
18 7 
ductless, or endocrine (Gr. endon, within, krinein, to separate), 
glands. The concept that the activities of the body may be 
39. See above, p . 80 . 
regulated by chemical substances given off by its tissues 
and organs is as old as physiology itself. As early as the 
end of the fifth century B.C., for example, Hippocrates 
taught his students that health and temperament depend upon 
the bodily humors. 40 Nevertheless, the experimental eluci-
dation of the functioning of the ductless glands has been 
accomplished almost entirely within the past generation--and 
there is a great deal which remains yet to be discovered . 
A few experiments which can be looked back upon as 
harbingers of endocrinology as a science took place during 
Lotze's lifetime, but their full portent was certainly not 
then understood . Earliest and most striking of these were 
the experiments - of Berthold (published in 1849) on the 
effects in the fowl of caponization and testicular trans-
plantation.41 Experimental and clinical observations in 
the field, however, did not become numerous until the decade 
following Lotze's death, while progress cannot be said to 
have become rapid and systematic until about 1920. Such 
methods as the surgical extirpation and transplanting of 
glands, administration of glandular extracts, and clinical 
study of the effects of naturally defective glands have 
been used to accomplish the results. 
In its broadest sense, endocrinology may now be viewed 
as the branch of physiology which deals with the chemical 
40. Turner, GE, 5. 41. Turner, GE, 6. 
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integration of the organism. As such it embraces more than 
the system of ductless glands ; 42 however, they provide its 
central study. Their true function was not understood until 
recent times. Previously the control of the bodily functions 
was thought to be entirely accomplished by the nervous 
system. 43 Now it is known that, in general, the quick 
adjustment of muscles and glands in response to changes in 
the environment is accomplished by the nervous system, while 
metabolism, growth, reproduction, and other processes which 
require prolonged stimulation are influenced greatly by 
. M blood-borne endocrine secret1ons. 
In contrast to the glands of external secretion, which 
have tubes through which the fluids they manufacture are 
conducted to the surface or into the cavities of the body, 
the ductless glands pour their secretions directly into the 
blood stream. 45 These secretions are called hormones (Gr. 
hermon, exciting) because of their function in exciting or 
stimulating growth , development, and functional activity. 
The term, in its broadest sense, may be applied to the 
products of any tissue in the body which are carried as 
excitants to any other tissues by the blood stream. 46 
42. Turner, GE, 32. 
43. Best and Taylor, HBF, 355. 
44. Turner, GE, 12. 
45. Of. Best and Taylor, HBF , 334. 
46. See Best and Taylor, LB, 320. Sometimes the term 
chalone is applied to substances which have an inhibitory 
function, but more commonly hormone is applied to both 
exciting and inhibiting substances. 
18 
The glands are so intimately interrelated that the 
problem of separating their functions has been complex and 
difficult. They supplement and counterbalance each other 
47 
to maintain a delicate equilibrium. So far, the function 
of the following glands is known in extensive, if not com-
plete, detail: the pituitar~, thyroid, parathyroid, and 
adrenal glands; the islets of Langerhans in the pancreas; 
48 the duodenal mucosa; the gonads; and the placenta.. However, 
there are a number of bodily structures suspected of exer-
cising as yet undetermined endocrine functions: the pineal 
gland, thymus, stomach, spleen, liver, and kidney cortex. 49 
It is not necessary here to consider these structures sepa-
rately and in detail, but it is necessary to raise the 
question as to the meaning of their total operation for 
Lotze's view. 
The development would appear to leave Lotze's view un-
touched. Endocr inology would come under the heading of that 
growth in physiological knowledge which Lotze encouraged 
without claiming to be able to foresee. He was readily 
willing to acknowledge (on behalf of himself and all of his 
contemporaries) the inadequacy of his own knowledge. 
Is the system of endocrine glands in any way under 
our conscious control? So far as is known, it is not. 
It is a subconscious means of controlling many functions 
47. See Vaughan, G~, 191, 202. 49 . See Turner, GE, 19-26. 
48. See Turner, GE, 12-17 . 
190 
vital to the organic life. Lotze alre ady assumed that all 
of these functions were automatically controlled below the 
conscious level; be was simply unaware of the means by 
which this took place. An unbalanced endocrine system has 
a detrimental effect upon the conscious life of a kind 
wh ich can be included under Lotze's conception of the 
detrimental effects upon the soul of a diseased body. ~at 
the possibilities and limitations of mutual influence be-
tween the mind and endocrines may be cannot now be said with 
confidence, but definition in the field is part of that 
future for psychosomatic medicine with which Lotze's view 
50 
seams likely to prove compatible. 
ii. The Nervous System. 
It has already been indicated that Lotze was more 
interested in the nervous system than in any other part of 
the bodily equipment, because of its intimate association 
with the conscious life. 51 His knowledge of it was 
necessarily slight and in large measure conjectural, for 
very little real experimental work had yet been done in 
the field in h is time. Anatomical dissection bad led to a 
general knowledge of the structure of the system but its 
functioning wa s l a rgely inferred from data other than those 
50. See above, p . 187 . 
51. Sea above, pp . 151- 152 . 
19 
gathered from controlled experiments. Yet Lotze was in a 
position in which his philosophical interests demanded 
suppositions going beyond assured scientific results. He 
wa s aware of what he was doing and was conscient ious, as 
always, about pointing out the limitations of his knowledge. 
These considerations have special importance with 
regard to the question of functional localization in the 
cerebral cortex, but they apply with almost equal force to 
the workings of the sensory and motor nerve fibers. The 
latter may be considered first. 
a. The Nerve Fibers. The state of knowledge, in 
Lotze's day, concerning the physiology of the nervous system 
is vividly suggested by the fact that the nervo us trans-
mi ssion of electrical impulses was a new and as yet in-
completely verified hypothesis. After describing the nerve 
fibers themselves, in the Microcosmus, and indicating t hat 
in newly killed animals pressure, chemical agencies, and 
electrical currents applied at any point in the course of 
a nerve e~cite contraction in the muscle to which it runs, 
Lotze went on to suggest that "recent minute investigations" 
had made it "credible that an alteration in its electric 
state running quickly, though not instantaneously through 
the nerve" 52 was the process which effected the muscular 
contra ction in question. 
52. MIC, I, 106. 
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The decision in this matter Lotze said would have to 
be left to physiological inquiry, but he asserted that its 
outcome would make no difference to his view of man, which 
simply took for granted some change in physical condition 
advancing from point to point in the nerve and occasioning 
the effect noted. Lotze was, so far as can yet be judged, 
completely right in his contention. 
It is a curious and interesting coincidence--but no 
matter of vital philosophical import--that Lotze so accurate-
ly forecast findings which have since been arrived at con-
earning the nature of the nervous transmission. He said 
that the nequilibrium of the minutest elements of the nerve-
substance is so unstable as to be disturbed by many kinds of 
shocks, and easily to propagate its disturbances from point to 
point."53 The similarity of this to the membrane hypothesis 
of nervous conduction set forth by E. D. Adrian in 1932 is 
remarkable. Adrian's theory may be summarized in his own 
words: 
According to this hypothesis the resting nerve fibre 
is enclosed by a polarised membrane, and this breaks 
down locally under the action of the stimulus, 
establishing a potential difference between the active 
and inactive regions. The potential gradient ••• 
causes a differential movement of anions and cations 
at the boundary of the depolarised region, and this 
leads to a spread of the depolarisation and at the 
same time to a restoration of the surface already 
depolarixed. The restored surface is at first re-
fractory and therefore unable to break down again, and 
53. MIC, I, 105-106. 
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thus the area of breakdown shifts down the nerve fibre; 
the potential change in each section acts as the stimu-
lus to the next section and the surface is automatical-
ly restored to the polarised state after a brief period 
of activity. It follows tha t the potential change is 
an essential link in the transmission of the impulse: 
if it is found not to vary with the stimulus there can 
be no possible variation in the i mpulse: the duration 
of the period of surface breakdown must coincide with 
that of the potential change, and the surface break-
down is, in fact, the impulse, the disturbance which propaga~es itself down the nerve fibre.b4 
However, this coincidence of views as to the mechanism 
involved cannot be said--even as Lotze suggested--to have 
any important bearing upon the soundness of the conclusions 
which Lotze based upon the fact of nervous conduction. In 
any case, Adrian put forth his results only as an hypothesis 
supported by evidence, and it is generally agreed that the 
exact nature of the nervous impulse is still a matter o~ 
theory. 55 
On another matter involving individual nerve fibers 
Lotze was less confident of what the effects of future dis-
coveries might be. His best-reme mbered contribution to 
psychology--the theory of local signs--relates to the matter 
of space perception. This theory is not sufficiently closely 
relevant to the present investigation to justify its full 
exposition here, but some of its essentials may be set forth. 
The primary impulse resulti~ from external stimulus to 
every sensory nerve has a subsidiary impression or qualitative 
54. Adrian, MNA, 19-20. Of. Fulton~ PNS, 13. 
55. See, e.g., Vaug han, GP, 145. Of. Erlanger and Gasser, 
ESNA, 204-205. 
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mark--its local sign--which depends upon its place of origin. 
In whatever arrangement the impressions may reach the brain, 
the local signs enable the soul to assemble them in spatial 
relations. The analogy which Lotze suggests56 involves the 
moving of a library. hather than attempting to preserve the 
order and arrangement of the books in transmission, the 
mover would mark the books in order that they might be 
correctly reassembled at the appropriate time and place. 
Thus every sensory nerve fiber would be called upon 
to impart to its impulse a quality different from every 
other. A question was raised in Lotze's mind as to whether 
such complexity could be imputed to nervous impulses. He 
freely confessed that he had no anatomical knowled~e of a 
diversity in the single nerve fibers so manifold as his 
t . . d 57 b t h f d th t• assump 10n requ1re , u e oun e assump 10n necessary 
all the same. 
What have the intervening years of research revealed 
in this matter?--no adequate solution to Lotze's problem, 
despite many important advances . The required com~lexity 
in nervous structure has not yet been discovered, but the 
assumption is still found necessary. Thus the theory of 
local signs is still taken for granted but incompletely 
rationalized. 58 
56. MIC, I, 311. 
57. MET, II, 255. 
58. See, e.g., Vaughan, GP, 380- 381 . 
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b. Cerebral Localization. In yet another direction 
Lotze seems to have looked forward to results in nerve 
physiology which have not come to pass. The implication of 
his treatment of the seat of the soul in the brain is that 
he expected developments in the direction of discovery of 
functional localization in the cerebral cortex which not 
only have not appeared but which have been rendered almast 
certainly impossible by subsequent research. In order that 
the matter may be made clear it is necessary to examine 
Lotze's suggestions more closely. 
Lotze was, characteristically, willing to acknowledg e 
without hesitation the meagerness of contemporary physio-
logical knowledge of the brain. The structural complexity 
of the brain was r ecognized from anatomical studies, but the 
purpose of the various components remained a mystery. 59 
Even where some localization of psychical function was 
recognized the results were very general, and no one could 
specify exactly what physical function was associated with 
what psychical function. Indeed Lotz e was so concerned to 
emphasize this paucity of knowledge that he asserted that 
there was familiarity with the fact that mental activity 
depended upon many conditions Without any knowledge what-
ever of the nature of the service rendered by these con-
ditions. nNothing can help us over this sta te of ignorance," 
59 . See M T, II, 294. 
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said Lotze, "but the multiplication of exact observations. '•60 
There appears to be no reason to doubt that this over-
coming of ignoranoe meant one thing and one t~ing only to 
Lotze: the gradual disoovery by empirical means of a highly 
specific looalization of function which he assumed to exist 
without its having been confirmed. The questions of the 
location and proximity of that plurality of points which he 
regarded as the seat of the sou16l Lotze was willing to 
leave to experience, in the form of anatomical inquiry, to 
answer.62 Whether the points approached each other so as to 
present themselves to the imagination as a unit.y, or whether 
they remained scattered points, Lotze was not concerned to 
decide, but he took it for granted that they did have 
definite locations which would, sooner or later, prove 
discoverable. 
How has this expectation fared at the hands of that 
subsequent research towards which Lotze looked? In order 
to answer this question in a way which will illuminate the 
basic problems with which Lotze wa s dealing it will be 
necessary to consider and summarize the actual investi~ations 
which have takED place in this field. 
It is interesting to note that Lotze's expectations in 
this matter were by no means universally accepted by his 
contemporaries, indeed they were not widely shared. The 
6 0. MET , I I , 2 9 5 • 62. f IC, I, 300. 
61. See above, p . 153. 
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dynamic theory of intelligence as an indivisible function 
of the entire cerebrum, which had been set forth by Flourens 
in 1842, was vigorously reaffirmed by Goltz during the year 
of Lotze's death and was upheld by Loeb even after the turn 
63 
of the century. Functional localization as a theory held 
64 
on scientific grounds, can be traced back to about 1860 
but received its important development after Lotze wa s gone. 
Lotze can be said to have lived at the threshold of 
scientific work upon the problem. He wa s a first-cla ss 
critical thinker who carefully considered such data as were 
available to him from anatomical dissection and observation 
of the results of accidental brain injury, but modern neuro-
surgery cannot be said to have gotten its start until the 
decade in whi ch he died, 65 and nothing approaching con-
trolled experimenta tion on the problem was attempted in 
Lotze's day. Indeed Lashley has asserted of his own work, 
begun in October 1926, that it represents the first attempt 
to apply quantitativa methods "to both neurologica l and 
behavior data. n66 ~fuether or not this be true in the strict 
sense, a great deal of work went on in the intervening 
period which was clearly scientific in its conception and 
63. See Lashley, B I, 4-5. 
64. This was later than the first publication of the 
Miorocosmus. See Penfield et al, ECL, 34. Cf. Lashley, 
BM!, 6. 
65. See Penfield et al, ECL, 522. 
66. Lashley, BMI , x. 
198 
intent, as Lashley freely admitted~7 and the general trend 
of the work was in the direction of confirmation of the 
hypothesis of cerebral loc alization. 
Lashley's experiments came as a profound challenge to 
this whole conception. Whatever may be said by way of 
criticism of Lashley's conclusions, or even of his methods, 
his work was sufficiently epoch-making so that no subsequent 
worker has been able to leave it out of account. He re-
garded his work, as ha s already been suggested, as a new 
beginning. All previous work was regarded as insufficiently 
quantitative. It fell short of establishin that doctrine 
of a hierarchical organization within the central nervous 
system which had been so useful schematically. The whole 
problem was in confusion. 68 
The experiments involved an extensive program of train-
ing rats in a variety of problems with a view to studying 
the effects of the destruction of various parts of the 
cerebral cortex upon the retention of habits formed both 
before and after the lesions. The tendency of his findings 
was to emphasize the unitary character of every habit, the 
impossibility of stating any learning as "a concatenation of 
reflexes, and the participation of l arge masses of nervous 
tissue in the functions rather than the development of 
restricted conduction paths. n 69 He found that for some 
67. Lashley, BMI, 6-9. 69. Lashley, BMI, 14. 
68. Lashley, BMI, 10-11. 
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problems the magnitude of the injury was important, but the 
location was not . For other problems there was a general 
retardation arising from the injury plus a specific hindrance 
resulting from a sensory deficiency associated with the 
location of the lesion. For still other problems there was 
no effect at a11 . 70 The more complex the problem to be 
learned the more pronounced the retarding effect engendered 
by any given extent of lesion. 71 But the conclusion which 
Lashley himself regarded as most surprising was "the 
equivalence of function of all parts of the cerebral cortex 
for learning.tt 72 He then went on to give it as his opinion 
that increase of learning efficiency with increasing amounts 
of cortical material is not due to the aggregation of more 
and more diverse functions, but results from "an increase 
in the amount or intensity of some qualitatively unitary 
thing which contributes to the efficiency of a variety of 
functions." 73 
As this suggests , Lashley does not hesitate to draw 
pointed inferences from his results . The learning process 
and retention of habits are dependent upon no finely local-
ized structural ehanges within the cerebral cortex. Indeed, 
"integration cannot be expressed in terms of connections 
between specifi c neurons . " 74 T-he mechanisms of integration 
70 . Lashley, B I, 60. 73 . Lashley, BMI, 123. 
71. Lashley, BMI, 175. 74. Lashley, BMI, 176 . 
72. Lashley, BMI, 122. 
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are to be sought "in the dynamic relations among the parts 
of the nervous system rather than in details of structural 
differentiation." 75 
vlliatever qualifications· may need to be applied, it can-
not be doubted that Lashley's results tell heavily against 
a high degree o£ cerebral localization of function--in rats. 
It may, of course, be remarked that men are not rats. 
Lashley was aware of this, but he did not hesitate to give 
it as his opinion that in this respect they are not greatly 
different from rats, despite greater specialization of 
76 
cerebral areas. 
The study has not, of course, been confined to rats. 
Other animals have been experimented with, and research on 
man has been made possible by the development of brain 
surgery. Extensive studies of the results of human lobecto~ 
mies, as well as diseases affecting the brain, have been 
77 
made. The result is a very substantial body of knowledge 
which is, however, regarded as only a beginrling. 78 In sum-
mary of the situation it may be said that, despite hopes to 
the contrary on the part of many workers in the field, no 
irreplaceable specialization of function bas as yet been 
assigned to most fields of the brain and quite possibly 
75. Lashley, BMI, 176. 
76. Lashley, BMI, 123. 
77. E.g., by Halstead, as reported in BI. 
78. Cf. Sherrington, Art .(l949), 19, 72; Halstead, BI, 149; 
Adrian, MNA, 93-94. 
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none exists. 79 The area of vision is quite localized and 
seemingly irreplaceable. The motor cortex is so specialized 
in man that other areas of the brain "do not seem to take 
over its function even when injury occurs in utero,n 80 ex-
capt to a limited extent. Other areas as well seem to be 
irreplaceable, especially when the homologous parts of both 
hemispheres are taken together, but many functions of the 
brain can be carried out by areas other than those to which 
they normally are directed. 
an is like the lower mammals in the possession of a 
remarkable capacity for substitution of one area for the 
homologous field in the other hemisphere, or even for another 
area in the same hemisphere. This replaceability decreases 
with age in man, just as it decreases with progress upward 
in the evolutionary scale. 81 The frontal lobes in man are 
regarded as a largely silent (replaceable) area, and yet at 
the same time they are considered to be associated with man's 
most significant mental functions. 82 There is a great deal 
of uncertainty here. Consciousness has "thus far resisted 
our attempts at measurement." 83 Nevertheless it is fair to 
conclude84 that there is a distinguishable area of the brain 
79. 
80. 
81. 
82. 
83. 
84. 
~enfield et al, ECL, 34. 
~enfield et al, ECL, 36. 
~enfield et al, ECL, 206. 
Of. Campbell, HPE, 70-71; Halstead, BI, 149i Fenfield 
et al, ECL, 51, 206; Sherrington, Art.(l949J, 19. 
Halstead, BI, 91. 
According to ~enfield et al, ECL, 215. 
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which is essential to the existence of consciousness. Here 
is to be found the highest level of integration of the ner-
vous system and the source of the i mpulses which activate 
the motor cortex in an integrated manner. ~he normal 
functioning of this area may be taken as necessary to the 
understanding and voluntary activity which are marks of 
consciousness, without showing how neural activity can be 
transla ted into understanding, or reasoned decisions into 
motor activity. 1Vi th what areas of the brain is this 
region to be identified? 
The clinical evidence indicates that the level of 
final integration within the nervous system lies above 
the midbrain and within the diencephalon. This is the 
old brain found even in the elementary forms of animal 
species in some of which at least consciousness may 
well exist. viith new skills and new means of environ-
mental contact, the more posterior portions of the 
cerebral cortex seem to have been developed. .nth new 
capacity for reasoning, the more anterior portions of 
the cerebral cortex appeared in the highest mammalian 
types. The frontal lobes must have a function of 
importance i n the conscious analysis of sensory 
material.85 
How does all this bear upon Lotze's view? First of 
all, these physiological developments appear to render Lotze's 
conception of the seat of the soul completely untenable. 
His evident expectations concerning brain mechanisms have 
been disappointed. In the current dynamic conception of 
brain function there is no place for a plurality of fixed 
points serving as the loci of interaction between soul and 
85. Penfield et al, ECL, 215. 
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body. This development is, however, no serious blow to 
Lotze's general view for, as shown above, 86 the conception 
in question does not fit coherently into Lotze's total view, 
and should never have been taken up by him. 
On the other hand, while it would be too much to claim 
that these physiological developments lend active support to 
Lotze's views, they do them no hurt . Lotze denied that 
brain action produces thought . Sir Charles Sherrington, 
approaching his subject as a physiologist assuming such pro-
duction does take place, confesses that all our recent gains 
in knowledge about the brain "fail to give us a key to the 
mystery of how it creates--if it does create- -our thoughts 
87 
and feelings." Or again, "Row does the brain produce 
thoughts? hat is our central question and we have still no 
answer to it.n88 
c. Brain Waves. At one other point concerning the 
physiology of the brain it is necessary to g ive considera-
tion to the rel a tion between Lotze's views and subsequent 
developments. It is a point which turns entirely upon lack 
of investigation prior to Lotze's times in a field in which 
investigation is still so new that its significance can be 
appraised only hesitantly . 
Lotze attributed two clear-cut functions to the brain. 
2G4 
86. See pp . 159 -160 . 88. Sherrington, Art.(l949), 72. 
87. Sherr ington, Art.(l949) 19 . 
It is the organ for concentrating all external stimuli re-
ceived by the body and transmitting them to the soul. It is 
likewise the organ for translating the will into motor im-
pulses to be appropriately distributed to the body. 89 Does 
it have any function other than this provision for bringing 
about a "commerce of the soul with the external world" ? 90 
Does the internal activity of the mind require its co-
operation? vii th some hesitation and in acknowledgement of 
lack of relevant data to help in judging the matter, Lotze 
answered no. 
The view, which Lotze thus reflected, of the central 
mervous system as a static instrumentality springing mto 
activity only upon stimulation has now been abandoned. any 
lines of evidence have led to this development but the 
phenomena of brain waves alone are enough to show the neces-
sity of the change. The brain generates rhythmical electri-
cal waves, 92 whose patterns were discovered by Berger as 
93 
recently as 1934. v'hether or not a stimulus is being ap-
plied all parts of the brain show a continuous electrical 
activity. The mntral nervous system seems to consist of 
active neurons which are modified, rather than set in motion, 
by particular types of stimuli. 94 
89. ee vffiT, II, 292-293. 
90. MET, II, 293-294. 
91. et, II, 294. 
92. See Sherrington, Art.(l949), 19. 
93. organ, PP, 11. 
94. ee Vaughan, GP, 162. 
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The waves, which can be recorded by the electroencephalo-
graph, show a different characteristic pattern for every 
individual, in a state of mental relaxation. The pattern 
for a given individual varies under different conditions of 
mental activity. The ordinary waking pattern differs from 
tha t of sleep. Intense concentration disturbs the pattern. 
So, also, do the various sensory stimuli, but each in a way 
different from that of concentration. 95 
The full significance of these phenomena is by no means 
clear as yet, but the conclusion can hardly be escaped that 
Lotze was wrong when he suggested that the soul does not 
receive the co-operation of the brain in its internal 
activity. Is the error a serious one from the standpoint of 
Lotze's basic conceptions? It might be so regarded if Lotze 
had made a special point of the supposed lack of association 
between brain activity and thought, and had attempted to 
build something upon it. But he did not. Lotze's tentative 
manner of putting forward his conclusion half suggests that 
he suspected the future deve l opment of physiology might prove 
his guess wrong. He was concerned to encourage the develop-
ment of physiological knowledge, and there is no reason to 
suppose that he would have found these results disturbing. 
The new data f it in well--and, indeed, they further illu-
minate--his basic thesis of the interaction of soul and body. 
95. ee ~aughan, GP, 163. 
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On the other hand, brain waves are no more thought than 
electromagnetic waves or nervous impulses are the sensations 
of color. 
3. Depth Psychology 
Passing beyond the borders of strictl scie ntific con-
siderations wh ich bear upon the va lidity of Lotze's view, it 
is neces sary to consider some of the implications of psycho-
analysis and its related schools of psychotherapy. The views 
of t h e self wh ich they presuppGse appear to offer Lotze's view 
of the soul one of the sharpest challenges it has received 
since it was set forth. Is there ground for reconciliation? 
. 
Or must . one view be abandoned if the other prevails? 
This branch of contemporary psycholo y arose not from 
laboratory experiments, as did the various schools of 
academic psychology, but from medical ~ractice. Its primary 
purpose was an attempt to deal therapeutically with menta l 
illness, but its development was ba sed upon what may, in its 
various forms, be called a psychodynamic theory of person-
ality.96 It is this theory which brings the schods under 
consideration into the purview of the present inves tigation. 
They are sometimes collectively termed "depth psychology" 
because of their great concern with what lies in the un-
conscious depths of the individual's life. 97 The name is 
96. Alexander et al, PT, vi-vii. 
97. See vVoodworth, CSP, 126. Cf. Freud, NILP, 217. 
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appropria te here because it emphasises the point of present 
interest. 
The founder and great creative spirit of the movement 
was Freud. 98 This is true despite the fact that his work was 
antedated in the same general field by Charcot, with whom 
Freud studied, and even by Janet, a slightly younger con-
temporary of Freud's. The latter's more dramatic con-
ceptions quickly brought him to the fore and made him the 
dominant figure in the movement. To some extent he con-
tinues so even after having passed from the scene, although 
most of the other creative experimentalists in the field 
have in some degree modified his conceptions. It is not 
necessary here to trace the development of psychoanalysis or 
consider directly its dominant therapeutic interest. It 
will be sufficient to present the view of the personality 
which it i~lies and then endeavor to relate it to Lotze's 
view. Freud's view may be considered first and then 
modified. 
One of his basic assumptions was that all conduct is 
99 
motivated. This is very far from saying that all conduct 
consists of voluntary acts ba sed on conscious motivation. 
Fr eud was much more interested in the unconsciou s t han the 
. d d d . t . t t l OO H . b d consc1ous an regar e 1 as more 1mpor an • e as cr1 e 
98. Born in 1856, the year of the publication of vol. I 
of the Microcosmus. 
99. ioodworth, CSP, 143. 
100. See Freud, NILE, 82, 99, 110. 
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great importance to the libido, which he defined as the 
driving force or energy of the sexual instinct as represented 
in the mind. 101 The libido is mostly below the surface of 
the consciousness but it spouts up, so to speak, in the 
various sexual expressions (broadly understood) of the 
conscious life. Freud conceived of it in quantitative 
terms, somewhat on the model of the conservation of energy 
in physics. 
The reservoir for the libido is _the id, one of the 
three parts into which Freud analyzed the total personal-
ity.102 It is the amoral interior part of the psyche, con-
taining both the life instincts and the destructive death 
instincts, which has no direct contact with the environment. 
The ego is that part which is in contact with the external 
world and tries to mediate between it and the id and super-
ego.103 The superego or ego-ideal,104 which corresponds in 
a rough way to an automatic conscience, is built upon the 
basis of parental prohibitions and represents an internalized 
voice of parental authority. Like the id, the· superego is 
endowed with instinctive forces. The ego provides the meet-
ing point and battleground of these two, and also in some 
101. 
102. 
103. 
104. 
See Freud, NILP, 132-148. Cf. Barbu, Art.(l946), 39; 
Vaughan, GP, 63. 
See Freud, NILP, 102-105. Cf. Voodworth, CSP, 155; 
Barbu, Art.(l946), 43; Alexander, FP, 82. 
Freud, NILP, 105-109. 
Freud, NILP, 86-98. Cf. Woodworth, CSP, 155-157. 
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sense synthesizes them. Concerning the superego, Franz 
Alexander proposed a distinctinn between the unconscious 
superego and the conscious ego-ideal. The latter contains 
conduct-controlling values accepted in later life, while 
the former is acquired early, functions automatically, and 
is not easily changed. Although Alexander later became 
convinced that no such sharp distinction can be maintained, 
his suggestion is an illuminating extension of Freud's 
analysis. 105 
If the uestion be raised as to whether this Freudian 
picture be true, all that can be said immediately is that 
it would appear to be permanently beyond the reach of 
direct empirical verification. Fr eud would claim that the 
success of his therapy, because it is based upon his theoret-
ical concepts, constitutes a sufficient indirect verification 
of them. It should be remembered that Freud's diagrammatic 
presentation somewhat falsifies his view, by giving struc-
tural representation to the functional complexity of a 
dynamic conception. 
Freud's views have undergone change at the hands of many 
of those associated with him in the same general therapeutic 
practices or others stemming directly from them. Most of 
the dissenters have charged Freud with perverting and 
105. See Alexander, FP, 82-83. Of. van dar Hoop, CU, 56-58. 
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exaggerating the role of sexuality, and have modified the 
destructiveness and pessimism of his conception of the 
death instincts. The two most famous defections were those 
of Adler and Jung. Adler dropped the conception of the libido 
and substituted the self-assertive impulse for the sex 
impulse as the dominant force in life and the one most subject 
to frustration. 106 The unconscious plays a role with Adler 
so much less prominent than with Freud as to make it ques -
tionable whether his relatively coherent system should be 
called depth psychology at a11. 107 For him, the unconscious 
is that which the individual has repressed so as not to know 
about it or be responsible to it. The more responsible he 
is the broader his consciousness and the less his need of 
. 108 
an unconsc1ous . 
Jung reproached both Freud and Adler for over-emphasiz-
ing the pathological aspects of life and for interpreting 
man too exclusively in the light of his defects. 109 etain-
ing the libido, Jung even extended its meaning, but denied 
that it is distinctively sexual. It is a general urge 
somewhat akin to Schopenhauer's will to live. 110 The 
structure of the psyche, or 11 Self," consists of pairs of 
opposites which must be kept in proper balance for internal 
harmony: thinking and feeling, sensation and intuition, 
106. 
107. 
108. 
Woodworth , CSP, 163. 
Cf. Freud, NILP, 93-94. 
Barbu, Art .(l946), 49. 
109. 
110. 
Jung, MMSS, 134-135. 
voodworth , CSP , 170. 
extraversion and introversion, conscious and unconscious. 
Disturbance of this inner balance results in cornplexes. 111 
Jung distinguishes between the 'elf and the ego. The ego 
( a lso called the ''ego-complex") is the subject of conscious-
ness, for a psychic element is conscious just in so far as it 
is related to the ego. The Self, on the other hand, includes 
the ego, but also more. It is the subject of all psychic 
112 
elements, including unconscious psyche. 
The unconscious was divided, by Jung, into t wo general 
divisions: the personal unconscious and the collective 
unconscious. The former includes "the forgotten, the repres s ed, 
the subliminally :perceived, thought and feJt," 113 while the 
latter includes those unconsci ous ncontents which do not 
originate in :personal acquisitions but in the inherited 
113 
:possibility of :psychic functioning in general." These 
include inherited brain structure and "mythological associ-
ations--those motives and images which can spring anew in 
every age and clime, without historical tradition or migra-
t . "113 1on. Innate ideas are not involved in this racial 
unconscious but, rather, innate tendencies or lines of 
least resistance. 
Despite differences of views, most psychiatrists of 
the :psychoanalytic tradition agree that their therapy 
111. Cf. Woodworth, CSP, 177; Barbu, Art.(l946), 54. 
112. Jung, PT, 540. 
113. Jung, PT, 616. 
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depends on understanding the structure of their patient's 
personality in order to bring into his consciousness emotions 
and motivations of which he is not aware, and thus to open 
the way for the extension of his conscious control over his 
114 behavior. Neuroses betoken unresolved emotional constal-
lations, chiefly in the unconscious, which must be resolved 
before health can be restored. The importance and intimacy 
of the relations between the self and the body, especially 
the highest integrative canters of the nervous system, is 
recognized. However, psychoanalysis does not concern itself 
with anatomical and physiological matters. 1fuen mental 
disturbances arise from organic changes in the brain tissue, 
psychotherapy can only be of occasional and incidental help. 
But where the disturbance results from an injury to the self 
or ego, 115 i.e., a traumatic experience arising in inter-
personal relationships, psychotherapy of soma kind is the 
only source of help. 116 
Therapeutic progress is always associated with the 
recovery of memories from the unconscious. Until recent 
times the recovery of memories wa.s regarded as the causa of 
the progress, whereas it is now ra8arded as the result. 117 
The actual cause of the progress, according to the members 
114. Alexander et al, PT, vi. This describes Jung less 
adequately than the others mentioned here. 
115. Not used hera in a strictly Freudian sense. 
116. Alexander at al, PT , viii-ix. 
117. Sea lexander at al, PT, 20. 
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of the Chicago Institute for Psychoanalysis , is the success-
ful facing of life experiences after the same type of emo-
tional constellation which caused the original difficulty 
has to some extent been mastered in the transference situ-
ation of the psychoanalytic treatment . Thus the healing of 
mental illness is analogous to the healing of a bodily 
wound . The psychoanalyst trie s to provide the conditions 
under Which the normal integrative function of the ego can 
WOrk the Cure . ll8 It · ~ th t• t t d lS necessary or e pa 1en o un ergo 
new emotional experiences suited to undo the harmful effects 
of earlier ones . The old conflict is re-experienced with a 
new ending . The new reactions can gradually be integrated 
into the total personality . 
Three points of similarity or difference between Lotze ' s 
view of the soul and the psychoanalytic view of the person-
ality suggest themselves . 119 First, both are psychic views . 
They agree that the body and the mind influence each other 
in important respects, but neither regards the body as any 
part of the self . Psychoanalysis may be regarded, from the 
historical point of view, as a protest against the somatic 
tendency in psychology. 120 Lotze's emphasis upon this same 
121 point has already been brought out . 
118 . Alexander et al, PT, 18-20, 27, 71, 95 , 338 . 
119 . Vriting in a psychoanalytic journal; Ferenczi expressed 
the opinion that Lotze, because of his treatment of 
instinctst was a forerunner of Freud . See Ferenczi, 
Art.(l913J , 238 . 
120. ~odworth, CSP, 126 . 
121 . See above, pp. 165-166. 
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Again, there is superficial agreement between Lotze and 
the psychoanalysts concerning the importance of unity in the 
personality. Lotze regarded the unity of the consciousness 
as the conclusive evidence for the existence of the soul, 
indeed as the hallmark of that measure of independence which 
man possesses. he psychoanalytic emphasis upon integration 
points in the same direction, for it emphasizes the unity of 
the healthy personality. It is true that integration implies 
an acquired unity, while Lotze was speaking of a given unity; 
nevertheless, integration would not be possible without the 
"normal" integrative function of the ego upon which therapy 
is based. 
On a third point, there is a striking difference between 
Lotze and the psychoanalysts. ~fuat is the relation of the 
unconscious to the whole personality? For Freud, even the 
ego was partly conscious and partly unconsci ous, and the 
total personality was predominantly unconscious. All conduct 
was motivated, but the most significant motivation was un-
conscious. Insight into the nature of the unconscious 
alone could bring understanding of the personality. To try 
to understand it on the basis of the conscious alone would 
be like trying to put together a jigsaw puzzle with a vast 
majority of the parts missing. fuile others in the group 
have departed widely from Freud's conceptions, as has been 
indicated, they are all at one with him in emphasizing the 
importance of the unconscious part of the personality. 
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Lotze, on the other hand, regarded the soul as made up 
of conscious experience entirely. This manifested soul was 
its "true essence," and Lotze's final word as to its nature.l22 
This judgment must be adhered to despite the fact that Lotze 
occasionally used such expressions as "unconscious processes 
within us ."123 Nothing is to be found here which can be 
likened to the unconscious of the psychodynamic conception 
of personality put forward by the psychoanalysts. But the 
unconscious--whatever its relationship to the personality--
is now generally considered to be of great importance even 
by those who are disinclined to take very seriously the 
totality of the theoretical formulations of the psychoan-
alysts. Too much therapeutic evidence is available to permit 
dismissing it as unimportant. Inasmuch as this development 
has taken place entirely since Lotze's time it is necessary 
to raise the question of its bearing upon his view. 
vfuat did Lotze have to say about the unconscious? The 
concept was by no means unknown to him.l24 He recognized 
"a constant reciprocal action between the clear life of 
125 
consciousness and the dark background o:f the unconscious." 
It is a simple fact of our experience, Lotze suggested, that 
122. 
123. 
124. 
125. 
See above, ~P· 116-120 . 
MIC, I, 202. 
See Otto, HLU. 
MIC, I, 202. It is the judgment of the author that 
Lotze accepted this view as his own, although he does 
not unambiguously so indicate at the point here cited. 
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only a few of the numberless ideas arising from external im-
pressions are present with us at any given moment; yet that 
greater number which has disappeared from consciousness is 
not irretrievably lost to the soul, for they can be recalled 
to memory without reimpression. 126 As has been indicated 
127 
above, Lotze gave extended consideration to the manner in 
which ideas disappear from, and reappear in, the conscious 
life. He was puzzled concerning the best terminology for 
the ideas which had been forgotten . He warned that ''the 
names of forgotten or unconscious ideas denote something 
that is no longer in any sense an idea . " 128 The use of such 
"self-contradictory appellations" is understandable in every-
day speech but can only be tolerated in philosophical dis-
course nas reminders of the origin of the states to which 
they refer, not to be accepted as affirmations in regard to 
their present nature . n 129 Howev er, Lotze was apparently 
unable to find a more satisfactory term, and so approved 
this With the strictures noted. 
There was, then, for Lotz e an unconscious repository 
for states which had been psychic in origin, but which had 
passed from consciousness. vith every soul was associated 
such an unpictured, and probably unpioturable, inferential 
12 6 • I C , I , 19 6 • 
127. See pp . 162-163 . 
128. lv1IC, I, 202. Cf. MET, II, 224. 
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reality. 129 There is no suggestion of a social unconscious 
in Lotze. Each soul has its own individual unconscious. 
but the crucial issue, in making comparisons with psycho-
analytic views, centers around the question as to whether or 
not the unconscious is dynamic. Is there a process analogous 
to thinking in the unconscious? Is it also characterized 
by something like feeling and will so that it plays a role 
in motivation? 
Lotze gave no clear-cut answer to these questions. In 
fact, there is no evidence that he posed them for himself, 
although he did make some remarks which bear more or less 
directly upon them. Trains of ideas, he sug gested, " come 
back from forgetfulness with the aontrasts which distinguished 
them in consciousness in undiminished distinctness.n130 
Considered by itself, of course, this remark is not strictly 
true. The evidence for selective memory and for unconscious 
problem solving tells too heavily against it. However, in 
fairness to Lotze, it is necessary to mention the context of 
his statement. He was concerned at the moment to repudiate 
the suggestion that diverse ideas are blended into one by 
the soulrs unity. 
129. See MET, II, 217-219. 
1~0. MIC, I, 197. The famous passage already cited (~, II, 
317; see above, pp. 118-119), in which Lotze likened 
the soul to a melody with pauses, might also be regarded 
as indicating that Lotze did not recognize unconscious 
thinking. 
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On the other hand, Lotze does refer--without elabora-
tion--to r'unconsc ious processes within us, n 131 and regards 
the process of space perception as an "unconscious activity 
of our mind. n 132 However, his account 133 of the process 
by which ideas are recalled from the unconscious gives no 
clear indication as to whether or not an activity of the 
unconscious is involved in the process, or preparation for 
it. 
The only reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the 
meager data available is that Lotz e--however understandable 
it may be in consideration of the period at which he lived--
had an entirely inadequate conception of the unconscious. 
How serious is this fact for Lotze's view of the soul? 
Does it demand a radical revision? Must the unconscious 
be included within the soul? It will be evident from what 
has already been said134 that most, if not all, of the 
unconscious which Lotze recognized is to be included within 
his conception of the total sou1. 135 His unconscious was 
closely parallel to what Freud later called the "precon-
scious,n136 t hat is, those ideas which can be recalled to 
consciousness at will. But this unconscious is inadequate. 
131. IC, I, 202. See above, 
132. IC, I, 231 . 
133. See, e.g., MIC, I, 232. 
134. See above, pp . 216-218. 
135. See MET , II, 224. 
136. See Freud, NILP, 101. 
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What of tbe dynamic depths of the unconscious, which Lotze 
failed to recognize? 
It may be replied that Lotze could meet the problem of 
the unconscious in a way somewhat similar to that in which 
he met the problem of the body. The conscious experience 
of the soul alone is directly given. The body is inferred 
from experience. It is a peculiar possession of the soul 
with which the latter is intimately identified, but it is 
not a part of that soul. It is a part of the activity 
of God, uniquely identified by him with the soul in question. 
rvhy may not the unconscious be dealt with in a somewhat 
analogous manner? Like the body, it is inferred from the 
data of consciousness, though on much less conclusive 
grounds. Like the body, it is--if the collective uncon-
scious be rejected--the peculiar possession of a particular 
soul. May not it too be an action of God, uniquely provided 
by him? 
Clearly, to call that which is a part of God a "pos-
session" of the soul is not satisfactory, but it is difficult 
to find a suitable term. Lotze himself was puzzled by the 
problem, for he remarked that although he had never looked 
upon the body as more than the most intimate piece of the 
outer world, yet it is "given by a higher power to be more 
truly our own property than anything external can ever be 
22 
made by our own labour."13 7 And there can be no doubt that 
there is mora reason to regard the unconscious as part of 
the soul than there is for so regarding the body. It has 
already been noted that Lotze wavered in his definition of 
the sou1. 138 He sometimes seemed to regard it as all psychic 
but not all consciousness, although this was not his pre-
vailing opinion. Probably no term would better reflect Lotze's 
view of the relation of the body (and, by extension, the 
unconscious) to the soul than to say that they are trusts 
given the soul by God. 
If it be said that making the unconscious a part of 
God in the manner here suggested limits the freedom of the 
soul, it must be admitted that such is the case. But is 
this not precisely the effect of the unconscious as it is 
now understood? Certainly the growing understanding of the 
unconscious has required and will require modification of 
all views of the nature and workings of the soul, but it 
is not in any way incompatible with Lotze's basic conception. 
Before leaving the field of psychology it may be well 
to make a remark about soma other modern schools of psychology 
in relation to Lotze . Behav iorism, as a metaphysical theory 
which denies the existence of consciousness, is evidently 
completely incompatible With Lotz e's view. If the former 
137. MIC, I, 314. 
138. See above, pp . 116-120 . Of . pp . 256 - 257, below. 
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be true, there is no place whatever for the latter. Lotze 
tilted against the metaphysical forebears of behavioristic 
139 theory, although for purely methodological behaviorism 
he would have had only encouragement. On the other hand, 
Lotze would have welcomed both the hormic and the Gestalt 
psychologies . He would have been particularly sympathetic 
toward the protest which the latter school raised against 
the classical structural psychology which was just beginning 
to take form at about the end of Lotz e's career. Several of 
his remarks foreshadow the Gestalt point of view in a rather 
striking manner . 
In discussing the question as to how much the conscious-
ness can apprehend, Lotze suggests that "only for an uncon-
nected throng has consciousness no room; it is not too 
narrow for a complex total, whose parts we think as divided, 
arranged, and connected by relations.n 140 A few impressions 
linked by no bonds of mutual relationship are more difficult 
to apprehend than many which form one compound image. The 
simultaneous notes of a musical piece are not readily re-
membered by one for whom they are but an unconnected multitude. 
The more highly cultivated the mind becomes the more skillful 
it will be in detecting pattern among seemingly remote ideas 
and the more capacious will the ''consciousness become even 
139. See, e.g., MIC, I, 263 . 
140. MIC, I, 213. 
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for ideas bound to one another, not by forms of space and 
time, but by ties of inherent relationship. "141 Understanding 
is more than the grasping of a succession of impressions 
one-by-one. The soul is not a stage upon which a series 
of ideas pr esent themselves one after another without con-
nection; it involves, rather, comprehending, relating , and 
judging of the ideas Whethei they be simultaneous or sue-
. 142 
cess1ve. 
4. The Soul and the Self 
The time has come now to draw together and extend the 
remarks which have already been made concerning Lotze 's 
terminology in respect to the soul. The opinion that, 
despite ambiguity, it was Lotze 's dominant position that 
the soul is conscious experience has been set forth and 
143 defended. Consciousness was often used by him as a 
synonym for the soul. Likewise every one of the following 
terms was sometimes used by Lotz e as interchangeable with 
his dominant term: subject, self, mind, sgo, and personality. 
The first two of these terms were frequently, and quite 
casually, interchanged with the term soul by Lotze , without 
any suggestion of difference of meaning. 144 After equating 
141. MIC, I, 214. 
142. MIC , I, 223. 
143. See above, pp . 112-120 . 
144. See, e.g., 11ET, II, 170-171. 
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mind to the psychic life, 145 Lotze raised the question as to 
whether "the living mind" in which we should seek exclusively 
"the unity of our being, our true self"146 can be distin-
guished from the soul. His answer to the question was an 
emphatic negative. 147 The term ego was used less frequently 
than the other terms mentioned so far, but when it waa used 
it seemed to be in substitution for soul, without change of 
. 148 
mean1.ng. 
There is one passage in which Lotz e seems unmistakably 
to imply a distinction between soul and personality. 
As little as our will directly extends beyond the 
limits of our body and by its own efficiency produces 
changes in the distant outer world , so little does 
it in itself extend to more in our personality than 
the soul.l49 
This passage, however , stands alone and unconfirmed in its 
implication, save for one possible exception. In the 
Outlines of Practical Philosophy the body is referred to as 
"what is most peculiar to (one's) personality . nl50 t!on-
ceivably this passage might be interpreted as confirmation, 
but it is open to at least two interpretations . Is the body 
the most peculiar possession or the most peculiar part of 
the personality? The latter seems unlikely--to say the 
least--in the light of Lotze 's general emphasis. 
145. MIC, I, 532. 
146. MIC , I, 533 . 
147. See MIC , I, 533-536. 
148. See, e.g., MIC, I, 248 - 250. 
149. 1 IC , I, 2 86 . 
150. OPP , 68 . 
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On the other hand, there are passages which tell heavily 
against the implication of the passage cited above . 
Of course we do not hold our personality to be made up 
of body and soul, but wherever we may seek our true 
being (in the strict sense of the word) we are aware 
of finding it nowhere but in the soul ; and we have 
never looked on the body as more than the most intimate 
piece of the outer world, given by a higher power to 
be more truly our own property than anything external 
can ever be made by our own labour . l5l 
Lotze is no less ex:plici t in the Metaphysic, when he 
says that "we do not look for man's personality in body and 
soul alike, but in the soul alone , ie seek in the body only 
the echo or appearance of its action,"152 because the body 
must remain for the soul a part of the external world, 
albeit the part with which it st ands in most intimate 
mutual commerce. 
In the light of these emphatic and unambiguous state-
ments it seems clear that Lotze wa s speaking incautiously 
in the first pa ssage, and seeming to imply wha t he did not 
intend. Again, it may be concluded that personality is a 
synonym for soul . There is , however, a distinction here 
which is not required in the the cases of the other terms. 
Personality is for Lotze an ideal concept. It belongs 
unconditionally only to God, but "like all th at is goodn 
only partially to t hat wh i ch is imperfect. Therefore , "we 
have little ground for speaking of the personality of 
151. MIC, I, 314 . 152. MET, II, 191 . 
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finite beings. n 153 Thus, although Lotze sometimes uses 
soul and personality in a casual way as synonymous, it is 
clear that he does not do so at the most deeply reflective 
level of his thought . 
~oul was Lotze's characteristic term, as has been 
indicated. Is it the name best suited to his particular 
conception? Probably not . It was a traditional term 
which had never before been used in quite the sense he 
employed. Indeed, his meaning for it was a sufficiently 
radical departure from traditional usage so that it re-
quired extensive defense . The situation was rendered 
154 
even more complicated, as has been shown, by the fact 
that Lotze's defense was less than wholly consistent. 
But the term which was in line with the peculiar emphasis 
of Lotz e's view was the term self. Lotz e used it as a 
synonym for soul. It emphasizes more adequately th an 
the latter term the immediately-experienced nature of 
his conception. He would have done well to have adopted 
it as his characteristic term, and then explained its 
relation to the traditional term. 
153. MIC , II, 687. See below, pp. 235-2~6. 
154. See above, pp. 112-120. 
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5. Estimate and Criticism 
The projected consideration of Lotze's conception of 
the self in the light of subsequent developments in the rele-
vant sciences and in psychology is now complete. It has been 
found that the view was sufficiently empirical, in accomplish-
ment as well as in intention, that it has proved itself open 
to the future. In only one respect--and that non-essential--
has it proved impossible to reconcile Lotze's concept with 
the assured results of subsequent work. To be sure, in nu-
merous respects reconciliation involves developing the view 
somewhat beyond the state in which Lotze left it. This is to 
suggest a strength as well as a weakness. Lotze's view was 
as much a program of action for the discovery of the nature 
of the self as it was a coherent conception of that nature. 
A number of points at which Lotze left his conception 
ambiguous or obscure have already been indicated. These 
ambiguities and obscurities were important because they 
helped to disguise the importance and originality of the 
conception which has been under consideration here. An 
exhaustive and detailed study of the historical influence 
of the view lies beyond the scope of the present investiga-
tion. Likewise it is not possible here to attempt to take 
into account all subsequent developments in the field of 
philosophical thought and indicate their bearing upon 
Lotze's view. However, it is appropriate to essay some 
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general judgments, criticisms, and constructive suggestions 
which take subsequent developments into account. 
i. Lotze's Standpoint Accepted. 
The general standpoint which Lotze takes up in respect 
to the self, as it is interpreted in what has gone before, 
is accepted in this investigation as the most adequate 
approach available. fuen followed properly it is completely 
empirical in the sense of being committed to open-minded 
inquiry into all of the relevant facts. It recognizes the 
"ego-centric predicament" of man without regarding it as a 
predicament in the sense of being "an unpleasant, unfortunate, 
or trying ••• situation."155 It starts with what is 
immediately given in experience and endeavors to follow the 
implications of the given as far as possible, aiming to 
achieve an interpretation of the whole as coherent as the 
ability of the interpreter will permit. There is no need 
to claim on its behalf an exclusive corner on truth. Not 
all who take the same starting point will reach the same 
conclusions as Lotze. This expectation is implied in Lotze's 
recognition that human knowledge is not absolute. Experi-
ence poses riddles which are not readily solved. However, 
Lotze did not lapse into skepticism. Metaphysics can be 
built on the foundation of experience. Human knowledge, 
165. See Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary (1949}. 
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though not absolute, is sound. 156 
Thus it was no accident that Lotze gained a reputation 
as a mediator, or even as an eclectic, in philosophy; and 
the reputation was not merely the result of a temperamental 
bent on his part. His approach was inherently hospitable 
to sound interpretations of experience from whatever system 
they might come. No view was completely without signifi-
cance, even if it was largely invalidated by mistaken 
presuppositions. 
The most radical step which Lotze took with regard to 
the self was to deny that it is anything, or includes any-
thing, which is merely inferred from consciousness. It is 
not the supporting substratum of the soul. It is not an 
unchanging core of consciousness. It does not include the 
body. It does not include the brain. It does not include 
whatever permanent unconscious there may be. At the same 
time, the self is a unified concept without being synthetic. 
It is not any unity which is put together, it is a unity which 
is found, although critical consideration is necessary to 
the clear-out definition of what it is that is found. It 
has been freely admitted that some Lotzean words can be 
found to tell against several of these judgments, but the 
reasons for holding to them despite the ambiguity of the 
152 
evidence have been given. 
156. Of. Staffel, Art.(l918), 328-332. 
157. See Chap. IV, above, for documentation on all of 
these points. 
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Lotze's conception was, in effect, a new working defini-
tion of the self. Its content was to be understood through 
interpretation both of the accumulated past and of the 
future experience of mankind. Other definitions are possible, 
but to confine the self to the actual conscious experience 
seemed to Lotze to make all reality most doherently inter-
pretable. The self includes the full richness of all sides 
of man's experience: aesthetic, moral, and religious, as 
well as intellectual.. 
The striking nature of this Lotzean conception was not 
quickly appreciated. Among contemporary and subsequent 
commentators it was not widely accorded a. place of out-
standing importance, even among Lotze's conclusions. The 
most important reason for this was, as hc s been intimated, 
the hesitancy and ambiguity with which Lotze put it for-
ward. Another reason is to be found in the manner of Lotze's 
presentation of all his points. He did not characteristical-
ly lay claim to originality, nor did he seek for striking 
effects. He emphasized affinities with, rather than differ-
ences from, the work of others. Thus, although Lotze was 
held in the highest respect, he has never been regarded as 
a creative spitit of the first rank within the field of 
philosophy. 158 Windelband spoke of him as "by far the most 
159 important among the epigones of German philosophy.'' The 
158. ·See above, pp. 43-45. 
159. vVindelband, HP, 632. Of. 624. 
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importance and originality of Lotze ' s conception of the 
self, thus, was to some extent obscured by his own hand . 
ii . Questions concerning the Self . 
Although Lotze's general position has been given a 
qualified acceptance here, it is still necessary to raise a 
number of ouestions , make criticisms , and suggest modifi -
cations . These may be gathered under two general headings : 
those relating to the nature of the self , and those concerned 
with the relation of the self to God . 
160 The judgment has been set forth and defended that 
Lotze equated the manifested soul and the true self. The 
self was not a noumenal entity which in any way transcended 
experience . Thus it may be said that Lotz e held to a kind 
of psychic phenomenalism. The phenomenal and noumenal souls 
were one. But Lotze was sometimes wont to add, in effect: 
11 At least, so far as we can know the noumenal soul . " 
Lotze greatly needed to clarify his position at this point. 
If he is to be understood as he has here been interpreted, 
he should once-for- all have laid the ghost of the trans-
cendent subject of the self states . He used subject as a 
synonym for self, yet he was unable to shake himself free 
from the use of the term subject which conceives it as 
"that which 11 entertains its states without including them. 
160. See above, ~P · 117- 118. 
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Is the manifested soul that which is now manifest? Or 
is it more? To be sure, the experience of the self always 
transcends both time and space. nwe only take in any dis-
course if our memory retains the earlier words while we are 
hearing those which follow.rr 161 But what of that which was 
experienced yesterday, or last month, but is now forgotten? 
Is it a part of the true self? Evidently so, for "the whole 
self," SS\VS Lotze, "can never be brought together at one 
moment, our self-consciousness never presents to us a com-
plete and perfect picture of our Ego . n 162 Here Lotz e is 
making two distinctions at once, with neither one of which 
he has dealt as extensively and explicitly as he ought to 
have done. 
The first of these distinctions is that which he makes 
between the empiric ego and the true ego. 163 He deals with 
164 
this distinction in only one passage, and that one Which 
is difficult to interpret confidently. He does not say 
directly what the empiric ego is, although he indicates that 
it is something transient and incomplete. It is likened to 
the foliage of a tree, which depends upon its environmental 
circumstances and can pass away without endangering the 
tree. The empiric ego thus may, conjecturally, be identi-
fied as the present self, the transient self, or the datum 
161. MIC, I, 220. 
162. MIC, II, 686. 
163. See above, p. ll7n. 
164. MIC, I, 252 -254. 
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self. The ' true ego," on the other hand , collects the per-
manent characteristics and true content of the self. It 
may perhaps be most clearly identified with what is in 
common parlance called the character. It is not a directly 
experienced entity; neither does it seem to be the total 
self, but something which represents the true genius of 
the self. 165 
But even as Lotze is making this distinction he is 
involved in the other: the distinction between perfection 
and ineptitude, completeness and partiality, infinity and 
finiteness. Selfhood can be perfect only in the Infinite 
Being which when it surveys its own condition and actions 
rr never finds any content of that which it suffers or any 
law of its working, the meaning and origin of which are not 
166 
transparently plain to it." The self-consciousness of 
man never rises to this level. 
Both of these distinctions are significant. For pur -
poses of clarity they should have been discriminated by 
Lotze and each dealt with more explicitly and more ex-
tensively. ~articular attention should have been given to 
t he relation between the total and the datum selves. ~hat 
is the status of memories which are recallable but are not 
167 
now actually in experience? 
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165. Cf . Bertocci's conception of personality, below , pp . 234 - 235 . 
166. MIC, II, 686 . 
167. See below, up. 237, 256-257. 
It is evident that Lotze could have reduced the 
confusion with respect to these matters by introducing 
some clarifying distinctions in terminology and maintaining 
them throughout his discussion. Bertocci, for example, 
makes use of such a set of definitions while yet remaining , 
in a general way , wi thin the Lotz ean tradition. He em-
phasizes the conscious nature of the self by using the term 
11 psychological self, 11 defined as "a complex, unitary activity 
of sensing, remembering, imagining, perceiving , wanting, 
feeling, and thinking ."168 '..C he ego and the personality, 
however, are to be distinguished from the self, and from 
each other. Both are acquired, ratl1er than given. The ego 
is 11 an object of the knowing-fighting self, but itself is 
not a knower or fighter;" 169 it is "the self's evaluation 
of its activities in the life situation;"169 it is "that 
portion of the personality with which the self has identi-
170 fied its greatest value." The personality is "the 
particular adjustment the self has learned to make to the 
171 
c onoei ved world;'' it is not the product of an "ambiguous 
field of foroes, but represents what a given unique self has 
created out of the forces and opportunities open to it in 
172 its rap-port with the world ." Personality is, of course, 
168. Bertocci , Art. (1945), 91. 
169. Bertocoi, rt. ( 1945) , 93. 
170. Bertocci, Art.(l945), 96. 
171. Bertooci , Art. (1945), 94. 
172. Bertocci , Art.(l946), 475. 
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anchored in a self, but it also has the effect of modifying 
the self which has developed it. 173 
It is apparent that Lotze's "true ego" is closely 
parallel to Bertocci's 11 personality," but Lotz e makes almost 
no use of the concept. Certainly no more than an occasional 
hint of these or other similar distinctions is to be found 
in Lotze's work . It can be said without injustice that he 
was weak at the point of establishing firm definitions and 
adhering to them throughout his discussion. This deficiency 
is especially apparent in his treatment of the relation 
b t l . t d value •174 L t ' · · f · t 1 e ween persona 1 y an o ze s s1gn1 1can p ace 
in the history of value theory is indicated by r/indelband' s 
remark that "since Lotze raised the conception of value to a 
place of prominence, and set it at the summit of logic and 
metaphysics as well as of ethics, 11175 many suggestions have 
arisen pointing to "theory of valuesn as a new discipline 
within the field of philosophy. However, Lotze's appli-
cation of value considerations to the self is unsystematic. 
It has been indicated that Lotze excluded animal souls from 
the realm of value appreciation, although with some un-
certaihty.176 On the other hand, a value distinction is 
implied in Lotze 's treatment of the terms self and person-
ality. ~he perfection associated with the latter makes of 
173. Bertocci, Art .(l945), 95. 
174. Cf . Bertocci, Art .(l946), 456. 
175. Windelband, HP, 681. 
176. See above, p . 99 
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it an ideal norm toward which every self should strive. And 
yet Lotze sometimes uses the terms synonymously, and nowhere 
gives the matter the explicit treatment it deserves. 
Finally, it may be mentioned that Lotze's view of the 
unconscious--the general deficiencies of which have been 
mentioned177--is curiously intellectualized. It seems to 
consist of ideas only, whereas Lotze took a rounded and 
balanced view of the self. 
iii. The Self and God. 
Lotze's treatment of the problem of the-one-and-the-many 
raises numerous questions which he does not fully answer. 
It may be admitted that th e question as to how finite selves 
can be both dependent nactions" of God and yet free agents 
is unlikely to receive any answer which will universally 
and permanently be regarded as satisfactory. It is easy to 
expect too much of Lotze; nevertheless, he might have done 
more than he did in this direction. The phrase independence-
in-dependence was applied to Lotze's position. 178 In pre-
cisely what respects is the self dependent, and in what 
respects independent? Gratifying light could have emerged 
from the joint consideration of these two questions. Lotz e's 
tendency to keep them separated had the effect of leaving 
177. See above, pp . 216 - 221 . 
178, See above, p . 146. 
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to inference their correlation. 
Numerous simultaneous and interrelated perplexities 
are raised which must be dealt with seriatim. What is the 
179 
existential status of non-existent selves and the un-
conscious ideas of existent selves180? How are they har-
bored by God? How are God's will and finite wills inter-
related in their re-activation? Lotze 's position strongly 
invites these questions. Perhaps they are beyond any 
answer, but they should be posed, and the decision whether 
or not to speculate upon them defended. 
Vfuat is the status of nature? To this ouestion Lotze 
gives very extended consideration. However , as has already 
been shown, 181 he did not finally transcend ambiguity . A 
related difficulty shows up in connection with the problem 
of perception . uoes God place perceptions directly in the 
experience of the finite subject? Or is a tertium quid 
necessary as an object? Certainly for Lotze there can be 
no tertium quid independent of God, but are the objects of 
perception permanently maintained actions of God? Or is 
there no need to speak of an object at all? Is the per-
ception induced directly in the finite subject by a 
transient action of God? There can be little doubt that 
most Lotzean references to this matter appear to tell in 
179. See MET, II, 317 . 
189. See MIC, I, 202. 
181. See above, pp. 131-126. 
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favor of the former of these two alternatives. Lotze 
characteristically speaks in terms which imply the permanent 
objectivity of nature. However, there is at least one late 
and important passage which raises serious doubts about 
this. 
Could not the creative power ••• giv e rise directly 
in spirits to the phenomena which it was intended to 
present to them? ••• This power being in all spirits 
one and the same, why should there not in fact be a 
correspondence between the several activities which it 
exerts in those spirits of such a kind that while it 
would not be the same world-image that was presented 
to all spirits but different images to different 
spirits, the different presentations should yet fit 
into each other, so that all spirits should believe 
themselves planted at different positions of the 
same world and should be able to adjust themselves 
in ~t, i~~h to each, in the way of harmonious 
act1on? 
In this connection, which recalls the discussion of 
Lotze's shift from panpsychism to occasionalism, a further 
remark may be made . It probably would be fair to suggest 
that Lotze only toyed with panpsychism. He never suggested 
that matter develops anything approaching spiritual life, 
although he did suggest some kind of awareness. However, 
Lotze readily admitted that this awareness was an unem-
pirical supposition, and he seems never to have taken it 
very seriously. Some other theory having the same effect 
would do just as w~ll . This alternative he found in his 
own form of occasionalism and his atomic theory, which was 
182. MET I, 225 . The status of this passage is discussed 
eariier. See above, pp. 133-135. 
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consistent with it. Thomas puts the situation well when he 
th t L t . tl h. h" 183 It says a o ze qu1e y gave up 1s panpsyc 1sm. 
is difficult to believe that it ever had more than "as if" 
status for him. aterial particles act as if capable of 
entering into "sympathetic rapport." The reason they do 
so is that they are actions of God. 
Finally, what may be said of Lotze's doctrine of 
creation? He used the term freely to describe God's 
original relations both to the natural world and to man. 
Thus he used it in a t least two different senses, neither 
one of which can be identified with the traditional 
Christian idea of creation out of nothing. Here again--as 
in discussion of God's continuing relations to the natural 
world and to mun--Lotze fails to discuss his two conceptions 
in conjunction with each other, and thus leaves the situation 
more confused than necessary. He should have discussed 
what is meant by God's creation of the natural world, what 
is meant by God's creation of man, and how the two are re-
lated. Nature is a part of God; man has a measure of in-
dependence. 1fuat do we mean when we say of both that God 
created them? Once more the reader is left to make his 
own correlations. 
That God created finite selves not out of nothing but 
183. Thomas, LT , 203 . 
23 
t f h . lf h 1 d b . d. t d 184 ou o 1mse as a rea y een 1n 1ca e • On the face 
of the matter this might appear more like emanation than 
creation; nevertheless, Lotze rejects the former term 
emphatically. His reason for doing so becomes apparent 
only in his discussion of God's creation of nature. He 
regards emanation as something "non-voluntary." 185 Lotze 
expressed the expectation that no one would so misunderstand 
him as to suppose that he "wished to represent the world as 
an emanation of the divine intelligence and not as proceeding 
from His will."186 vThatever may be w.id of the historical 
and etymological grounds for using the term in this way, 
in the light of its use Lotze's reasons for rejecting it 
are plain. For him, "intelligence without will is as incon-
ceivable as will without insight ." 187 God is personal 
experience in the fullest sense of the term. To him creation 
alone is appropriate. 
Creation is difficult for men to understand because 
their experience is so different from Sod's. For a finite 
self the consequences of his will are not carried out by 
his own power, but by the power of God. Thus he can make 
no other contributions to the achievement of the results 
of his own volition than a steadfast and undistracted 
184. 
185. 
186. 
187. 
See above, p. 
MIC, II, 700. 
MIC, II, 706. 
MIC, II, 707. 
144. 
Of. OPR , 71-73. 
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volition itself . The result "belongs to us only because we 
will it, and do not by divided willing put hindrances in 
188 
the way . " fuat we call work is the sum of those inter-
medi a te operations set in action because our will cannot 
directly effect its i ntent. For God there is no such thing 
as work in this sense. nThe divine will does not work out 
its result, bu t is t hat result . "189 God stands i n an "un-
graduated and equally intimate relation to all parts of 
reality t hat eith er already exist or are coming into exist-
ence . "189 He is directly conscious of every consequence of 
his will, and it is inconceivable that any event proceeding 
from tha t will should be rrsuch an alien developme nt of 
189 
something external," as we recognize in the eventual 
results of our wills . 
EVidently these considerations do not apply with equal 
force to t .hose actions which are wholly within God and to 
those actions which are- - so to speak--outside of him. The 
differences should be elucidated. 
6 . Summary 
Lotzers view of the soul, being empirical in intent, 
built upon the results of the physics, physiology, and 
psychology of its day . Therefore , subsequent developments 
188. 
189 . 
MIC, II, 702 . 
MIC, II, 703 . Of. O.PR, 78-79 . 
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in these disciplines must be taken into account in apprais-
ing the view. Examination of these results shows that 
Lotze's work can stand the test remarkably well . Not only 
had Lotze built soundly and conservatively, but he had 
provided for the possibility of change without disruptive 
effects. It happens that, without his having been able to 
foresee it, modern results in some fields are more readily 
compatible with Lotze's position than the results current in 
his own day . It is not intended to suggest, however, that 
Lotze's vie~s as he left them are still adequate . Some 
points must be dropped, some additions and alterations must 
be made, but the acceptability of the general framework he 
proposed has been increased rather than diminished with the 
passage of time . 
In physics the modern developments in atomic theory 
are more readily compatible with Lotze's view of matter 
than were the theories of contemporary physicists . On 
the other hand, the implications of the quantum theory 
have required re-appraisal of his conception of mechanism 
in nature. Clarity has not yet been achieved at this 
point, but causality still appears to be a useful guiding 
principle, which is what it was, in practical terms, for 
Lotze . 
In physiology much change has taken place since Lotze 's 
time, but it has caused surprisingly little basic disturbance 
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of his view. Endocrinology, entirely unknown to him, has 
brought great developments in the understanding of bodily 
functioning, but it fits readily into Lotze's inadequate 
picture of subconscious bodily control . Lotze's defective 
understanding of the f1mctions of the brain, however, 
led him into errors . He seems to have expected the dis-
covery of a highly specialized and fixed localization of 
cerebral function which subsequent experimentation has in-
dicated does no exist. ~his development requires the 
abandonment of the Lotzean concept of the seat of the soul. 
The loss is not serious, however, for the concept can be 
shown, on other grounds, to be unnecessary to Lotze's 
system. The co-operation of the brain with the purely 
internal activity of the soul was another rna tter which 
Lotze failed to apprehend because of lack of physiological 
information. 
Lotze's view of the soul as c0nsisting of the conscious 
life has received a profound challenge from the psycho-
analytic emph&sis upon the unconscious as the most im-
portant part of the personality. In the light of subse-
quent findings, Lotze's view of the unconscious must be 
judged inaderuate . However, the Lotzean standpoint is not 
necessarily overthrown, for Lotze could have int erpreted 
the unconscious in terms similar to those in which he treated 
the body . 
Among the modern so ools of academic psychology, Lotze 
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would have found behaviorism utterly irreconcilable with 
his position, but would have welcomed the hormio, and 
especially the Gestalt, psychologies. 
Lotze used several terms as synonymous with soul. It 
may be suggested that one of these, the term self, would 
have been more satisfactory than soul as Lotze's dominant 
term, because it suggests his emphasis upon conscious ex-
perience more adequately than the traditional term. Soul 
has a long association with several meanings Which Lotze 
was concerned to deny. 
In accepting Lotze's view as supplying the most 
adequate available working definition of the self, no 
claim is made to a corner on truth. Lotze's standpoint 
is strategically located to see and accept truth in other 
positions . This, when added to the admitted ambiguity of 
Lotze's presentation, helps to explain why the radical 
nature of Lotze's conception of the self has not been 
more widely appreciated. 
There are numerous matters relevant to his view which 
Lotze left in an unsatisfactory state. The more important 
of these may be divided into questions concerning the concept 
itself and questions concerning the self's relation to God . 
Lotze should have laid the ghost of a transcendent noumenal 
soul more effectively than he did; he should have clarified 
the relation between the datum self and the total self; and 
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he should have correlated the self with his concept of 
value more systematically than he did. On the other hand, 
Lotze should have improved in clarity his treatment of the 
admittedly difficult problem of the-one-and-the-many. In 
what respects are selves dependent upon and independent of 
God? ,fuat is the existential status of unconscious ideas 
and non-existent selves? What ·, exactly, is the status of 
nature? How are the creation of man and nature, respective-
ly, to be conceived? Every one of these questions should, 
if possible, receive a more cogent answer than Lotze 
succeeded in giving. 
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSIOll 
The task set forth and outlined in the beginning has 
now been completed. Lotze's views in respect to the self 
have been expounded, criticized, and evaluated in the light 
of relevant scientific developments. The time has now come 
to summarize the findings and make a few concluding remarks. 
1. G a ne ral Summary 
The actual attack upon the problem of the self was pre-
aeded by a brief, general treatment of Lotze, his teaching, 
and his place in the history of philosophy. Trained in both 
medicine and philosophy at Leipzig, Lotze was called back to 
the University as a teacher after one year of medical 
practice. He was destined to spend the rest of his life in 
teaching, most of it at G6ttingen, where he taught with 
distinction for 37 years. He was highly successful at com-
bining the results of the new science with the traditions of 
philosophy, and his mediating position enabled him to make 
a great contribution to the development of empirical method 
in philosophy. He insisted that philosophy should be a 
coherent interpretation of all experience: aesthetic, 
moral, and religions, as well as sense data, must be taken 
into account. 
Lotze drew philosophical inspiration from many different 
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sources, but those predecessors who influenced him most pro-
foundly were Leibniz, Kant, Hegel, Herbart, and ~eisse. He 
regarded all reality as consisting of God and a plurality of 
finite souls created, maint ined, unified, and ~overned by 
him. Things were either actions of God or partly-independent 
beings similar to the lowest grade of Leibnizian monads--
Lotze never declared himself unambiguously on this matter--
but they were not part of the spiritual realm. 
Lotze was greatly respected by friend and opponent 
alike, and wielded widespread influence both on the Continent 
and in the English-speaking world. A few critics have re-
garded him as one of the great philosophers of all time and 
many as the greatest of his own generation. However, his 
influence has declined during the past eneration, for 
various reasons. 
l~Ioving to the central problem of the investigation, 
Lotze's views of the body, the soul, and the soul in relation 
to the body were expounded in order. Lotze did his work 
at a time when the scientific approach to nature had not yet 
won complete acknowledgment. He was a vigorous proponent of 
the application of the mechanical principle to every area 
of nature for, althou?h he did not re~ard it as philosophi-
cally ultimate, he did look upon it as the most fruitful 
working principle for study in the natural realm. His 
special contribution was in opposing the vital force theory 
in biology, and arguing with convincing force that the same 
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set of universal regulative principles operates in both the 
living and non-living realms of nature . He showed, in 
detail, how living organisms--including human bodies--il-
lustrate the working of universal laws and are so completely 
imbedded in nature that no sharp dividing line can be drawn 
between them. The constant interchan~e of material makes 
it impossible to fix clear-cut boundaries. 
More of Lotze's work dealt with the soul than with any 
other subject. It was a dominant interest with him, and his 
interest in the body derived largely from it, for he re-
garded the body as the soul's instrument of contact with 
nature. However , it is no simple task to discover exactly 
what Lotze considered the soul to be, for he committed him-
self to no brief definition, and his thought contained some 
ambiguities. Of these the most noteworthy centered in the 
question: Is the soul something which manifests itself in 
conscious life or is it the conscious life itself? 
In leading up to discussion of the soul's nature, Lotze 
considered the arguments for its existence. He found that 
there was only one of significance, but t his he regarded as 
unassailable: the argument from the unity of consciousness. 
Every combination of manifold phenomena, every comparison, 
even every sensation presupposes a unified and unifying 
nature, which is the soul. This nature Lotze called a 
substance in order to emphasize its unity, for he regarded 
the two ideas as linked in the popular imagination. However, 
248 
he rejected the scholastic conception of soul substance as 
an unchanging real entity underlying the conscious life with-
out entering into it. He used the term substance to refer 
to any entity having the power to experience and exert 
effects. The use was unfortunate for it tended to confuse 
rather than to clarify Lotze's exposition. The soul's true 
identifying characteristic, according to him, is its power 
to recognize itself, and this in turn is dependent upon its 
unity. 
In thus emphasizing the soul's unity, however, Lotze 
did not seek to explain away its variety of states. The 
soul's three faculties, cognition, feeling, and will, are 
irreducible. ~ach is equally inherent in the soul, yet the 
soul is not divided. It always acts as a whole through each 
of them. The soul is changeable, yet its variability is not 
unlimited. Every single sensation brings an alteration in 
its being, yet the regularity of bodily influences, sensations, 
and mental mechanisms places limits upon its mutability. 
The soul is unity in multiplicity: the empirically discover-
able solution of the age-long problem of change-and-identity. 
Is the true nature of the soul knowable? Despite his 
denial that the soul is unconscious substance or has an un-
changing core, Lotze never gives a completely unambiguous 
answer to this question. He said that the soul is active, 
but denied that it is activity. He affirmed that the soul 
is conscious, but hesitated to call it consciousness. The 
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charge has been made that, in the last analysis, he made the 
soul unknowable by separating phenomena and things-in-them-
selves as completely as Kant did. The charge cannot be 
certainly refuted, but the balance of evidence is heavily 
against it. A few Lotzean words suggest that the soul is 
unknowable, but the characteristic emphasis of his work 
points strongly in the opposite direction. The whole of 
his interest was centered in the manifested soul, but he 
could not altogether turn away from a primitive essence or 
predisposition conceived as making possible the development 
of the former. 
1/hen Lotze's teachings in the Metaphysic--and particu-
larly the passage which denies that the soul continues to 
exist when unconscious--are considered it is reasonable to 
conclude that Lotze should have sheared away the unknowable 
primitive essence with Occam's razor, and plainly affirmed 
that essence is identical with activity. During the latter 
part of his life his thought moved in this direction. 
The soul, f or Lotze, was a complex of t h inking, feeling, 
and willing unified in conscious experience. It not only 
was real, but it supplied the key to all reality. 
Lotze regarded interaction between the soul and the 
body as an inescapable fact indicating in advance that the 
mind-body problem is soluble. His 0~1 solution was imbedded 
in his system as a whole. Nominally he was a panpsychist, 
but he gave little attention to sub-human souls, paid less 
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and less attention to panpsychism as time went on. On the 
other hand, the significance of occasionalism in his system 
steadily increased until it may be said to have been his 
final solution to the problem. The reason he never acknow-
ledged that his own occasionalism was metaphysical was that 
he wanted to keep his own idealistic qualitative monism 
clearly distinguished from the metaphysical dualism of the 
traditional oocasionalism. 
Because Lotze regarded all nature, including the body, 
as consisting of actions of God, the mind-body interaction 
could for him be looked upon as an interaction between the 
soul and God. In this way the problem could be subsumed 
under the problem of the one-and-the-many. To his own 
solution of this problem Lotze gave the rather confusing 
name, monism. Actually, his solution was a derived quanti-
tative pluralism in which souls were created, correlated, 
and maintained by God--yet in possession of a measure of 
independence by the very fact of their existence-for-self. 
~ihen he considered the details of the interaction be-
tween soul and body, Lotze thought it necessary to assign 
a spatial seat to the non-spatial soul. On the basis of 
the anatomical and physiological data available to him, 
Lotze believed this to be a plurality of geometrical points 
in the brain. At each of these points the soul was believed 
to be fu l ly present--without difference of de gree but with 
difference of function. Inasmuch, however, as this view 
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can have no more than symbolic meaning on Lotze's own 
presup~ositions , it may be deemed ill-advised. 
Lotze denied that bodily processes are the efficient 
cause of consciousness, although he readily admitted that 
they affect it. Disease, injury, and fatigue in bodily 
organs have the power to impair and obstruct consciousness. 
The latter is stimulated into being by contact with the out-
side world although it is entirely a part of the soul. The 
body is a specialized instrument in this contact. The soul, 
in its turn, has a significant, though limited, influence on 
the form and functional effectiveness of the body. The term 
psycho-physical mechanism was applied by Lotze to a part of 
the inter-related life of body and soul. Body and soul 
develop together, and it is impossible to identify a time at 
which their association begins. The soul's destiny at the 
death of the body is dependent upon God's will for it in 
accordance with its place in his realm of values. 
Inasmuch as it was Lotze's intention to be empirical 
his view depended heavily upon the results of the physics, 
physiology, and psychology of his day. Accordingly, sub-
se _uent developments in these disciplines must be taken into 
account in appraising the view. Examination of Lotze's 
view in the light of these developments shows that he came 
off remarkably well, for he built soundly and provided for 
the possibility of change with a minimum of disruptive 
effect. It happens that in some respects--which Lotze could 
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hardly have foreseen--modern scientific results are more 
compatible with his position than those of his own day . It 
should not be suggested , however , that Lotze's views as he 
left them are still adequate . They are not. Some points 
must be dropped , others added, and alterations made, but the 
acceptability of the general framework he proposed has in-
creased rather than diminished with the pas sage of time. 
Clearly modern atomic theory is more compatible with 
Lotze's view of matter than was that of his O\v.n time . How-
ever, the implications of the quantum theory require a modi-
fication of Lotze's mechanical conception of nature . The 
status of causality is still in doubt, but it appears to be 
a useful guiding ~rinciple in the study of nature - -which was 
what it was for Lotze , although it was also more . In 
physiology there have been great advances since Lotze's day, 
but they have not wrouP:ht any crucial disturbances in his 
view. Endocrinology has been developed since his time, 
but the net effect of the ductless glands is to care for 
functions which he supposed were cared for by the nervous 
system. In view of subsequent studies of cerebral local-
ization Lotze's concept of the seat of the soul must be 
rejected. However, t he matter is not serious, because this 
judgment simply confirms its rejection on grounds already 
discoverable within Lotze's thought itself. Another error 
Lotze made, as revealed by the phenomena of brain waves, 
lies in the assumption that the internal activity of the 
soul does not require the co-operation of the brain. 
The psychoanalytic affirmation that the unconscious is 
the most important part of the personality has raised a pro-
found challenge to Lotze's view. Certainly Lotze's view of 
the unconscious was inadequate. However, it is possible 
to maintain Lotze's standpoint and explain the relation of 
the unconscious to the soul in somewhat the same way as the 
relation of the body to the soul is explained. Both the 
body and the unconscious can be viewed as uniquely identi-
fied with the soul without being part of it. 
As far as modern schools of academic psychology are 
concerned, behaviorism (when given metaphysical status) is 
irreconcilable with Lotze's view, while the hormic, and 
especially the Gestalt, psychologies are compatible with it. 
Lotze used various other terms as roughly synonymous with 
soul. Among these, the term self would have been the best for 
Lotze to have used as his standar~ term. It sugge s ts his 
characteristic emphasis upon the soul as conscious experi-
ence more adequately than the traditional term, soul, which 
carries with it several meanings Lotze was careful to 
reject. 
No claim to a corner on truth need be made on behalf 
of Lotze's view although it may be accepted as the most 
adequate available working definition of the self. It was 
open to the acceptance of the truth in other positions , 
which fact--in comb ina ti on with the ambiguity of Lotze's 
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presentation--helps to explain why Lotze's conception has 
not been regarded as more radical. 
There are a number of questions relating both to his 
view of the soul and to its relation to God which need more 
cogent answers than Lotze was able to give them. Is there, 
in the last analysis, a transcendent noumenal soul? If not, 
why is it necessary to retain the concept? Exactly what is 
the relation between the datum self and the total self? And 
between the self and values? On the other hand, in exactly 
what respects are selves dependent upon, and independent of, 
God? fuat is the existential status of unconscious ideas 
and non-existent selves? ~Vhat, precisely, is tbe status of 
nature? How are the creation of man and nature, respectively, 
to be conceived? 
2. Principal Conclusions 
The chief conclusions reached in the course of this 
investigation may be summarized briefly as follows: (1) Lotze 
contributed to the broadening of empirical method in philos-
ophy. (2) He was a leading defender of the mechanical con-
ception of nature although he did not regard mechanism as 
philosophically ultimate. (3) Lotze found in the soul's 
"unity in multiplicity" the solution of the problem of 
change-and-identity. (4) Despite ambiguity in his treat-
ment, Lotze may be affirmed to have found the nature of the 
soul knowable. He regarded it as a complex of thinking, 
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feeling, and striving unified in conscious experience. 
(5} Therefore , Lotz e should not have called the soul a 
substance. (6) Lotze's solution of the mind-body problem 
was an idealistic occasionalism. (7) Al though his system 
was a qualitative monism, his solution of the problem of 
the-one-and-the-many was a derived quantitative pluralism. 
His own use of the term "monism" was therefore confusing. 
(8} Although Lotze's view of the seat of the soul must be 
rejected, and other alterations made, his general conception 
has stood up well in the face of subsequent scientific 
developments. (9) The discoveries of the depth psychology 
have posed an important problem in readjustment for Lotze's 
view, but they have not overthrown it. (10) If Lotze had 
followed out the logic of his own position more consistently, 
he would have concentrated more attention upon the datum 
self, which is the only immediately-known reality. 
3. Concluding Remark 
In conclusion, the final remark made above may be 
emphasized. If Lotze had followed to its logical conclusion 
what is here interpreted as the central tendency of his 
thought concerning the self, he would have concentrated 
more attention upon the datum self than he did. It alone 
is completely empirical in the sense of being immediately 
experienced. The total self is a legitimate concept, as 
256 
long as its synthetic nature be recognized. It is a con-
cept inferred from experience. The character, likewise, 
is a legitimate, but inferred, concept. Only onael did 
Lotze make the direct suggestion that these synthetic 
concepts repres.ent the ntruen self (or ego). He would have 
done better to have avoided the suggestion altogether. 
In common speech it is often said, nHe was not himself 
last night, 11 or ni am not myself today,"--by which is meant 
that the person concerned is acting in an unusual way , or 
feeling different from the way he usually feels. The first 
remark represents an exterior judgment, and is therefore not 
in line with Lotz e's characteristic approach to the self . 
The second remark is simply not intended to be taken 
literally, for the speaker has had to recognize that he is 
himself before he can make the judgment. From Lotze 's 
point of view there is no truer self than the datum self. 
1. MIC, I, 252-253. 
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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this dissertation is to expound Hermann 
Lotze's (1817-1881) conception of the self, and to evaluate 
it in the light of subsequent scientific developments which 
are relevant to it. This particular line of criticism is 
important because of the heavy reliance Lotze placed upon 
the scientific results of his own day. Lotze's work in its 
entirety is considered and his relation to his philosophic 
forebears and descendants is dealt with in general terms, 
but detailed treatment is attempted only in the restricted 
area indicated. 
Lotze was trained in both medicine and philosophy at 
Leipzig and, save for one year of medical practice, spent 
his entire career in university teaching. Although his 
interests moved more and more in the direction of philosophy 
his background enabled him in unique degree to combine 
scientific results with philosophic traditions. Thus he 
was able to make an important contribution to impirical 
method in philosophy. He held that philosophy should be a 
coherent interpretation of aesthetic, moral, religious, 
and sense experience. 
Exposition of Lotze's ~iew 
Lotze was a vigorous exponent of the mechanical concep-
tion of nature, and played a leading role in helping the 
2E 
conception gain acceptance. He did not regard mechanism as 
philosophically ultimate but he did consider it the most 
fruitful principle for the study of nature. Specifically, 
he was a powerful opponent of the vital force theory in 
biology. He argued convincingly that the same set of uni~ 
versal regulative principles operates in both the living and 
non-living realms of nature. He held the human body to be 
embedded in nature so deeply that it is impossible to draw 
a sharp dividing line between the body and its environment. 
The body was, however, for Lotze the soul's specialized 
instrument of conta ct with nature: this was his chief reason 
for interest in it. The soul itself was his primary concern, 
yet it is not easy to say with assurance what Lotze meant 
by the soul. Because he never committed himself fully to 
a brief definition, his conception must be inferred from the 
whole of his thought. This process is complicated by several 
unresolved ambiguities, of which the chief one centers in 
the question: Is the soul something which manifests itself 
in the conscious life, or is it the conscious life itself? 
Lotze called the soul a substance, but he rejected the 
scholastic conception of soul substance as an unchanging 
real entity underlying the conscious life. Thus his use of 
the term was unfortunate, inasmuch as it tended to confuse 
rather than to clarify his meaning. The soul's true identi-
fying characteristic for him was its power to recognize 
itself. This in turn was dependent for its very possibility 
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upon the unity of the soul. All knowledge, every act of re-
lating, even perception would be impossible were it not for 
this unity. However, his emphasis upon its unity did not 
lead Lotze to deny mutability to the soul. Every single 
sensation brings about a change in the soul's being. This 
variability, however, is not unlimited, and the soul's unity 
always persists through it. In short, Lotze found the soul's 
"unity in mul tiplici ty'1 to be the empirically discoverable 
solution of the age-old problem of change-and-identity. 
Although Lotze denied that the soul is unconscious sub-
stance or has an unchanging core, he never spoke with com-
plete consistency on the question as to whether or not the 
ultimate nature of the soul is knowable. The charge that, 
in the last analysis, he made the soul unknowable by sepa-
rating phenomena and things-in-themselves as completely as 
did Kant cannot be certainly refuted, but the balance of 
evidence is against it. Some Lotzean words can be counted 
in its favor, but the most characteristic emphasis of his 
work pointed in the opposite direction. 
The soul, for Lotze, was a complex of thinking, feeling, 
and striving unified in conscious experience--a complex 
which not only is real, but which supplies the key to all 
reality. 
Lotze considered interaction between mind and body to 
be undeniable . However, as to the actual form of his solu-
tion of the problem raised by it, he never finally declared 
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his choice between panpsychism and idealistic occasionalism, 
although the movement of his thought was in the direction of 
the latter. The metaphysical dualism of the traditional 
occasionalism was probably what kept him from declaring him-
self more plainly. 
Lotze's system was an idealistic qualitative monism, 
but a derived quantitative pluralism. All of nature con-
sisted of actions of God, so that the mind-body problem 
could be subsumed under the problem of the one-and-the-many. 
In calling his solution for this problem "monism" Lotze was 
guilty of using misleading terminology, for finite spirits, 
though created, correlated, and maintained by God, were in 
possession of a measure of independence by the very fact of 
their existence-for-self. 
Evaluation of Lotze's View 
Lotze's View stands the test remarkably well when evalu-
ated in the light of subsequent developments in physics, 
physiology, and psychology. This is due in part to the 
soundness with which he built, and in part to developments 
he could not have foreseen. The view as he left it cannot 
be regarded as still adequate in detail--it requires both 
correction and addition--but the acceptability of the general 
framework he proposed has been increased rather than dimin-
ished with the passage of time. 
His conception of the atom accords better with twentieth 
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century physics than with that of the nineteenth, but his 
view of mechanism must be re-appraised in the light of the 
quantum theory. The striking development in endocrinology 
has not touched his view, for the ductless glands have 
simply taken over some of the functions he believed to be 
controlled subconsciously by the nervous system. Developing 
understanding of the nature of cerebral localization, on the 
other hand, has required the abandonment of his conception 
of the seat of the soul as a plurality of fixed points in 
the brain. This view, however, can be shown to have been 
inconsistent with Lotze's own view of space. He should have 
abandoned it himself. Because of lack of adequate data on 
the functioning of the brain he also failed to realize that 
it co-operates even in the purely internal activity of the 
soul. Lotze's view of the soul as consisting of conscious 
experience has been given a more profound challenge by the 
development of psychoanalysis than by any of the strictly 
scientific developments mentioned. Certainly his under-
standing of the unconscious was inadequate; however, it is 
possible to correlate his view of the soul with the new 
facts brought to light by psychoanalysis. 
Among the various terms whi ch Lotze used as synonymous 
with soul, self would have most adequately represented his 
emphasis upon immediate experience. The traditional term, 
soul, which he used ordinarily, was not good because it 
carried with it several meanings which he was concerned to 
deny. 
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Lotze's standpoint is strategically located to see and 
accept truth in other positions. Thus, it can be accepted 
as the most adequate working definition of the self without 
claiming for it a corner on truth. There are numerous 
relevant matters which Lotze himself left in an unsatis-
factory state. The most important of tfuese can be divided 
into questions concerning the concept itself and questions 
concerning the self's relation to God. Lotze should have 
laid the ghost of a transcendent noumenal soul more effective-
ly than he did; he should have clarified the relation be-
tween the datum self and the total self; and he should have 
correlated the self with his concept of value more system-
atically than he did. On the other hand, Lotze should have 
improved in clarity his treatment of the admittedly diffi-
ctitt problem of the one- and-the-many. In what respects are 
selves dependent upon and inde~endent of God? fuat is the 
existential status of unconscious ideas and non-existent 
selves? What , exactly, is the status of nature? How are 
the creation of man and nature, respectively, to be conceived? 
Every one of these questions should, if possible, receive a 
more cogent answer than Lotze succeeded in giving. 
Conclusions 
The chief conclusions reached are as follows: (1) Lotze 
contributed to the broadening of empirical method in philos-
ophy. (2) He was a leading defender of the mechanical con-
ception of nature although he did not regard mechanism as 
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philosophically ultimate. (3) Lotze found in the soul's 
"unity in multiplicity11 the solution of the problem of 
change-and-identity. (4) Despite ambiguity in his treatment, 
Lotze may be affirmed to have found the nature of the soul 
knowable--a complex of thinking, feeling, and striving uni-
fied in conscious experience. (5) Therefore, Lotze should 
not have called the soul a substance. (6) Lotze's solution 
of the mind-body problem was an idealistic occasionalism. 
(7) Although his system was a qualitative monism, his solu-
tion of the problem of the one-and-the-many was a derived 
quantitative pluralism. His own use of the term "monism" 
was therefore confusing. (8) Although Lotze's view of the 
seat of the soul must be rejected, and other alterations 
made, his general conception has stood up well in the face 
of subsequent scientific developments. (9) The discoveries 
of the depth psychology have posed an important problem in 
readjustment for Lotze's view, but they have not overthrown 
it. (10) If Lotze had followed out the logic of his own 
position more consistently, he would have concentrated more 
attention upon the datum self, which is the only immediately-
known reality. 
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